DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

[The Tinkerman]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

Hi AC

What is your take on the attachments I have posted regarding the T & C'S please.

[Angry Cat]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

[Quote] by Tinkerman:
"I must stress this request is NOT made pursuant to section 78 Consumer Credit Act 1974 but is made pursuant to the Civil Procedure Rules ( Pre action protocols and Part 31.16) and therefore an unsigned copy, or application form, will not suffice, only a copy of the original contract in its unaltered form will suffice in these circumstances". /[Quote]

Hopefully, you also requested ALL documents that related to the PPI within your CPR Part 31.16 request?

Avco Trust and other affiliated companies...(2) (3) etc are part of Citi Financial Europe.

In reality, you would need to provide absolute proof that the T&C's provided did not apply, to the credit agreement concerned at the point of signing same.

Therefore, IMHO the safest route for you would be in reclaiming the mis-sold or mis-applied PPI

[Angry Cat]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

Creditcare Insurance...

[The Tinkerman]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

Well could you not use the T & C'S 2 from the previous agreement she had the year before, as proof they are not the same because quite clearly they are not, as its 99% certain that her copy will be a correct version of the T & C'S at the time whilst theirs is just an updated version.

Been reading this MBNA V THORIUS Case again!

Published on 7th September 2010 07:13

A recent judgement at South Shields county court may have far reaching effects not only for pre-2007 Consumer Credit Act agreements but also for Consumer Credit Act agreements under the new 2006 legislation.

The case which was brought against MBNA in respect of an alleged credit card debt was decided for the claimant predominantly because MBNA were unable to provide a true copy of the original credit card agreement. This is very established law and causes no surprises as this principle has been often tested since 1974. In fact the only real surprise is that MBNA decided to defend the case at all.

What is particularly significant about this case is that there had also been mis-selling of Personal Protection Insurance (PPI). The judge referred to this aspect of the case in her judgement and decided there had been an unfair relationship between the claimant and MBNA because of the way she had been sold payment protection insurance.

This case is highly significant for claims brought under the old 1974 legislation because it adds another important basis upon which Consumer Credit Act agreements may be rendered unenforceable. This is in addition to the very much more usual ground for an enforceability that the agreement is flawed in some way because it is not properly executed, or that a true copy cannot be produced by the lender.

It now seems highly likely that even where an agreement seems to be properly executed, if the agreement has been accompanied by PPIwhich has been mis-sold, this mis-selling itself is a basis upon which to vitiate the entire loan agreement.

This principle that a Missold insurance policy is capable of tainting and invalidating the entire agreement is likely to become a very dominant feature in challenges to Consumer Credit Act agreements which have been concluded under the new 2006 legislation.

Whereas the 1974 legislation required very strict adherence to highly detailed requirements in any agreement, as well as requiring a fair and balanced relationship between the contracting parties, the 2006 Act is not so concerned with the form of the agreement and whether all of the I's have been dotted and the T's crossed. The entire focus of the 2006 legislation is upon the relationship between the lender and the borrower and seeks merely to ensure that there is a fair, balanced, transparent and nonabusive relationship between them.

The decision at South Shields County Court suggests very strongly that where an apparently fair agreement is accompanied by mis-selling ofPPI, then that mis-selling may well be taken as evidence that the lender has exercised an unfair relationship and has therefore tainted the entire loan agreement.

This seems to be an entirely satisfactory state of affairs and is probably a very necessary style of reasoning in order to serve as a very strict warning to lenders to do not conduct themselves properly that the consequences for them will be severe.

Of course, this was only a County Court Decision. It would need to be decided at High Court or Court of Appeal level to become completely authoratative. Would any finance company dare go to the senior courts and risk a binding decision which would destroy the millions made out of loanagreement tied to scam PPI deals? Unlikely, but on the other hand we have seen for years now that the finance industry are incapable of thinking strategically when it comes to litigating against their customers.

It is only this kind of far reaching decision that is likely to drum home a properly-learned lesson into the mindset of the finance industry.

If you rip off your customers in anyway, then the consequences may well be that you will lose far more than merely a refund of premiums.

[The Tinkerman]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

Dont get me wrong I agree the safest route for her would be in reclaiming the mis-sold or mis-applied PPI

Its just the above case that bugging me all along with what it says.

Instead of treating the two separately as has been quoted, this MBNA V THORIUS Case seems to have treated
them as one, and killed two birds with one stone so to speak.

[Amethyst]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

Tinks, Thouris the agreement was temp unenforceable due to non compliance with sec 78, the ppi unfair relationship was seperate but he looked at it as an alternative argument and said if he hadnt made the judgment on unenforceability (temp unenforceability not irredeemable unenforceability) then he would have found the unfair relationship created by the miselling of the ppi would have resulted in a rebate / refund of the ppi payments. (its best to read the judgment rather than press reports)


What date was the current loan taken out ? (ie have you checked it wasnt after citi took over)

[Angry Cat]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corpor...associates.htm

[The Tinkerman]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

Sorry Amethyst

I was under the impression she did get some rebate as a result of the mis sold PPI.

"The Judge ordered the company either to repay Mrs Thorius's PPI premiums and interest, or the value of the commissions it had received which so far has been undisclosed."

States on the Insurance form the name of the creditor as Avco Trust, even gives their address Avco House Castle Street Reading RG1 7DX back in 1996.

[Amethyst]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

best thing to do is read the judgment

IN THE NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE COUNTY COURT

The Quayside
Newcastle Upon Tyne
NE1 3LA
Date: 21st September 2009
Before:
DEPUTY DISTRICT JUDGE SMART
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:
MBNA EUROPE BANK LTD. Claimant
- and -
MRS. LYNNE THORIUS Defendant
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
APPROVED JUDGMENT
Tape Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,
1st Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.
DX 410 LDE
Telephone: 020 7067 2900. Fax No: 020 7831 6864
DEPUTY DISTRICT JUDGE SMART:

1. This is a claim by MBNA to recover a total debt of £8,396.90 under a Sunderland FC MBNA Credit Card.

2. The sums claimed comprise:
(a) what I shall describe as "capital borrowing"; the purchases and cash advances;
(b) "interest";
(c) "standard charges" such as late payment fees and administrative expenses;
(d) Monthly payments for payment for Payment Protection cover ("PPI").

3. It is for the Claimant to prove on the balance of probabilities the prima facie
contractual right to recover the sums claimed.

4. Thus the Defendant invokes specific statutory protection and remedies of:

(i) An unfair relationship under section 140A Consumer Credit Act 1974 as amended, which when established results in the court having the flexible powers of intervention under section 140B Consumer Credit Act 1974;

(ii) In relation to the levying of charges, Regulation 5 of the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, which has been held as capable of applying to such charges (as falling outside the core obligations) at first instance upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal in Abbey National PLC & Others v. Office of Fair Trading [2009] EWCA Civ 119, [2009] 2 WLR 1286; and further argues

(iii) in relation to the PPI Claimant was or should be treated as, or in the same position as a broker or equivalent ("ad hoc") fiduciary relationship and concealed (in the sense of did not disclose) commission, so that Defendant is entitled to rescind the PPI transaction

(iv) in breach of section 78(1) Consumer Credit Act 1974 Claimant failed upon
request of Defendant to provide the documents as required by that section and
accordingly its right to enforce the consumer credit agreement is suspended.

THE AGREEMENT

5. The Agreement was signed by the Defendant on 6th July 2002 when she was visiting Sunderland FC Shop to buy Christmas presents for her son who was a keen Sunderland supporter. She went at that time well in advance of and to avoid the increased demand for items closer to Christmas. She too was a loyal Sunderland supporter.

6. The Defendant was the only witness to give evidence. She was an extremely honest witness, completely without guile, who answered all the questions put to her in crossexamination immediately and directly, readily and maturely accepting the responsibility for the decisions she had made in relation to taking out the credit card. I accept her evidence in its entirety.

7. Her evidence was that she was approached by a sales person to take out the credit card and originally declined. The sales person was persistent and she was followed round the shop and pressed again. She was told (paragraph 3 of her section witness statement) that she could save money in the shop. She was told that she did not have to keep the card. Eventually she agreed and signed up. She said "Sometimes it is easier to do that with these people to shut them up."

8. The original Agreement, to the extent that it has been reproduced, is in the trial bundle at pages 56-57 (with a more legible version of the front page at page 231).

9. It includes personal details of the applicant (2), employment details (3), financial details (4), and a "Principal Cardholders Request and Declaration" which concludes with a request for the issue of a credit card including:

"I agree to be bound by the MBNA Credit Card Terms and Conditions and I understand I will be responsible for paying any balance due on my credit card account."

10. No document headed or described "MBNA Credit Card Terms and Conditions" has been produced, no document described specifically as such. The document at page 57 of the bundle is headed "Financial and Related Conditions". Under that is a reference to the MBNA Credit Card. It is very probable, and I find, that this is a reproduction of what is on the original, on the reverse of the original Agreement reproduced at page 56 of the bundle. In the absence of proof of any other documents satisfying the description, I find that is "the MBNA Credit Card Terms and Conditions". This will become important later.

11. The Defendant was asked on that occasion if she wished to take out payment protection insurance ("PPI"). She declined and in the box "no" was ticked under "5. Payment Protection Cover". At the time of taking out the credit card her gross income was £10,000. She had a clear credit record. She had not previously had a credit card, had no substantial debts, no county court judgments, and her only experience of credit, she said, was a catalogue account. On the other hand, I am satisfied from the evidence she was not vulnerable. She knew what a credit card was. She knew what PPI was.

12. The subsequent steps in relation to using the card required that she telephone to activate it, which she did. She said in evidence that payment insurance was mentioned at that time, but she does not accept that she agreed to it being taken out. That appears to have been on 31st July 2005, only some twenty-five days after the agreement was signed.

13. There has been produced by the Claimants (through the statement of someone who is actually the case worker at the Claimant’s solicitor’s office) a computer record with very limited information on it. I heard no direct evidence from anybody from the Claimant. The computer record refers to the telephone call being for activation of the credit card and a standard record of the PPI being sold. So far as that conflicts with what the Defendant’s evidence is I accept the Defendant’s evidence. I do not accept that when she activated the credit card she agreed to take out the PPI which she had rejected only some twenty-five days earlier.

14. Her evidence is that she noted she had been charged for PPI and she noticed it on the credit card statements. She initially discussed it with her partner and did not challenge it because she thought at that price there might be a certain benefit on that. But the payments increased as her liability did, and she made a further phone call to the Claimant in which she challenged it and effectively sought to terminate the PPI policy.

15. Her evidence of that occasion is that she was told that she had to have it. She could not have the credit card without it. That was her understanding of the conversation. What is quite clear from her evidence is she did make such a telephone call and it did not result in the Claimant cancelling the PPI, which was the purpose of the call. What she said specifically in her evidence was that she was told she had to have the PPI and she would not have got the credit card without it. She did not know the law. It is clear to me that she understood from that conversation that she could not cancel the PPI and that she had to have it.

16. There is no evidence from the Claimant to rebut the Defendant’s evidence. There is nothing but a computer record, unsupported and unexplained even as to the circumstances in which the record of the sale of PPI would have been put on the computer file.

17. In the light of that, I find that there was no contract in relation to the PPI. The fact that it was charged for against a background of making minimum payments in my view cannot constitute an acceptance of the liability to make those payments. There is a further difficulty in relation to that in my view. It would have been a fundamental variation in the contract as originally taken out; that such a variation goes not as to amount to anything chargeable under a head previously agreed but introduced a new head of payment. If it was a term of the consumer credit contract (as benefiting the creditor), to actually vary that agreement there would have to be compliance with the Consumer Credit Act Regulations. (I also have that in mind in relation to fixed charges.)

18. The PPI was probably not a part of the consumer credit contract, rather a separate contract, but related.

19. However, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me, bearing in mind that the Defendant has given what appeared to be consistent and logical evidence of the steps taken against the background of someone who had originally declined PPI, that the Claimant has established a contract entitling it to recover for that insurance, and it is no answer to say, well, she has got it so she should have paid for it. She did not want it. I am not satisfied that there was an agreement to take it out. On the contrary, the charging of the payments continued on the basis of her understanding of information which was incorrect when she tried to stop further payments being added to the account.

20. After those phone conversations the monthly statements continued to be provided. She made the minimum payments. The original credit card limit was £1,500 and over the subsequently years those credit limits were increased, I accept unilaterally, in the sense that those increases are offered by the creditor and unless there is opposition to them they are activated. But I do accept also that it is entirely open to the person with the credit card to actually respond back and say they want the credit limit restored as it previously was.

21. The Defendant did use the credit card. She did use it with the benefit of the increasing limits. She maintained minimum monthly payments at least, and the bank statements evidence a significant increase in, shall we say, capital indebtedness even before we get to the charges being added, until 2008 when she struggled, because of a reduction in her income where her employment circumstances changed and her hours reduced, to maintain the monthly payments. That is the crystallisation ultimately of the Claimant commencing proceedings.

22. Prior to the commencement of proceedings on 19th December 2008 the Defendant’s solicitors requested documents under sections 7 and 8 of the Consumer Credit Act 1978 enclosing the appropriate fee required under those sections. The response was sent on 20th January 2009. For the purposes of this hearing in relation to the request it sent a copy of the signed Agreement and the current conditions, that is, the conditions current in 2009. So far as the Agreement is concerned, in 2002, the crucial documents, and the only ones anybody can point to, are at page 56-57 in the bundle. The current conditions on the face of what has been provided are different to the 2002 conditions.

23. Dealing with the various issues raised, this is necessarily a summary of my reasons.

24. Firstly, in relation to the terms formulated in the Agreement, I have dealt with that previously.

25. So far as the fixed charges are concerned the Claimant has not proved a contractual term entitlement to recover them, that is the default charges and the charges for legal and administrative expenses. The evidence before me of the original contract is at pages 56-57 of the bundle. That is what the Claimant has produced, and doing the best I can with a magnifying glass to read the conditions, which I do find must have been what is on the reverse of the original Agreement, what has been provided is incomplete and does not evidence any entitlement to recover fixed charges. It deals with interest and the minimum payments and the ability of the Claimant to suspend them or reduce them, but it does not deal with fixed charges. There clearly was more
to the Terms and Conditions than that, because if you read on the first page the reference to the Conditions under "Data Protection" the person applying is actually directed to Condition 11 -- there is no Condition 11 -- and the power to make conditions attached to that. Quite clearly that document is not complete. The Claimant has to prove it. This is the trial and I am not prepared to make leaps of faith as to what was in the original agreement. This is not an unusual type of proceedings and it is not that difficult to produce the original contractual documentation, even if it is on microfiche. Therefore in any event on the evidence before me today, the standard charges have not been proved as recoverable.

26. So far as the Claimant tries to rely, effectively as a course of dealing, on the statements produced from time to time, that is one thing in relation to the amounts claimed; it is quite another in relation to a heads of charge that the Claimant is entitled to recover. If you cannot prove the original contract you have got to prove entitlement as a variation, and variations of the Consumer Credit Act in material particulars have to be established by notice served under the Consumer Credit Act. It is also limited in its scope where it can apply. None of that has been established before me having regard to the sums claimed in reliance solely on the credit card statements.

27. The interest rates are covered under the terms and conditions, and as far as I can see from the extracts of the original Terms and Conditions, the ability to vary them from time to time. In so far as the contract is concerned, on the question of proof before me today the Claimant is limited to the provisions in the actual sections of the credit card conditions it has produced.

28. Similarly, in relation to the PPI, so far as it might fall within the standard "Terms and Conditions", the sending of the documents in relation to the sums which have been challenged do not in my view establish a contract for payment, even when those statements have been produced for a length of time.

UNFAIR RELATIONSHIP

29. I then move on to the question of unfair relationship. This is relied upon by the Defendant, effectively to challenge the whole of the Consumer Credit Agreement and the PPI. This was an ordinary credit card agreement. It is with one of the High Street lenders. It is not a sub-prime lender. It is not an unlicensed lender. It has not been targeted at vulnerable categories of consumer. It was being proferred in a store with related benefits, albeit a store to which a customer might exhibit some loyalty. Before we get to specific elements of it, the general structure of the obligation is one where all or none of the credit can be used. The structure of the charging provisions, charging interest on capital not so paid with no period of credit given, or the amount
of credit given, even if I found the clauses proved in relation to standard charges, was not out of line with regularly undertaken such credit agreements. It is an agreement where the person undertaking it is free to cancel it at any time, albeit repaying the balance. I do not regard the nature of the agreement and the circumstances of its selling of itself as something which resulted in an unfair relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.

30. If any finding was likely to be operative in relation to this, there is one aspect of this in respect of which I would be prepared in this context to say that there was an unfair relationship. Going to section 140(a):

"The court may make an order under s. 140(b) in connection with a credit agreement if it determines the relationship between the creditor and the debtor arising out of the agreement is unfair to the debtor because of one or more of the following:

any of the terms of the agreement, or of any related agreement."

31. I would take that view, in this particular case, in respect of the related agreement, which is the PPI agreement.

32. The Agreement actually encourages acceptance of the PPI by the debtor. It does so on the face of the application for payment protection cover --

"Safeguard your payments against life’s unpredictable events
with our Payment Protection cover for just 68p per £100. Our
payment protection cover is designed to protect your ability to
make repayments of your MBNA credit card in the event you
are unable to work due to accident, sickness or involuntary
unemployment …. We strongly recommend you take out this
cover. For cover just tick the ‘yes’ box to confirm that you are
eligible and have read and understood the terms and
conditions."

33. There is no evidence the terms and conditions of the cover were actually produced or available at the time somebody was invited to take out the payment protection cover. There is a strong encouragement to the person signing the form in terms which I do not think can be regarded as a mere puff in the context of the explanation in the Agreement of the benefits of that PPI. That would not in itself, in my view, be enough for a challenge; but what the Agreement does not explain is that there is a benefit to the Claimant from commission, which is undisclosed, and they are in a position where it is in their interests to get the particular debtor signed up. So effectively at the time this agreement is entered into there is a lack of transparency of the relevant positions of the debtor and the creditor of the terms of the PPI and not enough information provided for the debtor to be aware that the Claimant has a financial benefit from this. That is in a context where there is also no explanation of the freedom to look elsewhere.

34. When you are able to look at PPI as in this case as a linked transaction, or particular terms of a contract, I take the view that in respect of that particular part of the transaction there was an unfair relationship. But if I was considering the remedy for that, I would be considering the benefit to the Claimant compared to any detriment and benefit to the debtor. I would take the view that the debtor has not been encouraged to look round. I would also take the view that the financial benefits to the Claimant have not been disclosed. I would have regard to a proportionate order, and it seems to me glaringly obvious in this particular case that an appropriate order would be the restoration of one of two things: either to rebate the premiums or to set
off the commission against the premiums. But that of course would only be relevant if I found that the PPI had effectively been entered into. And it is unnecessary to go further into the question of an unfair transaction and remedies because of my findings on the issue of imposition below. I should add that on the issue of unfair relationship it is accepted by both counsel that because of the unique nature of the transitional provisions applied to an application made after the transitional one year period, the relevant provisions can apply to the Agreement and PPI in this case.

35. I turn to the Consumer Credit Regulations. I have already referred at the start of the judgment to the fact that in principle it has been held that the nature of the provisions in relation to fixed charges fall outside the core terms in relation to provision of credit so that they can be considered under Regulation 5. Terms which may be unfair are those which require any customer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation. Under Regulation 5:

"A contractual term which had not been individually negotiated
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’
rights and obligations arising under the contract to the
detriment of the customer."

36. There are two elements to that. First, there has to be a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising out of the contract and that imbalance is to the detriment of the consumer; then, second, that has got to be contrary to the requirement of good faith. In relation to fixed penalty charges, putting it very broadly, they are fixed sums imposed, in this case starting at £25 and then reducing to I think £12.50, in two types of circumstances. The first is where somebody has not made the minimum
payment by the due date, the second, where a credit limit has been exceeded. That means that the same amount of money can be recovered whether somebody is one day late or twenty-eight days late, whether the amount due under the credit agreement is £5 or £5,000, and where a credit agreement is exceeded by £1 or by £1,000. On the face of it that operates disproportionately between the detriment suffered having regard to the extent of the breach of obligation by the consumer and the amount of charge to be paid by the debtor.

37. The question is whether that occurs contrary to the requirement of good faith. Good faith appears to be a nebulous concept applied to ensuring that terms are balanced between the Claimant and Defendant. I take the view that a threshold of breach of regulation 5 has been raised in relation to fixed penalty charges of £25 and later on, more significantly, £100 or more in relation to legal and administrative expenses. I am in a position where the Claimant has not led any evidence or provided any explanation to counter the rigidity of the effect of those charges on the debtor. For the purposes of this particular case in the state of the evidence before me I would incline to the view that those charges -- that is in the alternative to whether or not they are contractually binding -- do breach regulation 5. I make it clear I am confining my decision to this case and the state of the evidence before me. The unfairness extends only to that term, and therefore the remainder of the contract is binding between the Claimant and the Defendant.

38. If I were looking at this particular contract in a more general context (and we were considering a particular contract and for example minimum payments of £85.15 late payment of which would allow imposition of a £25 charge) it may very well be the case that over the general operation of fixed charges over the life of credit card agreements it could be established by a balancing exercise, certainly at a reduced rate of £12.50, that fixed charges are not out of line with the cost and reasonable compensation to the Claimant for a breach by a debtor. But I have got to deal with this case on the evidence and information that has been put before me. In fact it is unnecessary to determine formally that point because I found that on the evidence before me it has not been proved that there is a contractual entitlement to recover those sums.

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

39. The next point that has been raised is, was there a fiduciary duty such that there is an obligation on the Claimant to inform and to advise as to commission? The only evidence that the Defendant can point to in this case is the encouragement to take out insurance and her assumption that that was advice and that was advice being given to her in her interests. I am quite satisfied in this case that the Claimants are acting as agents for the insurers. The contractual provision and encouragement is not in my view sufficient to constitute an assumption of responsibility towards the Defendant; nor in any more nebulous form to be a situation in which the court ought to impose an
ad hoc agency or fiduciary relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant. That would be pushing the factual situation far beyond the bounds of the arm’s length transaction between a creditor and a debtor. It was, if anything, a matter to be dealt with under the allegation of unfair relationship in relation to a related transaction.

40. I have dealt with the points above going beyond the question of contractual entitlement because I have been asked to do so.

41. However, there is a final crucial matter that has been raised which bears on the Claimant’s entitlement to recover, and that is whether or not there has been provision of appropriate information under section 78 of the Consumer Credit Act.

42. It may be very simplistic, but I take the view that it is obvious that the appropriate information was not provided. Section 78(1) states in terms that where the request is given in accordance with that section on payment of the requisite fee the creditor shall give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement, if any, and of any other document referred to in it.

43. In this particular case the consumer credit agreement refers to the "MBNA Credit Card Terms and Conditions", and there is a partial reproduction of those on the back page which clearly is not complete. The subsequent response to that request provided a copy of the Agreement and the current credit card terms and conditions. It is clear in my view, having regard to the purpose of section 78, to provide the debtor with the information to enable her not just to assess the day to day statement of account and calculation of the liability, but actually the compliance, at the stage the contract was taken out, with the elements of the Consumer Credit Act, and also the heads of liability which could be claimed by the creditor, that in this particular case the documents provided fall short of the statutory requirement and specifically do not include the original terms and conditions referred to in the Agreement. That has become important in this case because of the claim to contractual entitlement to the fixed terms and charges. Without the complete terms and conditions it is impossible for the consumer to assess whether or not those charges are recoverable under the original contract, before you get to any question of entitlement to recover them having regard to any provisions of the Consumer Credit Act.

44. Accordingly, I take the view that section 78 has not been complied with and the contractual entitlement to recover the money claimed has been suspended prior to the commencement of proceedings, and remains suspended, pending full compliance with that section.

45. On the basis of that last element of my decision there has to be judgment for the Defendant.

46. I make it clear that if I had found section 78 complied with, I am satisfied in this case that the original capital is recoverable, by which I mean the purchases and the cash advances, that there is clearly a scheme of recovery of interest proved under the original agreement and that the interest would be recoverable including as varied.

47. The result of my decision is that the Defendant has won on a little, but merely postponed liability for the majority

[Angry Cat]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

1999/2000:
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=22595
------------------------------- merged -------------------------------

... their address Avco House Castle Street Reading RG1 7DX back in 1996.

What was the date of the original application for credit?

[The Tinkerman]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

24 TH Sept 1996 on the PPI document for the loan in question, Originally thought she said she had another two PPI documents from previous loans with them but only actually got one more that was Dated the 22 nd of August 1995

[Angry Cat]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

Citifinancial (First National Corp) did not aquire Avco until 1999/2000.

[Differentjudge]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

The Associates acquired Avco Trust , then They were acquired by Citi Financial

[Angry Cat]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-50237302.html

PROVIDENCE, R.I.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 11, 1998--Textron Inc. today announced it has reached an agreement to sell its Avco Financial Services unit to Dallas, TX-based Associates First Capital Corporation for $3.9 billion in cash. Additional terms were not disclosed. The acquisition is subject to regulatory approvals.
Net after-tax proceeds to Textron will approximate $2.9 billion. "These proceeds will enable us to accelerate our acquisition and share buyback programs, consistent with our focus on maximizing value for Textron shareholders," said Textron President and Chief Executive Officer Lewis B. Campbell. "Our primary objective is to redeploy these funds into our existing market-leading businesses," he added.
Textron also announced today that its Board of Directors has authorized a new 25-million-share repurchase program. This program supercedes the 8 million shares that remained under its previous authorization.
"This increased authorization will enable us to be more aggressive in repurchasing shares, beginning immediately," Campbell said. "This, coupled with our disciplined acquisition strategy, position us to maintain our record of consistent, double-digit earnings growth."
It is anticipated that up to 40% of the after-tax proceeds from the sale of Avco will be used to repurchase Textron shares, while the remaining 60% will fund acquisitions.
In the past five years, Textron has acquired 33 companies in the United States and Europe. Having invested more than $500 million in five acquisitions to date this year, the company has already exceeded last year's acquisition activity. "With a full pipeline of opportunities, we are well-positioned to continue our aggressive acquisition activity," Campbell continued. "However, we remain steadfast in our commitment to our rigorous acquisition criteria."
With $1.85 billion in annual revenues, AFS comprised 18% of Textron's total 1997 revenues. "Our financial goals are clear and have not changed," said Campbell. "We are confident we will meet or exceed our targets of 8-11% annual revenue growth and double-digit EPS growth, and we are targeting revenues in excess of $14 billion by the year 2000," he added.
In June, Textron announced it was exploring strategic alternatives for AFS, which could include a sale, spin-off or other form of divestiture. With the increasing consolidation of the consumer finance industry, Textron concluded the value of AFS would be maximized by combining it with another leading financial services company. The strategic review did not include Textron's commercial finance subsidiary, Textron Financial Corporation (TFC) which finances the sale of Textron and third-party products. TFC remains a part of Textron.
Textron Inc. (NYSE:TXT) is a $10.5 billion, global, multi-industry company with market-leading operations in Aircraft, Automotive, Industrial and Finance.
Certain statements in this news release are forward-looking statements, including those that discuss strategies, goals, outlook or other non-historical matters, or project revenues, income, returns or other financial measures. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in the statements, including the following: (i) continued market demand for the types of products and services produced and sold by Textron, (ii) changes in worldwide economic and political conditions and associated impact on interest and foreign exchange rates, (iii) the level of sales by original equipment manufacturers of vehicles for which Textron supplies parts, (iv) the successful integration of companies acquired by Textron and (v) changes in consumer debt levels.

[Angry Cat]

Re: DCA Just sent a copy of t & c's for CCA request? Thoughts please!

The Associates acquired Avco Trust , then They were acquired by Citi Financial

http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Citifinancial