Re: Brandon v Amex - date of appeal hearing + detail?
"Thirdly, if, as a matter of construction, the Default Notice has not or may not have allowed the minimum statutory period for Mr. Brandon to remedy the breach, then it is (at least) realistically arguable that the defect cannot be overlooked as de minimis."
This was looked at in terms of Summary Judgement and that is why" it is (at least) realistically arguable" is there. It would take some serious front for any firm to go to court with a dodgy default notice in light of this judgement. You also have to bear in mind that it is the statute which gives a prescribed term and does not have a caveat attached to it.
The court in Brandon has strongly hinted, if not stated, that statute is there to be followed even if it makes those who have to enforce it unhappy.
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It will be recollected that if the notice requirements of these sections were applicable then it was plainly arguable that Amex had not complied with them so that the contractual termination route was itself closed; in any event, a conclusion either way as to the applicability of these sections of the Act could have obvious ramifications for standard credit card agreements. While there cannot be one rule for those legally represented and another for litigants in person, I confess to concern as to the evolution of the argument at the appeal stage in the circumstances of this case. Although this issue was realistically arguable on both sides, as it involves a point of law I am far from saying that it was incapable of summary disposal – had the procedural groundwork been laid. But here that had not been done and I do not think it acceptable – in proceedings claiming summary judgment - for the argument as to contractual termination to have emerged in the manner and at the stage of proceedings when it did. For completeness, although (given the view I take of the matter) it is unnecessary to reach any final decision on the point (and I do not do so), my inclination, in broad agreement with Mr. Philpott's submissions, would be to conclude that ss. 76 and 98 did not apply to the agreement – but, as already indicated, I do not think it was right for this issue to be determined summarily here.
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"Thirdly, if, as a matter of construction, the Default Notice has not or may not have allowed the minimum statutory period for Mr. Brandon to remedy the breach, then it is (at least) realistically arguable that the defect cannot be overlooked as de minimis."
This was looked at in terms of Summary Judgement and that is why" it is (at least) realistically arguable" is there. It would take some serious front for any firm to go to court with a dodgy default notice in light of this judgement. You also have to bear in mind that it is the statute which gives a prescribed term and does not have a caveat attached to it.
The court in Brandon has strongly hinted, if not stated, that statute is there to be followed even if it makes those who have to enforce it unhappy.
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Originally posted by Gorang
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