Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

[Marley66]

Hi I received an invoice from npe for parking outside a shop near KFC. I did not see signs until I was leaving as I had to pull in from a busy main road. So even if I had of pulled in seen the sign and left again I'd still have the invoice. I think £60 is an unrealistic estimate of loss as the shops were closed. I have appealed but they rejected it. I now want to take it further and appeal to popla but how do I word is so I can guarantee I win.
Thanks in advance

[mystery1]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

Can you let me see your pcn and appeal please ? (sanitised)

M1

[Marley66]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

Hi I have attached the original letter and my appeal
Thanks

[mystery1]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

Any chance of a better look at the pcn ?

M1

[Marley66]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

Yeah I have attached a larger image. Hope it is better, if not I can just write what it says.
Thanks

[mystery1]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

marley66popla.rtf

http://parking-prankster.blogspot.co...a-process.html

That explains entering a popla appeal quite well.

You only get one shot so enter everything at once. You may need to convert to pdf, i'm not sure on that.

M1

[Marley66]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

okay brilliant thanks. i will check that out later today.
do you think popla will accept my appeal as im debating whether to just ignore them or not?
thanks

[mystery1]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

Popla is a far better way and you can still ignore afterwards if you choose to. You should win.

M1

[Marley66]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

Hi can you tell me if this is okay please. Also they have used CCTV to capture the images is this allowed? As i want to include a piece about that as well as im fairly sure CCTV is only to be used for crime prevention and the times are incorrect to. thanks.

I wish to appeal this charge for the following reasons.

1. Inadequate signage
2. No Contract with landowner to pursue charges in their own name at court and No proprietary interest in the land
3. Unlawful Penalty Charge No genuine pre-estimate of loss (GPEOL)



1. The signage was not compliant with the BPA Code of Practise so there was no valid contract formed between NPE and the driver.
The signs were not seen by the occupants of the car on entering the parking space. The signs are placed between windows of shops not noticable from the road therefore it was impossible to see them before parking. No contract could have been formed at the entrance to the premises prior to parking. It is not formed after the vehicle has already been parked as this is too late.
Also on viewing the photographs sent by NPE of the parking signs, the first line indicates that restrictions apply only during the shop opening hours. Since the photo shows the car parked at 7.06 on Sunday evening when all the shops were closed it would not have occurred to anyone that there would be any other restriction..A notice is not imported into the contract unless brought home so prominently that the party MUST have known of it and agreed terms The driver did not see any sign so there was not consideration or acceptance and no contract agreed between the parties.



2. Lack of the NPE's proprietary interest in the land and no contract with the landowner. I believe NPE have no proprietary interest in the land to issue charges and pursue them in their own name, including at court level. If they do have such interest then I put them to strict proof to provide POPLA with the Deeds of Title in the land. In the absence of such title, NPE must have contractual authority from the landowner to issue and pursue charges. I do not believe such a document is in existence. I therefore put NPE to strict proof to provide POPLA with a contemporaneous copy of the contract between them and the landowner which provides them with the authority to issue and pursue charges, including to pursue them at court in their own name. Please note that a 'Witness Statement' to the effect that a contract is in place between NPE and the landowner will be insufficient to provide all the required information, and will therefore be unsatisfactory.


3. Punitive/unfair/unreasonable charge. No Genuine Pre-Estimate of Loss. The Department for Transport guidelines state, in Section 16 Frequently Asked Questions, that: "Charges for breaking a parking contract must be reasonable and a genuine pre-estimate of loss. This means charges must compensate the landholder only for the loss they are likely to suffer because the parking contract has been broken. For example, to cover the unpaid charges and the administrative costs associated with issuing the ticket to recover the charges. Charges may not be set at higher levels than necessary to recover business losses and the intention should not be to penalise the driver." In this case, NPE has failed to provide any calculation to show how the £100 figure is arrived at, whether as an actual or pre-estimated loss. It is the Appellant's position that NPE has suffered no loss whatsoever in this case. Even if there was a contract (which is denied), the £100 parking charge is arbitrary and disproportionate to any alleged breach of contract or trespass. There has been no loss to the landowner as this is a free car park and the shops were closed. I put NPE to strict proof to provide POPLA with a ‘Genuine Pre-estimate of Loss’ incurred due to my vehicle remaining on their parking area for any given period of time. This is therefore an unenforceable penalty and I respectfully request that my appeal is upheld and the charge dismissed.
NPE have also stated that “Following the judgement of the Court of Appeal in ParkingEye v Beavis on 23rd April 2015, we can confirm that the parking charge is considered to be a deterrent to parking in a restricted area and the charge is not extravagant or unconscionable. The parking charge is not a penalty and the issue of genuine pre-estimate of loss is not relevant.” However the ParkingEye V Beavis case has not been settled and is being taken to the Supreme Court and I do not believe it can be used as evidence by NPE.

[mystery1]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

You missed keeper liability. The appeal attached to post 6 is fine.

M1

[Marley66]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

is there any way you can copy and paste that appeal on here please as im not able to open on my computer. thanks

[mystery1]

Re: Parking ticket from npe for kfc.

is there any way you can copy and paste that appeal on here please as im not able to open on my computer. thanks

Sorry, i missed your post. If you still need it :-



I,as registered keeper, wish to appeal as follows.


1.The charge is a penalty


2.Unfair charges


3.Locus Standi


4.Signage


5.Keeper liability


1.Penalty charge


The operator has not submitted the charge to be a genuine preestimate of loss. The charge being a penalty is unenforceable.


Thesource of the doctrine of penalties lies in public policy. The needto protect
contractingparties against ‘extravagant and unconscionable’ behaviour isobvious, all
themore so in consumer cases. The doctrine must be rigorously anduniversally
appliedto protect the consumer.


InEl Makdessi v Cavendish Square Holdings BV [2013] EWCA Civ 1539
ChristopherClarke LJ, with whom Tomlinson and Patten LJJ agreed, explained that
theunderlying rationale of the doctrine of penalties is that the courtwill grant relief
againstthe enforcement of provisions for payment (or the loss of rights orthe
compulsorytransfer of property at nil or an undervalue) in the event of breach,where
theamount to be paid or lost is out of all proportion to the lossattributable to the
breach.If that is so, the provisions are likely to be regarded as penalbecause their
functionis to act as a deterrent.


InLordsvale Finance Plc v Bank of Zambia [1996] 3 WLR 688 Colman J heldthat
therewas no reason in principle why a contractual provision, the effect ofwhich was
toincrease the consideration payable under an executory contract uponthe happening
ofa default, should be struck down as a penalty if the increase couldin the
circumstancesbe explained as commercially justifiable, provided always that its
dominantpurpose was not to deter the other party from breach The ‘predominantfunction test’ is sound and does not require abolition oramendment.


Thejudgment of the Court of Appeal in this Beavis ignores and offendsagainst the
compensatoryprinciple. The Lords Justices were wrong to accept
theRespondent’s submission that some clauses which require payment onbreach of a
sumwhich cannot be justified as liquidated damages in accordance withestablished
principlesshould nonetheless be enforceable because they are not ‘extravagantor
unconscionable’and are justifiable in other terms


Themistake was to divorce the ‘extravagant and unconscionable’ testfrom its proper
roots.It is not in fact a stand-alone test. It is anchored in LordDunedin’s principle (a)
–that a clause will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated foris extravagant and
unconscionablein amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably
beproved to have followed from the breach.


The correct approach is to start by looking at what loss flows fromthe breach and
thenconsider whether the payment demanded is extravagant andunconscionable.
£70 (or £40 for early payment) is extravagant and unconscionablewhen compared to
thegreatest loss that could conceivably flow from breach. Looked atanother way,
whynot £150 or even £500?


Theconcept of ‘commercial justification’ cannot be left to floatfree of the
compensatoryprinciple any more than the phrase ‘extravagant and unconscionable’
can.The function of the concept of ‘commercial justification’ is notto justify the
impositionof a charge that is otherwise penal but to rather to enable theconclusion
inDunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd [1915] AC67,
thatthat deterrence of breach was not the dominant purpose of the term.See Clarke
LJ’sexamples of cases which exemplify commercial justification inMakdessi. In tBeavis, it being accepted by the Court of Appeal thatthe dominant purpose of the Parking Charge is as a deterrent, thereis no room for the concept of commercial justification.


Furthermore,if commercial justification is to have any place at all in thepenalty
clausearena then relevant only to commercial contracts freely negotiatedbetween
‘sophisticatedparties’.
Inote that the Appellant in the Cavendish appeal, supreme court,submit that there is no rationale
forthe doctrine of penalties in what they define as ‘the CommercialCase’ but accept
thatpolicy considerations may justify its application in a consumercontext .


The Court of Appeal appears to have considered that there was somekind of what
mightbe termed ‘social justification’ for the clause , yet did notbegin to formulate a
testfor the circumstances in which a deterrent payment might be carvedout as an
exceptionto the general law on penalties.
An analogy was made with the charges made by local authorities. Thisis not apt.
Localauthorities do not impose “charges of this kind” under contracts.They impose
non-negotiablepenalties in accordance with their statutory duty , the size of the
penaltiesbeing prescribed by statutory instrument.
In any event social justification is not a relevant consideration.
Thisis a matter for the legislature. Should Parliament perceive a need(presumably
withthe benefit of extensive inquiry, expert, industry and consumeropinion) to
permitprivate sector traffic management companies to charge deterrentpenalties on
socialpolicy grounds then it will enact suitable legislation, as it hasdone to regulate
localauthorities’ charges for parking contraventions.
Partof that inquiry may encompass:
a.a consideration of the level of permissible charges taking intoaccount, for
example,the national average weekly wage, which, including bonuses
paymentbefore taxes and other deductions for gross pay in March 2014 was
£47415 ;
b.consideration of the effect on traffic flow if this type ofmanagement system
wasnot operated;
c.whether there are viable alternative parking management systems andwhat
theyare;
d.whether or not Parking companies would be likely to lose
theircontract if the current mode of operation were to change
e.consideration of levels of Local Authority charges. For example,outside of
GreaterLondon, Local Authority charges are capped at £50 or £25 for
promptpayment;
f. whether Parking companies manipulate the period of free
stayto maximise revenue by breach;
g.the social justification, if any, for one level of chargeirrespective of the
lengthof overstay as opposed to an escalator clause.


As Sir Timothy Lloyd acknowledged in the Court of Appeal, Beavis, the law would allow
damagesfor trespass against an ‘overstayer’ such as Mr Beavis withoutregard to
whatthe operator would have done but for the trespass.
ParkingEye had no interest in the land, did not act as agent of thelandowner, and at
trialdisavowed a claim in damages for trespass. Nevertheless thecomparison with the
positionbetween a landowner and a trespasser is apt.
SwordheathProperties v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285 was cited in support of this
proposition.In that case the Court of Appeal held that where a plaintiff had
establishedthat a defendant had occupied residential premises as a trespasserthen he
wasentitled to damages for trespass calculated by reference to theordinary letting
valueof the premises, without the need to adduce evidence that he could orwould
havelet the premises to someone else had the defendant not been inoccupation.
The principle is unexceptional. In Swordheath Properties the 2 nd to5 th defendants
suedfor damages had been let into occupation by the tenant, the 1 stdefendant, and
remainedthere after the fixed term expired. They never had permission to bethere. In
Ministryof Defence v Ashman (1993) 25 H.L.R. 513 the defendant was a former
tenantwho remained in occupation without her landlord’s consent. Theissue was
whetherdamages should be assessed by reference to the market rent of thepremises
orthe subsidised rent paid by the 2 nd defendant, a serviceman who hadmoved out, his
wifethe 1 st defendant having remained in occupation. The Court of Appealheld that
thecorrect measure of damages was the former. Hoffmann LJ described thisas a
restitutionaryclaim 18 and valued the benefit she had received by reference to theopen
marketletting value of the premises.


In Stadium Capital Holdings (No.2) Ltd v St Marylebone Property CoPlc [2011]
EWHC2856 (Ch.) the defendant erected an advertising hoarding on the flankwall of
aproperty it owned. The hoarding trespassed onto the claimant’sairspace. Vos J held
thatthe appropriate measure of damages was the price which willing andreasonable
personsin the position of the landowner would have negotiated as thereasonable
pricepayable for the relevant right of user, the sum of money which mightreasonably
havebeen demanded as a quid pro quo for permitting the trespass 19 .
28.Having made the analogy, the Court of Appeal declined to follow thereasoning that
underpinsthe decision in Swordheath. They were wrong to do so. The explanation
given-- that if damages were limited to the market value of occupationduring the
periodof trespass it would provide no disincentive against overstaying 20 –is not a
properreason for ignoring the principle.












2.Unfair charges




TheUnfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 25 (“theRegulations”)
applyto unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplierand a
consumer.For the purposes of reg. 3(1), the operator is supplier and thedriver is a
consumer.By reg. 8(1), an unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumerby a
selleror supplier shall not be binding on the consumer.


Thebasis test of unfairness of a term set out at reg. 5(1) is that:
“Acontractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be
regardedas unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a
significantimbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under thecontract,
tothe detriment of the consumer”.
The Regulations implement Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April1993. The
sixteenthpreamble emphasises that in making an assessment of good faith,
particularregard shall be had to the strength of the bargaining position of theparties.


“Whereas the assessment, according to the general criteria chosen, ofthe unfair character of terms, in
particularin sale or supply activities of a public nature providing collectiveservices which take account of
solidarityamong users, must be supplemented by a means of making an overallevaluation of the different
interestsinvolved; whereas this constitutes the requirements of good faith;whereas, in making an assessment of
goodfaith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of thebargaining positions of the parties, whether the
Schedule 2 to the Regulations (‘the grey list’) sets out theindicative and non-
exhaustivelist of terms which may be regarded as unfair. Paragraph 1 ofSchedule 2
lists example terms, including the following which is relevant: a term
“(e)requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a
disproportionatelyhigh sum in compensation;”


TheParking Charge of £70 (or £40) which may be demanded of a motoristwho
overstaysby even one minute (or less) is disproportionately high. The motorist
carriesthe risk that if he overstays by even one minute a charge of £70 -which bears
norelation to the period of overstaying, the benefit he obtains, or theloss the
operatorsuffers - will be demanded of him.
Conceptsof ‘commercial justification’ or ‘social justification’ playno part in the test
forunfairness under the Regulations.


InDirector General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2002] 1 AC481 Lord
Binghamexplained at para. [17] that a term falling within the scope of the
Regulationsis unfair if it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’rights and
obligationsunder the contract to the detriment of the consumer in a manner or toan
extentwhich is contrary to the requirement of good faith. He went on tosay:
“Therequirement of significant imbalance is met if a term is so weightedin
favourof the supplier as to tilt the parties’ rights and obligationsunder the
contractsignificantly in his favour. This may be by the granting to thesupplier
ofa beneficial option or discretion or power, or by imposing on theconsumer
ofa disadvantageous burden or risk or duty. ...
Therequirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and opendealing.
Opennessrequires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and
legibly,containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence
shouldbe given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the
consumerhad an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods orservices were sold or supplied to
thespecial order of the consumer; whereas the requirement of good faithmay be satisfied by the seller or
supplierwhere he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whoselegitimate interests he has to take into
account;”customer. Fair dealing requires that a supplier should not, whether
deliberatelyor unconsciously, take advantage of the consumer’s necessity,
indigence,lack of experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the
contract,weak bargaining position or any other factor listed in or analogous
tothose listed in Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Good faith in thiscontext is
notan artificial or technical concept; nor, since Lord Mansfield was its
champion,is it a concept wholly unfamiliar to British lawyers. It looks togood
standardsof commercial morality and practice.”


Thesignificant imbalance requirement is met by the fact that themotorist assumes
therisk of having to pay the Parking Charge if he overstays by even oneminute (or
infact less). This disadvantage is amplified by the fact that becausethe car park is
governedby cameras operating an automatic number plate recognition system
(ANPR)at the entrance and exit, the 2 hour period (“max stay”) startswhen the
motoristdrives in and ends when he leaves, not when he enters and leaves aparking
bay.


Atpara. [54] Lord Millett discussed the ‘good faith’ test in thefollowing terms:
“Therecan be no one single test of this. It is obviously useful to assessthe
impactof an impugned term on the parties’ rights and obligations by
comparingthe effect of the contract with the term and the effect it would have
withoutit. But the inquiry cannot stop there. It may also be necessary to
considerthe effect of the inclusion of the term on the substance or core ofthe
transaction;whether if it were drawn to his attention the consumer would be
likelyto be surprised by it; whether the term is a standard term, notmerely in
similarnon-negotiable consumer contracts, but in commercial contracts freely
negotiatedbetween parties acting on level terms and at arms’ length; and
whether,in such cases, the party adversely affected by the inclusion of the
termor his lawyer might reasonably be expected to object to its inclusionand
pressfor its deletion. The list is not necessarily exhaustive; otherapproaches
maysometimes be more appropriate.


In Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona I Manresa [2013]3 C.M.L.R. 5 a
Spanishresident entered into a loan agreement with the bank which providedfor an
10annualdefault interest of 18.75%. Under the agreement the bank was entitledto call in
thetotality of the loan in the event of default and (cl. 15) bringenforcement
proceedings.Such proceedings were brought against Mr Aziz and his property was
repossessed.He applied to the Court of Justice for a declaration annulling cl. 15on the
groundof unfairness. Spanish domestic law did not permit Sr. Aziz tochallenge
mortgageenforcement proceedings based on the unfairness of a clause in acontract
betweena consumer and a seller and supplier. The Court of Justice was askedto
determinewhether the national legislation was compatible with the Directive93/13
andclarify the concept of “unfair term” in the light of art 3(1) and(3) of the Directive
andAnnex.


The ECJ noted:
(1)That the system of protection introduced by the Directive was basedon the idea
thatthe consumer was in a weak position vis a vis the seller or supplieras regards
bothhis bargaining power and his level of knowledge.
(2) That the Directive defines in a general way the factors thatrender unfair a
contractualterm that has not been individually negotiated and that the annex[the
Schedule]contains only an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms whichmay
beregarded as unfair.


Thecritical part of the judgment is para. [69]:
“Withregard to the question of the circumstances in which such animbalance
arises‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’, having regard to the
sixteenthrecital in the preamble to the Directive the national court must
assessfor those purposes whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and
equitablywith the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer
wouldhave agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations.”


The Order made was:
inorder to assess whether the imbalance arises ‘contrary to therequirement
ofgood faith’ it must be determined whether the seller of supplier,dealing
fairlyand equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the
consumerwould have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract
negotiations”


Interpretedin this way, a significant imbalance contrary to the requirement ofgood
faithplainly arises. The operator, dealing fairly, could not reasonablyassume that a
consumer would have agreed to a parking charge of £70 (or £40)
inindividual contract negotiations.


Theterm is unfair in the following respects:
(1)The Parking Charge of £70, even when reduced to £40 for promptpayment, is
disproportionatelyhigh. It is set this high because the operator relies on the charge
tofund the payment it makes to the landowner, all of its overheads, andto make a
profit.
(2)The fact that the Charge is imposed if the motorist overstays even byone minute
(orless) imposes a disadvantageous burden on the consumer.
(3)The consumer is not in a weak bargaining position. He has nobargaining position.
position,which is that the operator’s business model depends upon a certain
percentageof motorists’ overstaying, they would be more alert to the risk of
overstaying.
(4)The operator, dealing fairly, could not reasonably have assumed thatthe consumer
wouldhave agreed to the term in individual contract negotiations.












3.Locus Standi


Theoperator does not own nor have any interest or assignment of title ofthe land in question. As such, I do not believe that the operator hasthe necessary legal capacity to enter into a contract with a driverof a vehicle parking in the car park, or indeed to allege a breach ofcontract. Accordingly, I require sight of a full copy of the actualcontemporaneous, signed and dated site agreement/contract with thelandowner (and not just a signed slip of paper saying that itexists). Some parking companies have provided “witness statements”instead of the relevant contract. There is no proof whatsoever thatthe alleged signatory has ever seen the relevant contract, or, indeedis even an employee of the landowner. Nor would a witness statementshow whether there is a payment made from either party within theagreement/contract which would affect any 'loss' calculations. Norwould it show whether the contract includes the necessary authority,required by the BPA CoP, to specifically allow the operator to pursuethese charges in their own name as creditor in the Courts, and togrant them the standing/assignment of title to make contracts withdrivers.


InPOPLA case reference 1771073004, POPLA ruled that a witness statementwas 'not valid evidence'. This witness statement concerned evidencewhich could have been produced but was not. So if the operatorproduces a witness statement mentioning the contract, but does notproduce the actual un-redacted contract document, then POPLA shouldbe consistent and rule any such statement invalid.


SoI require the unredacted contract for all these stated reasons as Icontend the Operator's authority is limited to that of a mere parkingagent. I believe it is merely a standard business agreement betweenthe operator and their client, which is true of any such businessmodel. This cannot impact upon, nor create a contract with, anydriver, as was found in case no. 3JD00517 ParkingEye v Clarke 19thDecember 2013


Irefer the Adjudicator to the recent Appeal Court decision in the caseof Vehicle Control Services (VCS) v HMRC ( EWCA Civ 186 [2013]): Theprincipal issue in this case was to determine the actual nature ofPrivate Parking Charges.

Itwas stated that, "If those charges are consideration for asupply of goods or services, they will be subject to VAT. If, on theother hand, they are damages they will not be."

Theruling of the Court stated, "I would hold, therefore, that themonies that VCS collected from motorists by enforcement of parkingcharges were not consideration moving from the landowner in returnfor the supply of parking services."

Inother words, they are not, as the Operator asserts, a contractualterm. If they were a contractual term, the Operator would have toprovide a VAT invoice, to provide a means of payment at the point ofsupply, and to account to HMRC for the VAT element of the charge. TheAppellant asserts that these requirements have not been met. It musttherefore be concluded that the Operator's charges are in factdamages, or penalties, for which the Operator must demonstrate hisactual, or pre-estimated losses, as set out above.








4.Signage


Thesigns do not meet the minimum requirements in part 18 of the BPA codeof practice. They were not clear and intelligible as required. Itwas dark and the signs were not illuminated and were not seen andcertainly your average person would not be bound to see them.

TheBPA Code of Practice states under appendix B, entrance signage:

“Thesign must be readable from far enough away so that drivers can takein all the essential text without needing to look more than 10degrees away from the road ahead.”

Fora contract to be formed, one of the many considerations is that theremust be adequate signage on entering the car park and throughout thecar park. I contend that there is not.

Whenwith reference to the BCP Code of Practice, it actuallystates:

"Theremust be enough colour contrast between the text and its background,each of which should be a single solid colour. The best way toachieve this is to have black text on a white background, or whitetext on a black background. Combinations such as blue on yellow arenot easy to read and may cause problems for drivers with impairedcolour vision"










5.Keeper Liability






Theprotection of freedoms act 2012 schedule 4 allows the opportunity forparking companies liable for the actions of the driver but only iffull compliance is achieved. In the case of an ANPR situationcompliance with section 9 is required.


Rightto claim unpaid parking charges from keeper of vehicle




4(1)Thecreditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from thekeeper of the vehicle.
(2)Theright under this paragraph applies only if—
(a)theconditions specified in paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 12 (so far asapplicable) are met ....


6(1)Thesecond condition is that the creditor (or a person acting for or onbehalf of the creditor)—




(b)hasgiven a notice to keeper in accordance with paragraph 9.




9(1)Anotice which is to be relied on as a notice to keeper for thepurposes of paragraph 6(1)(b) is given in accordance with thisparagraph if the following requirements are met.
(2)Thenotice must—
(a)specifythe vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the periodof parking to which the notice relates;
(b)informthe keeper that the driver is required to pay parking charges inrespect of the specified period of parking and that the parkingcharges have not been paid in full;
(c)describethe parking charges due from the driver as at the end of that period,the circumstances in which the requirement to pay them arose(including the means by which the requirement was brought to theattention of drivers) and the other facts that made thempayable;
(d)specifythe total amount of those parking charges that are unpaid, as at atime which is—
(i)specifiedin the notice; and
(ii)nolater than the end of the day before the day on which the notice iseither sent by post or, as the case may be, handed to or left at acurrent address for service for the keeper (see sub-paragraph(4));
(e)statethat the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and acurrent address for service for the driver and invite thekeeper—
(i)topay the unpaid parking charges; or
(ii)ifthe keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to notify the creditorof the name of the driver and a current address for service for thedriver and to pass the notice on to the driver;
(f)warnthe keeper that if, after the period of 28 days beginning with theday after that on which the notice is given—
(i)theamount of the unpaid parking charges specified under paragraph (d)has not been paid in full, and
(ii)thecreditor does not know both the name of the driver and a currentaddress for service for the driver,the creditor will (if all theapplicable conditions under this Schedule are met) have the right torecover from the keeper so much of that amount as remainsunpaid;
(g)informthe keeper of any discount offered for prompt payment and thearrangements for the resolution of disputes or complaints that areavailable;
(h)identifythe creditor and specify how and to whom payment or notification tothe creditor may be made;
(i)specifythe date on which the notice is sent (where it is sent by post) orgiven (in any other case).
(3)Thenotice must relate only to a single period of parking specified undersub-paragraph (2)(a) (but this does not prevent the giving ofseparate notices which each specify different parts of a singleperiod of parking).
(4)Thenotice must be given by—
(a)handingit to the keeper, or leaving it at a current address for service forthe keeper, within the relevant period; or
(b)sendingit by post to a current address for service for the keeper so that itis delivered to that address within the relevant period.
(5)Therelevant period for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) is the periodof 14 days beginning with the day after that on which the specifiedperiod of parking ended.
(6)Anotice sent by post is to be presumed, unless the contrary is proved,to have been delivered (and so “given” for the purposes ofsub-paragraph (4)) on the second working day after the day on whichit is posted; and for this purpose “working day” means any dayother than a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday in England andWales.
(7)Whenthe notice is given it must be accompanied by any evidence prescribedunder paragraph 10.
(8)Insub-paragraph (2)(g) the reference to arrangements for the resolutionof disputes or complaints includes—
(a)anyprocedures offered by the creditor for dealing informally withrepresentations by the keeper about the notice or any mattercontained in it; and
(b)anyarrangements under which disputes or complaints (however described)may be referred by the keeper to independent adjudication orarbitration.






Thenotice to keeper does not meet those requirements in full.






Forall , or any, of these reasons the appeal should be allowed.

M1