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Re: EU Cartel law
just want to point his out as it sounds so familiar it is do do with the prosecution of Austrian banks:
of any secret competition, e.g. through deviations
just want to point his out as it sounds so familiar it is do do with the prosecution of Austrian banks:
(6)
The Austrian banks opted, at least in part, for the second
alternative. Since, owing to the, in the banks’ view,
‘uncontrollable risk’, the possible scenario of a shakeout
was not only regarded by the banks as a suitable starting
point for business initiatives but also aroused ‘fear’ (8),
the banks strove to achieve ‘disciplined’ and ‘orderly’
competition brought about by agreement (9). Cartel
agreements proved to be a welcome means by which to
combat so-called ‘destructive, cut-throat competition’,
or free competition, as it might simply be termed (10).
Episodes of more or less unrestricted competition used,
however, to be described by the banks as ‘hyperactivity’.
Charges were seen in this context, not so much as a
factor of competition, but more as ‘a joint earnings
opportunity’, to the detriment of customers (11). In fact,
the Austrian banks’ endeavours to achieve improvements
in their margins by means of coordinated action,
i.e. jointly at the expense of the consumer instead of
individually at the expense of competitors, run like a
leitmotif through this investigation. One bank itself
admits that the cartel had the effect of preventing the
necessary shakeout (12).
alternative. Since, owing to the, in the banks’ view,
‘uncontrollable risk’, the possible scenario of a shakeout
was not only regarded by the banks as a suitable starting
point for business initiatives but also aroused ‘fear’ (8),
the banks strove to achieve ‘disciplined’ and ‘orderly’
competition brought about by agreement (9). Cartel
agreements proved to be a welcome means by which to
combat so-called ‘destructive, cut-throat competition’,
or free competition, as it might simply be termed (10).
Episodes of more or less unrestricted competition used,
however, to be described by the banks as ‘hyperactivity’.
Charges were seen in this context, not so much as a
factor of competition, but more as ‘a joint earnings
opportunity’, to the detriment of customers (11). In fact,
the Austrian banks’ endeavours to achieve improvements
in their margins by means of coordinated action,
i.e. jointly at the expense of the consumer instead of
individually at the expense of competitors, run like a
leitmotif through this investigation. One bank itself
admits that the cartel had the effect of preventing the
necessary shakeout (12).
(7)
Because of the extensive standardisation of products, the
publication (‘posting at the counter’) of interest rates, and
regular price comparisons by the media and consumer
bodies, the Austrian banking market is on the whole
highly transparent. In order to increase this transparency
still further, to be better able to monitor compliance
with the cartel agreements and to minimise the effectiveness
publication (‘posting at the counter’) of interest rates, and
regular price comparisons by the media and consumer
bodies, the Austrian banking market is on the whole
highly transparent. In order to increase this transparency
still further, to be better able to monitor compliance
with the cartel agreements and to minimise the effectiveness
of any secret competition, e.g. through deviations
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