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Introduction
1.This is an appeal against the judgment of Henderson J dated 22 April 2013 and his consequential order whereby he dismissed the application of the appellant company ("Shebelle") for an interim injunction to restrain the respondent charity ("the Trust") from granting consent for a development of a property in the Hampstead Garden Suburb ("the Suburb") and whereby, upon the cross application of the Trust, he dismissed Shebelle's claim in its entirety.
2.Shebelle owns a neighbouring property under the terms of a lease from the Trust which contains a covenant for quiet enjoyment. It fears that the development will cause substantial damage to its property and contends that by granting consent for the development the Trust will be acting in breach of that covenant. In broad outline, the Trust responds that its powers of control over the contested development are derived from a statutory scheme and that their proper exercise for the public good cannot constitute a breach of the covenant. The judge agreed with the Trust and, for reasons I shall explain in this judgment, I believe he was right to have done so.
Introduction
1.This is an appeal against the judgment of Henderson J dated 22 April 2013 and his consequential order whereby he dismissed the application of the appellant company ("Shebelle") for an interim injunction to restrain the respondent charity ("the Trust") from granting consent for a development of a property in the Hampstead Garden Suburb ("the Suburb") and whereby, upon the cross application of the Trust, he dismissed Shebelle's claim in its entirety.
2.Shebelle owns a neighbouring property under the terms of a lease from the Trust which contains a covenant for quiet enjoyment. It fears that the development will cause substantial damage to its property and contends that by granting consent for the development the Trust will be acting in breach of that covenant. In broad outline, the Trust responds that its powers of control over the contested development are derived from a statutory scheme and that their proper exercise for the public good cannot constitute a breach of the covenant. The judge agreed with the Trust and, for reasons I shall explain in this judgment, I believe he was right to have done so.