EU Cartel law

[strangewayofsavin]

April 2011
The European Commission today fined Procter & Gamble and Unilever a total of € 315.2 million for operating a cartel together with Henkel in the market for household laundry powder detergents in eight European Union countries. The fine on the two companies includes a 10% reduction for acknowledging the facts and enabling a swift conclusion of the investigation. Henkel got immunity for revealing the cartel to the Commission. The three companies are the leading producers of washing powder in Europe. The cartel lasted some three years and aimed at stabilising market positions and at coordinating prices in violation of EU and EEA antitrust rules (Article 101 of the EU treaty and Art. 53 of the EEA agreement). This is the third cartel settlement in a year.
As I stated almost 12 months ago, watch out U.K banks, I will find a way

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

The European Commission has fined 17 producers of prestressing steel a total of € 269 870 750 for operating a cartel that lasted 18 years until 2002 and covered all but three of the then European Union Member States. The Commission decision concludes that the producers violated the European Union's ban on cartels and restrictive business practices. Prestressing steel comprises long, curled steel wires used with concrete in construction sites to make foundations, balconies or bridges. getting closer
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The European Commission has fined 17 bathroom equipment manufacturers a total of € 622 250 783 for a price fixing cartel covering six EU countries. A large number of household names are among the 17 undertakings fined: Artweger, Cisal, Dornbracht, Duravit, Duscholux, Grohe, Hansa, Ideal Standard, Kludi, Mamoli, Masco, Roca, RAF, Sanitec, Teorema, Villeroy & Boch and Zucchetti. The 12 year cartel covered ceramics such as sinks, baths, taps, and fittings. Masco received full immunity from fines under the Commission’s Leniency Programme, as it was the first to provide information about the cartel. The fines of five undertakings were reduced because of their likely inability to pay the fine given their financial situation.
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What is a cartel?
It is an illegal secret agreement concluded between competitors to fix prices, restrict supply and/or divide up markets. The agreement may take a wide variety of forms but often relates to sales prices or increases in such prices, restrictions on sales or production capacities, sharing out of product or geographic markets or customers, and collusion on the other commercial conditions for the sale of products or services.
Why are cartels harmful to consumers, businesses and to the economy in general?
Cartels shield participants from competition allowing them to charge higher prices and removing the pressure on them to improve the products they sell or find more efficient ways in which to produce them. It is the customers (companies and consumers) who foot the bill in terms of paying higher prices for lower quality and narrower choice. This not only makes consumers and businesses suffer but also adversely affects the competitiveness of the economy as a whole.
What legal basis underpins the Commission’s action to combat cartels?
Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community prohibits agreements and concerted practices between firms that distort competition within the Single Market. Fines of up to 10% of their worldwide turnover may be imposed on the guilty parties.
What happens to the proceeds from fines?
The amount of the fines is paid into the Community budget. The fines therefore help to finance the European Union and reduce the tax burden on individuals.
Does the Commission have the last word?
All cartel decisions by the Commission may be appealed against before the Court of First Instance (CFI) and then before the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. They can, therefore, be closely scrutinised by these two courts, which are empowered to annul decisions in whole or in part and to reduce or increase fines, where this is deemed appropriate.
What is the European Commission’s leniency programme?
It encourages firms to provide the Commission with insider information on cartels. The first firm to do so is granted total immunity from fines. Other firms that follow suit may be granted a reduction in the amount of the fine. This policy is very effective in uncovering cartels but does not prevent the Commission from conducting investigations on its own initiative. For further information, see IP/06/1705, MEMO/06/469and MEMO/06/470. Companies wishing to approach the Commission in order to benefit from the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases should consult

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

Antitrust: Commission fines marine hose producers € 131 million for market sharing and price-fixing cartel

The European Commission has imposed a total of € 131 510 000 fines on five groups – Bridgestone, Dunlop Oil & Marine/Continental, Trelleborg, Parker ITR and Manuli – for participating in a cartel for marine hoses between 1986 and 2007 in violation of the ban on cartels and restrictive business practices in the EC Treaty (Article 81) and the EEA Agreement (Article 53). Yokohama also participated in the cartel but was not fined because it revealed the existence of the cartel to the Commission. Marine hoses are used to transport crude oil to and from ships for transportation from production sites. The cartel members fixed prices for marine hoses, allocated bids and markets and exchanged commercially sensitive information. The fines for Bridgestone and Parker ITR were increased by 30% because of their leadership of the cartel. Manuli was granted a 30% reduction of its fine for its cooperation with the investigation under the Commission's leniency programme.
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The European Commission has imposed fines, totalling €1 383 896 000 on Asahi, Pilkington, Saint-Gobain and Soliver for illegal market sharing, and exchange of commercially sensitive information regarding deliveries of car glass in the EEA, in violation of the EC Treaty’s and the EEA Agreement’s ban on cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement). Asahi, Pilkington and Saint-Gobain are the three major players in Europe. Between early 1998 and early 2003 these companies discussed target prices, market sharing and customer allocation in a series of meetings and other illicit contacts. The Belgian company Soliver also took part in some of these discussions. These four companies controlled about 90% of the glass used in the EEA in new cars and for original branded replacement glass for cars at that time, a market worth about €2 billion in the last full year of the infringement. The Commission started the cartel investigation on its own initiative following a tip-off from an anonymous source. The Commission increased the fines on St Gobain by 60% because it was a repeat offender. Asahi provided additional information to help expose the infringement and its fine was reduced by 50% under the Leniency Notice. These are the highest cartel fines Commission has ever imposed, both for an individual company (€896 000 000 on Saint Gobain) and for a cartel as a whole.
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The European Commission has imposed a total of € 676 011 400 fines on 9 groups - ENI, ExxonMobil, Hansen & Rosenthal, Tudapetrol, MOL, Repsol, Sasol, , RWE and Total - for participating in a cartel for paraffin wax in the European Economic Area (EEA) in violation of the EC Treaty’s ban on cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 81) between 1992 and 2005. Shell also participated in the cartel but was not fined because it revealed the existence of the cartel to the Commission. The infringement committed by ExxonMobil, Sasol, Shell, RWE and Total also related to slack wax sold to end-customers on the German market. Slack wax is the raw material used to produce paraffin wax. All participants fixed prices for the products concerned. ExxonMobil, MOL, Repsol, Sasol, Shell and Total in addition allocated markets and customers for paraffin waxes. The fine for Sasol was increased by 50% because it was the leader of the cartel. The fine for ENI was increased by 60% as it had been previously taking part in similar cartels.
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The European Commission has imposed fines of €4 970 000 on aluminium fluoride producers for colluding to fix prices in violation of the ban on cartels and restrictive business practices in the EC Treaty (Article 81) and the EEA Agreement (Article 53). Aluminium fluoride is a chemical used to lower the smelting temperature of aluminium. It thereby reduces energy consumption in the smelting process. Fines were imposed on Fluorsid S.p.A. (Italy), Minmet Financing Company S.A. (Switzerland), Société des Industries Chimique du Fluor (Tunisia), Industrial Quimica de Mexico S.A. de C.V. and Q.B. Industrias S.A.B. de C.V. (both Mexico). During the second half of 2000, the companies agreed worldwide target prices and divided markets. The company Boliden Odda (Norway) received full immunity from fines under the Commission’s 2002 Leniency Programme (see IP/02/247 and MEMO/02/23), as they were first to provide information about the cartel.
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The European Commission has fined four Italian tobacco processors a total of €56 million for colluding over a period of more than six years on the prices paid to growers and other intermediaries and on the allocation of suppliers. Such collusion is outlawed by the EC Treaty’s ban on restrictive business practices (Article 81). The processors concerned are Deltafina, Dimon (which has now changed its name to Mindo), Transcatab and Romana Tabacchi. The Commission has also imposed small fines on APTI and UNITAB (respectively the Italian trade associations of processors and tobacco growers) for engaging in collective price negotiations.
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trust me we are getting there:
Commission fines five German banks for fixing the price for the exchange of euro-zone currencies



The European Commission today decided to fine five German banks a total of € 100,8 million for fixing the charges for the exchange of euro-zone currencies. In a clear violation of European antitrust rules, the banks in 1997 colluded to charge no less than 3 % for the exchange of euro-zone banknotes to compensate for the abolition of the buying and selling 'spread' at the dawn of 1999 when the euro was launched. "This behaviour was illegal, caused direct and irreparable damage to consumers and also gave a blow to citizen's confidence in the European single currency," Competition Commissioner Mario Monti said. "I am disappointed that the five banks did not reduce their charges to make good vis a vis consumers as was done by other banks in Germany and in other Member States".

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

German Banks case – CFI rules on standard of proof in cartel cases

On 27 September 2006 the European court of first instance (CFI) issued its judgment in the German banks cartel appeal. This was the second time the CFI handed down judgment in this case; the first was a judgment by default as the Commission failed to submit its defence within the required time period. The CFI confirmed its initial conclusion that the Commission had failed to prove to the required standard that the banks had entered into an anti-competitive agreement in breach of Article 81(1) EC Treaty, and the Commission's decision was annulled. The case will be of particular interest for trade associations; parallel conduct following meetings between competitors will not, of itself, be sufficient evidence to support an infringement finding.


Background
On 11 December 2001 the Commission imposed fines of just over €100 million on five German banks which it claimed had fixed the charges for the exchange of euro-zone banknotes at 3% during the transitional period prior to full switch over to the euro. The agreement was said to have been reached at a meeting held in October 1997. In support of its decision, the Commission relied on two sets of minutes of the meeting, as well as various witness statements and the banks' parallel behaviour during the transitional period. The banks, however, maintained there had never been an agreement between them and challenged the Commission's decision before the CFI. They challenged the accuracy of the findings of fact upon which the Commission's decision was based and denied that the discussions in respect of charging structures and levels amounted to an "agreement" falling within the scope of Article 81(1) EC Treaty. The banks argued that the meeting was used simply to share experiences of the legislation in the final stage of transition to the euro and to discuss in general any issues that had arisen under the new legislation.
The CFI ruling
The CFI noted that the concept of an agreement within the meaning of Article 81 EC Treaty centres around the existence of a concurrence of wills between the parties, irrespective of the form in which it is manifested. Although the Commission did show that the banks had referred to approximate levels of commission during the meeting in 1997, it had failed to show, to the requisite legal standard, the existence of a concurrence of wills between the parties.
The court confirmed that the presumption of innocence, resulting in particular from Article 6(2) of the European Human Rights Convention, is one of the fundamental rights protected in the Community legal order. Due to the nature of penalties for breach of competition rules, this right is particularly relevant in the context of competition law.
In order to establish the existence of an infringement of the competition rules the Commission therefore needs to base its decision on accurate and reliable evidence which is not undermined by other plausible interpretations. Although the court goes on to confirm that it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement, the evidence relied on as a whole must satisfy these criteria.
Having assessed the Commission's evidence, the court concludes that, although it is possible that the meeting was intended to fix the level of commission, the documents relied on by the Commission did not conclusively prove this was indeed the case. This is particularly so taking into account the specific circumstances during this transitional period for the introduction of the euro, and the court accepted that the banks' explanation for the meeting, to share experiences in relation to the introduction of the new legislation, was entirely plausible. The banks therefore succeeded in challenging the Commission's finding that they had entered into a price fixing agreement and the Commission's decision was annulled.
Comment
Some of the dicta of the court make the standard of proof the Commission must satisfy in competition infringement cases appear similar to that required in criminal cases. This may represent a high burden on the Commission, particularly in cartel cases, where the 'meeting of wills' necessary for there to be an agreement will be much harder to prove, given that much of the evidence is often hidden or destroyed. The Commission may use evidence that is fragmentary and sparse and can reconstitute certain details by deduction, but it can only do so provided that the evidence taken together does, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules.
This will be welcome news for trade associations and similar organisations, as the ruling confirms that parallel behaviour following from meetings between competitors can not in itself justify a cartel infringement. As long as companies can show that the Commission's assertions are unsafe or insufficiently proven because there are alternative and plausible explanations for their behaviour, the Commission will not have proved a cartel infringement to the required standard.
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[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

The past year has been an active period for German competition law, with the Federal Cartel Office (BKartA) establishing a dedicated cartel prosecution unit and drafting revised merger guidelines, and the Supreme Court handing down a precedent-setting judgement allowing the passing-on defence in competition damage claims. Sources note that the BKartA has been increasingly active – initiating numerous dawn raids at more than 100 companies since the beginning of 2010 – and the 47 lawyers we list in this section expect to see the strong demand for their services continue in the months to come.


Our international competition law firm of the year Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP leads the field in Germany in this discipline, with nine lawyers ranking highly. Düsseldorf’s Martin Klusmann is the global co-head of the firm’s antitrust, competition and trade team and has represented clients in the chemical, banking, food and commodities sectors in major mergers and domestic and international cartel cases, including acting in investigations and disputes both in court and arbitration tribunals. Managing partner of the Düsseldorf office Tobias Klose has recently represented Infineon and Aurubis in merger control proceedings and Bayer and ThyssenKrupp in cartel investigations, and is also highlighted by peers as a “great name” for disputes before the European Commission (EC), BKartA and national and European courts. Berlin-based Helmut Bergmann counts Barclays Bank, Hoffman-La Roche and Mars among his recent clients and is “highly recommended” for his work in merger, cartel and dominance cases. EU, state aid and administrative law expert Thomas Lübbig regularly represents clients from a range of industries, including pharmaceuticals, media, utilities and transport, before the European Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Peter Niggemann has acted for Airberlin, Goldman Sachs and Assa Abloy in recent acquisition matters and is described as “outstanding” for his work in cartel damages claims. Joachim Pfeffer heads the firm’s automotive group and is a “go-to-guy” for merger control proceedings, joint ventures, cartel work and distribution arrangements in that sector as well as acting for clients as diverse as Pfeifer & Langen and Primagas. Burkhart Richter has advised major multinationals in merger proceedings, including Microsoft, Bombardier and Continental, and frequently represents companies in proceedings before national competition authorities and the EC. Cologne-based Andreas Röhling is noted for his energy and European trade law expertise and specialises in co-operation and supply agreements as well as merger and abusive practices controls in the deregulated energy markets. Completing the firm’s impressive showing is Düsseldorf-based Gerhard Wiedemann, whose EC and German merger control, abusive practices and vertical agreements work is held in “high esteem” by sources.
Gleiss Lutz fields seven lawyers in this section, including competition practice head and “leading light” Ingo Brinker. A specialist in antitrust litigation before the BKartA and EC courts as well as the ECJ and the German competition courts, Brinker is also noted for his “nationally prominent” merger control and compliance expertise. The “exceptional” Petra Linsmeier heads the firm’s energy and natural resources group and focuses her practice on regulatory proceedings on behalf of gas and electricity clients as well as merger control matters at BKartA and EC level. Rainer Bechtold is “internationally recognised and trusted” for his work in merger control proceedings and was a member of the Gleiss Lutz team that advised the State of Baden-Württemberg in its purchase of EDF’s stake in EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG. Wolfgang Bosch’s practice combines strong corporate transactional and compliance work with “first rate” advocacy for clients in infringement proceedings. Ulrich Denzel is a “well-known” specialist in defending companies accused of anti-competitive behaviour and cartel activities, as well as representing clients in damages claims and advising on compliance and merger control. Matthias Karl divides his time between the Düsseldorf and Brussels offices and is “known throughout Europe” for his compliance, distribution and merger control work. Christian Steinle also spends time in the Brussels office alongside providing “superb” private antitrust litigation, cartel and compliance advice in Stuttgart.
Five lawyers from Hengeler Mueller rank highly in this discipline. Düsseldorf-based Thorsten Mäger’s practice combines competition law knowledge with “excellent” energy sector expertise and he is a “star” according to respondents to our survey. Prior to joining the firm, Frankfurt’s Horst Satzky worked both at the BKartA and the Federal Economics Ministry, and boasts “extensive experience” in domestic and European competition regulation and compliance matters. Christoph Stadler represents clients in complex international merger control and abuse of dominance matters in a range of sectors, including food, retail and power, and counts RWE among his clients. “Top tier” merger control expert Jochen Burrichter has made numerous notifications and acted in cartel cases before the BKartA and EC, as well as representing clients in the European Court of First Instance and the ECJ. Markus Röhrig has recently acted in high profile merger control matters in the energy, travel and transport sectors and is a “brilliant name” in cartel investigations, abuse of dominance cases and compliance issues.
Competition boutique Commeo LLP has become a “major player” in the German antitrust market since its foundation in 2010, and all four founding members are recognised in these pages. Jörg-Martin Schultze focuses his practice on merger control proceedings on behalf of clients in the automotive, public finance and building supplies sectors as well as disputes for clients in the consumer goods industry, and is a “stellar practitioner” according to sources. A specialist in compliance, litigation and distribution matters for clients in the oil, chemicals, IT and logistics sectors, Dominique Wagener recently represented Shell and Westfalen AG in high profile cartel proceedings. Stephanie Pautke focuses on domestic and European antitrust work for clients in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors, and is particularly noted for her distribution and abuse of dominance acumen. The “wonderful” Johanna Kübler completes the firm’s listings and focuses her merger control and dominance practice on the automotive, media and consumer goods sectors.
One of three partners listed at Noerr, Alexander Birnstiel co-heads the firm’s regulatory and governmental affairs practice out of the Munich office and is lauded for his work on behalf of clients in cartel damages, abuse of dominance, merger control, compliance queries and dawn raid matters. Joining him from the Berlin office are distribution, state aid and EU law specialist Karsten Metzlaff and telecoms and procurement expert Kathrin Westermann.
At Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Ulrich Quack is “highly respected” for his work in mergers and vertical and horizontal agreements, and counts Linde AG, TUI AG and Deutsche Telekom among his clients. Stefan Ohlhoff is another prominent name at the firm and combines his competition and regulatory practice with a strong international trade and aviation focus, regularly representing clients before the BKartA and EC courts.
Daniela Seeliger is one of two lawyers to feature from Linklaters LLP’s Düsseldorf office, where she is noted for her “sterling” work in merger control, anti-monopoly and transactional matters, frequently representing clients before the BKartA and EC courts. Carsten Grave is recommended for his knowledge of public enterprises and state aid law, with particularly strong expertise in the media, automotive and financial services sectors.
Joachim Schütze is the managing partner of Clifford Chance LLP’s Düsseldorf office and comes “highly recommended” for his work in the telecoms and energy sectors, with a particular focus on infrastructure. At the same firm, Marc Besen is noted for his work in regulatory and transactional work in the life sciences sector.
At Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Romina Polley is a “very well known” name for cartel proceedings, dawn raids and leniency applications, and cooperation, distribution and licensing agreements in the automotive, construction, IT and chemical sectors. Dirk Schroeder is also noted at the firm, with sources praising his merger control, cartel, monopolies and state aid work.
Allen & Overy LLP fields “superb” German competition group head Ellen Braun who has recently been a member of the firm’s teams advising Rosneft Oil Company, Dutch Kuiken Group and Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft in high profile transactions. Börries Ahrens at White & Case LLP also stands out for his merger control work, frequently acting in investigations and disputes as well as advising on joint ventures and distribution schemes for clients in the pharma, trade, machinery and entertainment sectors. At Hogan Lovells, Martin Sura is a “great choice” for cartel investigations work according to peers, and has particular expertise in the insurance and financial services industries. Corporate law specialist Alexander Rinne has recently acted for HK Food and Homann Feinkost in major acquisitions and represented Sustainable Resources International in damages litigation following a dominance complaint, and he is based in the Munich office of Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP. CMS Hasche Sigle sees international merger control, joint venture and distribution structuring expert Harald Kahlenberg rank highly, with sources praising his “exceptional” work for clients in the energy, media, engineering and sport sectors.
At her own firm, Bettina Bergmann is an “internationally respected figure” for competition litigation and cross-border transactional work, who counts Novartis, Viacom, DaimlerChrysler and Wal-Mart among her clients. At Glade Michel Wirtz, name partner Markus Wirtz is a “safe pair of hands” in competition litigation and merger work according to sources. Hermanns Wagner Brück Rechtsanwälte sees founder Ferdinand Hermanns rank highly, and sources describe him as a “top tier arbitrator”. Albrecht Bach at Oppenländer is a specialist in merger control and distribution matters as well as cartel investigations. SBR Schuster Berger Bahr Ahrens fields Christian Bahr, whose state aid, dominance and merger work is held in “high regard”. Hans-Joachim Hellmann is noted for his compliance and merger control work and he represents Schilling Zutt & Anschütz Rechtsanwalts AG in these pages.
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John Fingleton, the Chief Executive of the OFT, commented in a speech on 17 September to the IBA conference in Florence that the OFT will continue to pursue criminal cartel cases regardless of whether they result in successful trials. He stated that the OFT would "open lots of criminal cartel cases that we do not take all the way".
He explained that it is important to evaluate all of the available evidence thoroughly, in order to assess whether a case will "pass muster" before a jury. "Lots of investigations are not going to get past that standard," and he stated that "we are going to [conduct] many investigations, and not all of them are going to result in cases in court".
Mr Fingleton's comments come in the face of strong criticisms of the OFT's relatively poor performance in criminal enforcement to date. Since obtaining the powers to investigate and prosecute cartel members in 2003, the OFT has only prosecuted two cases: one which resulted in prison sentences for four executives in the marine hose cartel (a relatively simple victory as the executives had pleaded guilty) and the second, against four British Airways executives, which collapsed at trial. Mr Fingleton was defending the OFT's record and highlighted the need for understanding amongst observers.
In future it may be easier for the OFT to achieve cartel convictions. The Government's proposals to reform competition law are due to be published shortly. The Government is expected to remove the dishonesty requirement from the offence, and to replace it with a requirement to the effect that the defendant agreed to cause the relevant corporate entities to engage in the conduct specified.
After closing another criminal cartel investigation last month, the OFT is currently pursuing two criminal investigations in the automotive sector. The OFT is no doubt hoping that these two cases will "pass muster".

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

its your fault Bill K, you told me to, say what i found, its only a small % of what I have.

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

it is of my opinion, banks are a habitary creature, they have a way of doing things, it is my job (self appionted) to feck them back, they have tried to ruin my life on several occasions, so I see it as my job to repay themfor all the **** they gave me

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

So who can you trust? the cook, the accountant, the candle stick maker,it would seem not even your soap powder provider.

[CleverClogs]

Re: EU Cartel law

it is of my opinion, banks are a habitary creature, they have a way of doing things, it is my job (self appionted) to feck them back, they have tried to ruin my life on several occasions, so I see it as my job to repay themfor all the **** they gave me

It might be a dirty job but someone has to do it?

Just think of yourself as a C21st gong scourer.

[Bill-K]

Re: EU Cartel law

its your fault Bill K, you told me to, say what i found, its only a small % of what I have.

OOOPS - sorry about that, folks !!!

You ARE indeed a man on a mission, SWOS. Awesome.

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

Brussels, 2 February 2012

The first European Competition Forum will welcome ministers, parliamentarians, competition policy experts and the media to debate priorities for competition policy and enforcement in the coming years, identify the challenges ahead and exchange ideas.
Three panel sessions on Competition Policy and Competitiveness, State aid control at a cross-roads, and the European Competition Model will cover all competition policies – antitrust, mergers and State aid.
Confirmed speakers include:
Joaquín Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission and member responsible for Competition
Sharon Bowles, Member of the European Parliament and Chair of the European Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee
John Fingleton, Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading, Chair of the International Competition Network Steering Committee
Marc van der Woude, Judge at the General Court.
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Antitrust: Commission confirms inspections in suspected cartel in the sector of Euro interest rate derivatives
The European Commission can confirm that, starting on 18 October 2011, Commission officials undertook unannounced inspections at the premises of companies active in the sector of financial derivative products linked to the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) in certain Member States. The Commission has concerns that the companies concerned may have violated EU antitrust rules that prohibit cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area).
The European Commission can confirm that, starting on 18 October 2011, Commission officials undertook unannounced inspections at the premises of companies active in the sector of financial derivative products linked to the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) in certain Member States. The Commission has concerns that the companies concerned may have violated EU antitrust rules that prohibit cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area).

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

Post by LB http://www.legalbeagles.info/forums/...824#post241824

the Enterprise act 2002 was created from the EU laws Article 81 & 82, and you will see in future there will be more prosecutions of this type , mainly because the fines are based on a % of the companies worldwide turn over (not more than 10%)
speed cameras are the thing of the past.
OOOHHH Swos you conspiracist

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

section 1 & 2 of the Enterprise act were formed under the following:

Articles 81; 82; 83 of the European Community Treaty.
Article 81
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with
the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
be automatically void.
s. 101 will follow shortly
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which
does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial
part of the products in question.
Article 82
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in
a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market in so far as it
may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
Article 83
1. The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the
principles set out in Articles
81 and 82 shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
designed in particular:
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 81(1)
and in Article 82 by
making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments;
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 81(3), taking
into account the need to
ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify
administration to the greatest
possible extent on the other;
(c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the
scope of the provisions of
Articles 81 and 82;
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court
of Justice in applying
the provisions laid down in this paragraph;
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the

provisions contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

Article 86

Article 86 of the EC Treaty (was Article 90 in the Treaty of Rome) makes provisions for the application of the competition rules to public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights.
Article 86(1) applies to States, and ensures the effectiveness of the free-trade, non-discrimination and competition rules set out elsewhere in the Treaty:
(1) In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.
In particular, Article 86(1) it prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality through national rules governing public undertakings. It has also been interpreted (see for example Corbeau) as prohibiting States from creating or maintaining special or exclusive rights which would have the same effect as an abuse of a dominant position by the relevant undertaking. bitty <3 BBC
Article 86(2) applies to public undertakings and to undertakings that have been granted special or exclusive rights by a State:
(2) Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.
Article 86(2) provides a justification for acts that would otherwise infringe the competition rules, in particular Article 81 and Article 82, insofar as they are proportionate to legitimate purposes arising from their having been entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (public services) or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly (fiscal monopoly: monopole fiscal in the French text).
Article 86(3) entrusts the European Commission with enforcement of these provisions:
(3) The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.

[strangewayofsavin]

Re: EU Cartel law

Brussels, 30 October 2002
Commission rules against collusive behaviour of Christie's and Sotheby's
In a decision adopted today, the European Commission has found that Christie's and Sotheby's, the world's two leading fine arts auction houses, breached European Union competition rules by colluding to fix commission fees and other trading terms between 1993 and early 2000. The Commission consequently fined Sotheby's €20.4 million, i.e. 6% of its worldwide turnover. Christie's, on the other hand, escaped a fine because it was the first to provide crucial evidence, which enabled the Commission to prove the existence of the cartel.
Commissioner Monti, commenting on today's decision, said: "This case again shows that illegal cartels can appear in any sector, from basic industries to high profile service markets such as the one at hand. I also would like to underline the good co-operation with our counterparts at the US Department of Justice in this case, who have pursued the same cartel for its effect in the US."
The co-operation between the two competition authorities was made all the more easier by the fact that both Christie's and Sotheby's granted waivers as regards the exchange of confidential information. Co-operation with the Department of Justice took place not only as regards substance, but also on the timing of the procedural steps by each authority.
Based on evidence provided by Christie's to the EU and US competition authorities and confirmed by both auction houses during the proceedings, the Commission has concluded that Sotheby's and Christie's entered into an anti-competitive cartel agreement in the course of 1993 which lasted until early 2000, when the parties recovered their freedom to set prices individually.
The purpose of the cartel agreement was to reduce the fierce competition between the two leading auction houses that had developed during the 1980's and early 1990's. The most important aspect of the agreement consisted in an increase in the commission paid by sellers at auction (the so-called vendor's commission). But the collusive agreement also concerned other trading conditions, such as advances paid to sellers, guarantees given for auction results and payment conditions.
According to the Commission's findings laid down in today's decision, the collusive behaviour found its origins at the most senior level of both companies. In 1993 Alfred Taubman and Anthony Tennant, the then two chairmen of Sotheby's and Christie's, respectively, entered into secretive discussions at their respective private residences in London and/or New York. These first high-level meetings were followed by regular gatherings and contacts between the companies' chief executive officers at the time, D.D. Brooks of Sotheby's and Christopher Davidge of Christie's.
Christie's applied for leniency
The Commission's investigation started in January 2000, when Christie's approached both the United States' Department of Justice and the European Commission with proof relating to a cartel between itself and Sotheby's and applied for leniency in both jurisdictions. The evidence consisted mainly of documents that Christopher Davidge, former CEO of Christie's, had gathered about contacts between the two auction houses.
Sotheby's subsequently also applied for leniency in Europe and provided further evidence to the Commission.
The Commission in 1996 adopted rules providing partial or full immunity from fines for companies that unveil or provide decisive information on price-fixing, market-sharing or other anti-competitive agreements. These rules were updated in February 2002 (see: IP/02/247), but the old leniency rules apply to this case because the application for leniency dates from 2000.
The Commission considered that, according to the 1996 guidelines, Christie's ought to benefit from full immunity because it provided decisive proof at a time when the Commission had no investigation open and because it was the first to come in with such evidence.
The cartel agreement was considered a very serious violation of Article 81(1) of the EU treaty, which bans agreements or concerted practices, which have the effect of fixing prices, limiting production or sharing out markets.
The calculation of the fines for both companies took place according to the 1998 method on the calculation of fines for cartel behaviour and abuse of market power. That calculation, based on the gravity of the offence and its duration, resulted in fines close to or exceeding the maximum fine that the Commission can legally impose, namely 10% of world-wide turnover as laid down in Regulation 17/62, which sets out the rules and procedures to apply Articles 81 and 82, the latter covering abuses of dominant positions.
After applying the 1996 Leniency Notice, the fine for Sotheby's was established at €20.4 million, i.e. 6% of its worldwide turnover. The amount includes a 40% reduction for its co-operation in the investigation. Christie's received full leniency.
Background
Christie's and Sotheby's are the world's leading players in the art auction market. Christie's was established in 1766 and has its headquarters in London, but has been a subsidiary of French company Artémis SA since 1998. Sotheby's was also founded in the 18th century but has since become a publicly listed company both on the New York and London stock exchanges and has its headquarters in New York. Its majority shareholder is American entrepreneur A. Alfred Taubman, who was also its chairman during the entire period of the suspected cartel activity.
Companies fined in cartel proceedings have 3 months to pay the fines and 2 months to decide whether to appeal to the Court of First Instance, which has full discretion on the issue of the fine. If they do appeal, they may chose between paying the fine or providing a bank guarantee. If they chose the latter, interest payment is due.
so they are all at it