Re: OFT v Banks Judgment 25th November 2009 - 9.45am- Supreme Court - Test case
Compare and contrast the statements of the last Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) with the current Chief Exec of the OFT which replaced his role:
John Vickers, DGFT, May 2001, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0501.pdf:
John Fingleton, OFT Chief Executive, January 2009, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/spe...09/spe0109.pdf:
It's clear that the OFT is still there to staunchly act in the consumer's interest - the problem I have is that it will 'display a degree of pragmatism in recognising times when other policy interests may over-ride competition policy.'
Is this one of those situations?
Compare and contrast the statements of the last Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) with the current Chief Exec of the OFT which replaced his role:
John Vickers, DGFT, May 2001, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/spe0501.pdf:
The independence of the OFT is important for the same reason as the independence of the
Bank of England. Decisions are made on the merits manifestly without regard to political
considerations. (At least that should be manifest, though some comments reported in the
3
press, and the nature of some lobbying efforts, suggests that OFT independence is a truth
that is not yet quite universally appreciated).
If the right competition policy decisions were generally popular, the case for their
depoliticisation might be a little less strong. But any decision on a competition case is likely
to be unpopular in some quarters—and sometimes those quarters have well-resourced voices.
Competition policy is not the route to universal praise.
Independence from business interestsand interest groups generallyis no less important
than independence from political interests. And here too perceptions should match reality.
Bank of England. Decisions are made on the merits manifestly without regard to political
considerations. (At least that should be manifest, though some comments reported in the
3
press, and the nature of some lobbying efforts, suggests that OFT independence is a truth
that is not yet quite universally appreciated).
If the right competition policy decisions were generally popular, the case for their
depoliticisation might be a little less strong. But any decision on a competition case is likely
to be unpopular in some quarters—and sometimes those quarters have well-resourced voices.
Competition policy is not the route to universal praise.
Independence from business interestsand interest groups generallyis no less important
than independence from political interests. And here too perceptions should match reality.
The OFT – and other competition agencies – need to be able to respond
quickly to changing priorities, and display a degree of pragmatism in
recognising times when other policy interests may over-ride competition
policy. At the same time, our role as advocates of competition, within
government, with fair-dealing businesses and beyond has never been more
important; supporting governments in tackling powerful private vested
interests whose solutions would cost us dearly well into the future.
quickly to changing priorities, and display a degree of pragmatism in
recognising times when other policy interests may over-ride competition
policy. At the same time, our role as advocates of competition, within
government, with fair-dealing businesses and beyond has never been more
important; supporting governments in tackling powerful private vested
interests whose solutions would cost us dearly well into the future.
Is this one of those situations?
Comment