Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Fiasco Update!!!

Phoned court Monday (3 March 2014) and spoke to the Justices Clerk's assistant (Legal Admin Team Leader) to ask why a dozen or so correspondence had not been acknowledged and why the appeal rules were not being followed. The assistant knew nothing but would pass the message on to the Justices Clerk. Odd that the person copied in on emails was somehow not privy to the business of the person she assisted. There was therefore little chance of establishing whether O'Nions, the bench chair at the liability order hearing was the person responsible for the hold-up and intransigence.

So! It was left that because I have no landline she would ask the Justices Clerk to email that day on the understanding that a complaint would be submitted if the issues were further ignored. However, I didn't expect the Justices Clerk would make contact on the strength of complaining to HMCTS.

There was no contact, neither that day nor the next so on the morning of the 5th another call to the court got a similar response. The assistant this time was off and a team member from the judicial support unit made the excuses and promises to get the message to the justices clerk who was not available but due in later. Still no contact and a second call the same day (afternoon) and another member from the judicial support unit took the call and confirmed that the message had been passed on but the Clerk (again) not at the premises so unavailable. The evasiveness was down to Ministry of Justice's cost cutting which meant that one Justices' Clerk had to be shared between around eight Magistrates' Courts.

A surprise this morning (6th). An email from the Clerk to Justices stating that either today or tomorrow there will be written communication setting out the position with the case and advising on the next steps.

From: Clerk to Justices
To: 'outlawlgo'
Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2014 9:06 AM
Subject: Case Stated

Good Morning Mr o

I am sorry that I have not been available to speak with you when you have called my office.

I understand that it is not possible for me to contact you by telephone and that you would prefer me to contact you by e mail.

I am due to be in meetings all day today but I will have written communication with you either later today or first thing tomorrow setting out the position with your case and advising you on next steps.

Yours sincerely

Justices' Clerk for Humber and South Yorkshire

[ploddertom]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

This is getting better than an Agatha Christie mystery.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

This is getting better than an Agatha Christie mystery.

Are you suggesting the crime common to most of Christie's best-selling novels is likely to occur at some point in this saga?

[ploddertom]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Are you suggesting the crime common to most of Christie's best-selling novels is likely to occur at some point in this saga?

Now that may be wishful thinking! It's enough to drive you to it - drink being a close second.

[Drew]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

opcorn: Any update?

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

opcorn: Any update?

Hasn't been any progress. The Justices' Clerk continues with the same intransigence.

Phoned the Magistrates Court again (19 and 28 March) merely as a formality, thus providing a record for the High Court and to stress that the appeal had not been abandoned. Both times unable to speak to the Justices' Clerk or find out why no contact had been made to arrange the next step (arrange recognizance).

Will next be submitting a complaint regarding the Clerk's conduct which was stated to them, but evidently having no effect.

Work is still continuing with regards preparing the case, so if their strategy is to wear the opposition down it isn't working perhaps as they'd hoped.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

A sense of déjà vu..

Another request requiring the production of a Certificate of refusal to state a case under section 111(5) of the Magistrates Court's Act 1980.

The justices may refuse to state a case on considering the application to be frivolous, but they must then supply a certificate stating the reasons why an application has been refused. It can not state that the Court refused the application 'in its discretion', as it has no discretion other than taking the view that the application is frivolous.

If the magistrates refuse to provide a certificate, they can be required to pay the costs of an application to the High Court for a mandatory order to compel them to.

Justices' Clerk for Humber & South Yorkshire
Doncaster Magistrates Court
PO Box 49
The Law Courts
College Road
Doncaster DN1 3HT


22 April 2014


Dear Mrs .....


Re: North East Lincolnshire Council V ........

Grimsby and Cleethorpes Magistrates' Court - 2 November 2012
Application to State a Case

Thank you for your email of 6 March 2014 in which you stated:

“I will have written communication with you either later today or first thing tomorrow setting out the position with your case and advising you on next steps”

I did not receive the aforementioned communication, neither have subsequent calls to your office made 19 and 28 March prompted a response. The net result being that the case, for which the Magistrates owe a legal duty to state for the opinion of the High Court, has not been stated.

As no contact has been made regarding my 13 February 2014 letter to agree recognizance and every attempt to proceed with the appeal has drawn a blank, it appears the court is refusing to state the case.

Pursuant to section 111(5) of the MCA 1980, a magistrate can refuse to state a case, but must consider the application 'frivolous'. The meaning of the term was considered by the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal in (R v Mildenhall Magistrates' Court, ex p Forest District Council). The then Lord Chief Justice in considering the meaning of 'frivolous' was of the view that in the context, the Court should consider the application to be futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic. He went on to say that such a conclusion was not one to which the justices can properly come simply because they consider their decision to be right or immune from challenge.

Presuming the application is not considered 'frivolous' (a draft has been produced) there is no obvious reason why the court has not stated the case as legally required. However, as the court may only refuse on these grounds then I require a certificate stating that the application has been refused (section 111(5) MCA 1980) setting out the reasons why, so I may under section 111(6) seek a second mandatory order from the Administrative Court requiring the case to be stated.

Yours sincerely

[Ref]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Maybe the stalling which has wasted a year and a half of your time is down to the realisation that they consider a proper court (given the chance to preside over the evidence) would make judgment that £billions has in fact been unlawfully taken in the form of a tax on the poor. Given the potential damage to both the treasury's finances and the MoJ's reputation in perverting the course of justice it would seem worthwhile considering the negative impacts on your wellbeing and seriously think about guarding you body.

[bizzybob]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

They will do anythging they can to obfuscate the issue, and avoid court. Mind you they would need a few more Liability orders on debts of a quid or a penny to pay for it.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

After the substantial increase in Council Tax Court cases (Summons income) caused by Welfare Reforms apparently coinciding with the council's reduced operating costs, North East Lincs Council has reviewed its level of costs in order to ensure that they do not exceed expenditure incurred in making the application.

It also intends in future to review costs on an annual basis, in order to ensure that changing budgets and the number of summonses issued are reflected in the level of costs.

This is probably the first time a local authority has ever reviewed its cost and decided that in order to comply with the law (not make a profit) it would need to reduce the standard costs. The 14% reduction of the £70 – which was the amount they were imposing – does not bring the amount down to a reasonable level considering that the majority of costs are incurred after the summons and once the liability order has been obtained (see Chiltern council beneath) but should at least set a precedent for all local authorities to follow.

It has been recognised that there is potential for legal challenge should income generated exceed expenditure. The fact that income is exceeding councils' costs has been made more obvious because of benefit reforms that have seen the number of summonses issued doubling in some councils.

The 17th February 2014 Cabinet report acknowledges this: Review of Council Tax court costs

......
RECOMMENDATIONS

To approve the reduction in court costs from the current level of £70 to £60, which has been calculated as being the reasonable sum incurred, subject to approval from the Magistrate’s Court. This will be effective from the financial year 2014/15.

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Council Tax (Administration & Enforcement) Regulations allow the council to levy an additional fee which is equal to the amount of costs reasonably incurred in making an application for a Liability Order through the Magistrate’s Court. The level of recommended costs for 2014/15 is based on the most recent activity and cost data, and represents a reduction of £10 due to a reduction in operating costs combined with an increase in activity.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Failure to review the appropriate level of costs levied leaves the council at risk of levying costs which exceed the overall costs of making applications for Liability Orders. This could contravene government regulations and leave the council at risk of challenge.....

Perhaps the council wasn't previously aware it was unlawful to prop up other budgets with additional court cost income, as highlighted in its 2005/06 Revenues Budget (Appendix 2)

Finance:-Vacancy savings in all sections largely offset by use of Agency Staff pending permanent appointments. Underspend on benefits costs and additional court cost income £(148K) offset by an anticipated shortfall in Pathfinder Grant and Administration Grant £36k

Chiltern District Council

Reference:

Chiltern District Council's 16 March 2010 Cabinet report on its review of Court Costs in respect of unpaid Council Tax and Business Rates.

A very persuasive argument is made about Chiltern (and NELC or any council, as the law applies equally to all authorities) in respect of front loading costs for instituting the summons; more so in the case of NELC owing to the fact that all of its costs are imposed on issue of a summons (Chiltern currently charges 52% of its total £125 costs on issuing the summons (£65).

The document makes it categorically clear that the proposed changes i.e., introducing costs on the issue of summonses and increasing the overall amount, was solely as a budgetary measure to plug a gap in its finances by achieving a 10% saving on the Revenues Service budget.

The gem however is what is stated at paragraph 4:

4. .......Most of the costs the Council incurs arise from the application for a liability order at Court and the additional work required to secure payment once we have the liability order.

Essentially any costs it claims for work once they have obtained the liability order is unlawful and in any event, they have admitted to the fact that the majority of costs (they are lawfully entitled to) is NOT incurred on instituting the summons, but from the application for a liability order at Court.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

It's 4 months since the Justices' Clerk for Humber and South Yorkshire made an undertaking to have written communication setting out the position with this case and advising of the next steps....13 weeks since formally requesting a certificate of refusal to state the case, so perhaps it's time to take another approach and see if the Ministry of Justice has put an arrangement in place to restrict my contact with the court.

From: outlawlgo
To: Watts, Alison
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2014
Subject: Restricted Contact - Application to State a Case - Grimsby Magistrates' Court

Dear Mrs Watts,

Restricted Contact – Application to State a Case - Grimsby Magistrates' Court

With regards communication with Humber and South Yorkshire, I would like informing whether Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service has any arrangements in place to restrict my contact.

If so, I wish to know in what/which way(s) the organisation has restricted contact. For example, this may be by telephone, email, letter etc., or a combination of these. It may be that the organisation has blocked emails without telling me and would like to know if this is the case.

I look forward to your response.


Yours sincerely

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

There has been an ongoing battle with North East Lincolnshire Council to obtain under Freedom of Information, the costs it incurs in issuing a Council Tax Summons. This has escalated first to the Information Commissioner and then to the First-Tier Information Rights Tribunal.

All efforts have proved unsuccessful and the information still has not been obtained.

Permission to Appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a point of law has also been refused by the Tribunal Judge. The option remaining is to apply directly to the Tribunal, this has not been done and would appear unlikely to be successful where other efforts have not.

All relevant complaint and appeal documents are linked to below:

Information Commissioner's Decision Notice FS 50505226

Grounds of appeal

Information Commissioner's Response

Appellant’s Reply to Information Commissioner's Response

Final Decision

Permission to Appeal to Upper Tribunal

Permission Refused to Upper Tribunal

Had I not seen this bias over and over again towards the establishment by the Judiciary and all the so called independent watchdog/ombudsmen organisations I'd have been knocked for six. However, even at this stage of proceedings, the lame evidence (the spreadsheet) which appears only to show gross aggregated costs, has unsurprisingly been sufficient to satisfy the judge that the law is being complied with.

In fact, had the judge been mindful of the precise wording of regulation 34(5) he could not have come to any other conclusion that the council's calculation provided the evidence to support inappropriate expenditure being front loaded to instituting the summons. There seems to be a complete denial by everyone who stands to benefit from burying their heads in the sand that the council tax regulations DO NOT unconditionally allow for costs incurred in connection with the application (this would be open to exploitation). What in fact the regulations do allow is for costs reasonably incurred by the council in obtaining the liability order (referred to also as “making the application”); see 34(7) and 34(8) of the regulations.

The majority of costs are incurred by the authority once the liability order has been granted (non-qualifying for recovery); maintaining payment agreements – setting up attachment of earnings/benefits – related recovery correspondence and phone calls etc., which may be considered “in connection with the application”. However, contrary to what the authorities would like to believe, the law makes no provision for this expenditure to be recovered.

The costs at issue here are even further limited by Statute from those deemed reasonably incurred by the council in obtaining the liability order. NELC has elected to apply only its costs in respect of instituting the summons and therefore would not only be in breach of the law if it included costs incurred after obtaining the order, but also for any costs in respect of making the application at the Magistrates' court. The council would therefore be misconceived by thinking it would be open to legal challenge ONLY if its costs were to exceed the overall (accounted) expenditure, there can be no mistaking that the law makes no provision for the authority to recover its entire recovery budget with charges it levies through court costs.

The law states at regulation 34(5)(b) that the authority (after the summons has been issued, and an amount paid etc...) is only entitled to costs in connection with the application up to the time of the payment or tender. By virtue of the fact that any payment or tender would have occurred before the application for a liability order (at the court hearing) there has evidently been a deliberate distortion of the figures to enable a greater generation of costs income by moving expenditure incurred in respect of applying for a liability order (and post liability order), and front loading it to costs in respect of instituting the summons.

The relevant part being paragraph 5 which follows:

(5) If, after a summons has been issued in accordance with paragraph (2) but before the application is heard, there is paid or tendered to the authority an amount equal to the aggregate of—

(a) the sum specified in the summons as the sum outstanding or so much of it as remains outstanding (as the case may be); and

(b) a sum of an amount equal to the costs reasonably incurred by the authority in connection with the application up to the time of the payment or tender,

the authority shall accept the amount and the application shall not be proceeded with.

(6)....

Although there are others, this is just one example where the council's spreadsheet clearly identifies from its calculations (see ANNEX A) that inappropriate expenditure has been incorporated into the standard summons costs. For example, £260k+ in respect of 2012/13, of which a share is incurred by all account holders receiving summonses, regardless of whether applications are made in those cases for liability orders or there was need to correspond with the council. Many cases, therefore (particularly those settling in accordance with the summons) have legitimate grounds to argue that this element (£260k+ at the very least) could not have conceivably been incurred by the council in respect of their summonses and would have been unlawfully imposed.

NONE of the Gross Recoverable costs in relation to the Council Tax category (£260k – ANNEX A) could have lawfully been incurred by the council in respect of accounts settled on receipt of the summons.

The reason for this is simply because the £260k sum was based on Council Tax activity levels, but more specifically the man hours deemed attributable to dealing with enquiries which were estimated from the number of calls arising from issue of each summons being at least twice as many as for reminders. The request for information surrounded cases specifically in respect of costs incurred where the debt is settled on issue of the summons. The spreadsheet is therefore proof that NELC, within the £70 standard costs, included inappropriate and unlawful expenditure for all account holders settling their accounts as a result of getting a summons. If the impact this recovery had on the Council’s budget was properly evaluated, it would have perversely been deemed positive because lump sum payments would be made by many account holders – benefiting the council’s finances sooner – which ordinarily would have been paid in instalments.

The attempt was unsuccessful to sway the Tribunal's opinion that the authority is under a duty to hold the requested information by virtue of Reg. 34(5) and it held firm that "Reg. 34(5) does not impose the asserted duty..."

The Tribunal's opinion seems to be that if the council had a duty to hold the requested information then there would be statute requiring this with a sanction for its breach. It supported this argument by virtue of the fact there was Government guidance which would not exist if there was statutory provision. The understanding was that there was nothing in the wording (Reg. 34(5)(b)) "to preclude the application of a standard charge, provided it represents a reasonable estimate of the average cost of the application at the prescribed time" Although of no concern to the Tribunal, the issues which the Justices' Clerk are preventing from being brought before the High Court, deal precisely with the fact that the standard charge, does not represent a reasonable estimate of the average cost of the application at the prescribed time.

Paragraph 8 of the Tribunal's decision refusing permission is completely baffling:

It is fair to observe that the Request was not for the recoverable (“reasonable”) costs of the issue of a summons where payment was made on the day of issue but for the cost incurred, which could be greater in some cases.

Firstly, the law makes no distinction between the recoverable (“reasonable”) costs and the incurred costs; the phrase in use is "costs reasonably incurred". Secondly, for payment made on the day of issue, the costs incurred would be the same in all cases. They would only likely to be greater in those cases where the authority proceeds to the court and makes the application for a liability order; then costs (irrelevant to this FOI ) which are described at regulation 34(7) and (8) would be the appropriate costs.

The FOI was worded in a way such that there was no ambiguity regarding the costs. The whole point was that there would be no variation from one case to another and had been explained at paragraph 5 in the application for permission, the relevant part below:

5. In the same way that it is not explicitly stated that the requested information must be held, neither is it stated (see FD, §8) that “A council may use a standard estimate of the costs that it reasonably incurs...”. The obligation therefore derives from interpreting regulation 34(5) of which one is submitted below:

i) After a summons has been issued but before the case is heard, the court has no jurisdiction over the level a council may claim in costs and is of no consequence whether deemed reasonable by the court (only at the hearing would the court have power to question them).

ii) The amount paid or tendered to the authority is neither prescribed nor can a standard sum – in a legal sense – be agreed by the Court. It is therefore open to the council to accept payment at this stage, being mindful of the amount tendered as may vary from case to case (see note).

iii) .........

Note: The circumstances of the case were explicitly stated in the request for information.

Paragraph 11 of the Tribunal's decision:

11. The Appellant has produced as an annex to his application a calculation apparently undertaken by NELC subsequent to the Decision Notice and possibly the Tribunal’s decision . In principle, such material should not be introduced at this stage when other parties have no opportunity to deal with it. However, its effect seems to be to underline the NELC claim and to vindicate the ICO and Tribunal decisions. Headed “Summons Costs 2012 - [13]”, it produces an average figure for the recoverable costs relating to the issue of a summons. It is computed by deducting from the total figures for collection and recovery expenditure all the overheads and other collection and enforcement costs not referable to cases targeted by the Request and dividing the result by the number of summonses. Though I have not received further evidence as to the origins or compilation of this spreadsheet, it appears to confirm that gross aggregated costs were recorded but not attributed to particular summonses. Moreover, it shows that the costs that NELC would have incurred in respect of the issue of a summons (the requested information) would include a share of overhead costs that would be very hard to calculate and which were evidently disregarded when the standard £70 charge was proposed.

The Tribunal stated that the calculation should not have been introduced, evidently because it was unfair to other parties not having an opportunity to deal with it. However, because the Tribunal believed the calculation advantaged the establishment's position, it decided as an exception to consider its content. There is no mistaking that the Tribunal sought to capitalise on the material – which it obviously considered an 'own goal' by the Appellant – in support of its decision to refuse permission to appeal.

However, rather than the contents providing any credible evidence "to vindicate the ICO and Tribunal decisions", it seems the spreadsheet reinforces assertions that inappropriate and unlawful costs have been incorporated into the standard £70 charge. Furthermore the Tribunals comment's, along with those at paragraph 10, display an apparent misunderstanding of the calculation.

Paragraph 10 of the Tribunal's decision:

10. This does not assist the Appellant however because the evidence was that the information that he sought was not held in any form. Costs varied from one case to another. Whilst the variable factors - postage, telephone calls, staff time, stationery, reminders and more were undoubtedly recorded, given limited resources and the obvious problems of attribution of certain costs, they were not attributed to the summons concerned.

In respect of its comments at paragraph 10 where the Tribunal clearly demonstrates its understanding that "telephone calls" were not attributed to the summons concerned, the calculation leaves no doubt that this was exactly the criteria used to establish the attribution of £260k, i.e., the "number of calls arising from issue of each summons" being at least twice as many as for reminders. It has already been established that none of this (£260k) could have lawfully been incurred by the council in respect of accounts settled on receipt of the summons.

Going back to paragraph 11, in respect of its comments with reference to the spreadsheet. The Tribunal appears to be satisfied that all the costs which are NOT related to the summons under the Requested circumstances have been deducted from the total figures to return an appropriate standard sum. The need appears not to arise for it to be questioned whether all the relevant expenditure has been deducted in order that what is left leaves only costs which would comply with the law (reg. 34(5)). The evidence already covered, i.e., the £260k, which requires entirely discounting, suggests that the material is flawed to the extent that it serves no useful purpose as a calculation to support that its costs comply with the relevant provision.

The Tribunal has evidently misinterpreted the calculation by letting slip its understanding that a share of overhead costs "were evidently disregarded when the standard £70 charge was proposed".

Taking the liberty of identifying which part of the calculation supported the Tribunal's view, it would probably be the £124,483 deducted under the "Debt Recovery" category, described as "Enforcement Costs - staff and overheads". It is more likely that this is an estimate of overheads which are not specifically related to council tax, but are however, connected with NNDR, Sundry debts, housing benefit overpayments etc. etc. In other words it is likely that a share of overhead costs relating to the Council Tax element will not have been deducted, therefore will not have been disregarded and will be incorporated into the standard £70 charge.

It makes you wonder whether the people who are hoodwinked into believing these fantasy costs (amounting to 10s of £millions each year) would have been if they had knowledge of the background into the decision making process for establishing the level.

Newham Borough council made no secret of why it made the decision to change the composition of its overall £95 court costs from charging £20 summons and £75 liability order to ramping up the summons by 225% to £65 whilst reducing its liability order accordingly to £30.

Without any apparent regard for the law the Finance Officer openly admitted in the 27th May 2010 report reviewing these charges that the move aimed to influence behaviour:

The financial implication of this is to retain the overall charge for enforcement of council tax payment at £95.00 but to front load the costs so that a higher charge affects the customer at the summons stage. It is anticipated that this would deter tax payers from defaulting at this stage but rather resolve nonpayment earlier and thereby improve the council’s cash flow.

The Council in question (North East Lincs Council) at paragraph 5:

The decision to charge more in respect of Non-Domestic Rates is one which other local authorities are taking in increasing numbers. (There are two in this region currently, Bradford and Sheffield.) The reasoning behind this is that it is believed that some businesses deliberately delay payment of Rates as the penalty for late payment is so small in comparison to the amount that might be owed. The extra cost is seen as a way of encouraging prompt payment.

And another Income Generation:

Income Generation

In relation to proposed areas for charging to be introduced, 81 per cent favoured increased charges for summonses compared to 57 per cent who supported charging for replacement bins or garden waste collections. Only 15 per cent were not in favour of any charges being introduced.

It seems all local authorities view the manipulation of “court costs” to be a useful instrument to be taken advantage of; evidently mistaking them as “fees” for which they all probably have a “fees policy” detailing how they may be exploited, for example, by raising them with a view to influencing behaviour, targeting certain groups or meeting particular objectives.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

A formal complaint was submitted to North East Lincs council on 15 March 2014 to have the summons costs removed which appeared as a separate item (carried forward) on my 2014/15 council tax demand.

The council would not agree to re-allocate the job of investigating the complaint and insisted that unless I accepted it would be dealt with by the employee it had nominated then it was not prepared to proceed. It has therefore been shelved up until now.

The Magistrates' court has so far obstructed the case coming before the high court for twenty months. It therefore seems unreasonable if a complaint was made to the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) that by virtue of section 26(6)(c) of the Local Government Act 1974, it should determine that it would not investigate where the person aggrieved has available to him proceedings in a court of law.

With the emergence of the council's calculations fully supporting assertions that its costs are non compliant with the law and the Ministry of Justice blocking the high court case, it's worth considering again requesting the local authority apply to the Magistrates' court to have the liability order quashed. If refusing a second time now the authority has supplied indisputable evidence, there would be a good chance that the LGO would have difficulty finding a get out of jail free card to play to avoid investigating.

The follow up is linked to here: the whole document, with the desired outcome of the complaint detailed below:

"The desired outcome of this complaint

This is another opportunity for NELC to deal with the formal complaint submitted 15 March 2014. Though it refused then on the grounds that the employee nominated to investigate was suitable (in conflict with my opinion), NELC provided no arguments of substance to support its decision. On the other hand, I went out of my way to provide comprehensive evidence as to why the person nominated would be wholly inappropriate. Nothing has changed with regards my view that nothing would be achieved by having the nominated employee investigate the complaint.

If the council refuse to allocate another employee, which I suspect, I will therefore consider escalating the complaint to the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO). As no doubt you will already know from one or a number of NELCs “Effective Complaints Handling” courses delivered by LGO staff, that by virtue of section 26(6)(c) of the Local Government Act 1974, the LGO shall not investigate matters where proceedings in any court of law are available to the person aggrieved.

On the face of it this would appear to be the case, re the High Court application, however the LGO have discretion in circumstances where it would not be reasonable to expect the person aggrieved to resort to such remedy. The clause is provided within section 26(6) of the 1974 Act as follows:

Provided that a Local Commissioner may conduct an investigation notwithstanding the existence of such a right or remedy if satisfied that in the particular circumstances it is not reasonable to expect the person aggrieved to resort or have resorted to it

The LGO would have no reasonable cause to refuse investigating the complaint on these grounds. Moreover it would have no credibility should it investigate and its decision fall in favour of NELC given that the council’s calculations provide indisputable evidence that inappropriate and unlawful expenditure was incorporated into the £70 summons.

Regardless of whether the council agrees to allocate another employee to deal with the complaint, I expect that a response is given regarding the authority requesting the liability order be quashed.

Failing NELC agreeing to apply to the court to quash the order, there is the matter of the outstanding £60 sum and how it is going to obtain payment with available enforcement powers given by the liability order. It has no way of making an attachment to wages (I receive none), neither can it make an attachment to benefits (I receive none). The sum is far below the amount which would allow the council to instigate bankruptcy or apply to the court for a charging order. There is only therefore two realistic options remaining, one of which being to apply to the court for commitment to prison, which would fail to obtain payment. Besides, the council would embarrassingly have to apply to the same court which negligently granted the liability order in the first place. Its second option available would be to instruct its bailiff contractor to attempt levying distress. The problem envisioned with that is Humberside Police would be immediately alerted who are more than aware of Rossendales track record for defrauding householders with fees and charges in connection with council tax enforcement."

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

......Newham Borough council made no secret of why it made the decision to change the composition of its overall £95 court costs from charging £20 summons and £75 liability order to ramping up the summons by 225% to £65 whilst reducing its liability order accordingly to £30.

Without any apparent regard for the law the Finance Officer openly admitted in the 27th May 2010 report reviewing these charges that the move aimed to influence behaviour:

"The financial implication of this is to retain the overall charge for enforcement of council tax payment at £95.00 but to front load the costs so that a higher charge affects the customer at the summons stage. It is anticipated that this would deter tax payers from defaulting at this stage but rather resolve nonpayment earlier and thereby improve the council’s cash flow.

.....

If Newham Borough Council's response today isn't a blatant admission that local authorities are acting outside the law then I don't know what is.

If the Serious Fraud Office, Department of Communities and Local Government, Local Government Ombudsman, Ministry of Justice, Information Commissioner, any of the Nationals etc., etc., see this, they should seriously think about taking their heads out of the sand.

Newham's response

Further to your email dated 6th July we enclose the letter to the Magistrates Court dated 14th January 2004.

Key officer decisions in connection with the other decisions is exempt under Section 36 of the Act.

Under the Freedom of Information Act we have the right to refuse a request for information held if an exemption applies. We believe in this case Section 36 applies, which provides for exemption where disclosure would be prejudicial to the effective conduct of public affairs.

Section 36 relates to information that, if disclosed, could adversely affect the delivery of public services and exempts information which disclosure would likely to inhibit the free and frank provision of advice and exchange of views for the purpose of deliberation and prejudice the conduct of public affairs. Those contributing within the course of the deliberations and discussions would feel less able to do so frankly and less inclined to explore a whole range of options if they felt their views would be later released into the public domain. As such, disclosure would prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs; inhibit the free and frank provision of advice and the free and frank exchange of views within local government.

Local government officers and senior managers need to be able to take action regarding the effective and efficient operations of services within the Council, including making candid assessments. In particular, they need safe space to undertake such activities without feeling that there will be public disclosure of their work in progress. Also, such disclosure could undermine the local authorities’ abilities to conduct internal assessments of its services in future.

The Council’s Proper Officer, as required by the Act, has deemed that it would not be appropriate to release the information requested in full under the provisions of section 36, as it is more in the public interest to withhold the information as release would be likely to prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs, inhibit free and frank provision of advice and exchange of views within local government.

Please note, the (or one of the) "Key Officer Decisions" in connection with the other decisions which is exempt under Section 36 of the Act, is the 27th May 2010 report which we already have.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

North East Lincolnshire Council's response to the formal complaint (14 July 2014)

Municipal Offices
Town Hall square
North East Lincolnshire
DN31 1HU

24 July 2014

Private and Confidential

Dear Mr outlawlgo

I am writing in response to your stage 1 complaint received by me on the 23rd July 2014. As my role of investigating officer it is my responsibility to investigate your complaint and seek to resolve matters.

I have spoken to relevant personnel and read the supporting documentation as part of the investigation process. I will now attempt to address each of your concerns in turn.

Complaint 1: You feel that North East Lincolnshire council should apply to the Magistrates Court to have your liability Order quashed.

You offer in your complaint many different reasons and explanations as to why you feel North East Lincolnshire Council should apply to have your Liability Order quashed.

However, as you are aware you attended the Liability Order hearing and you were given the chance to produce evidence in the court to oppose the application.

The outcome of the hearing was that the Liability order was granted.

Outcome:
I do not uphold this part of the complaint as North East Lincolnshire Council applied for the Liability order in adherence to the relevant regulations and legislation.

The application was heard in front of a Magistrates bench and it was their decision that the liability order would be granted.


How is North East Lincolnshire Council going to obtain the £60.00 sum outstanding.

With regards to the £60.00 outstanding on your account I can make you aware that it is for North East Lincolnshire Council to decide on any course of action.

Any action that is taken will of course be relayed to you, giving you ample notice.

As part of our efforts to continually improve services we consider learning from complaints to be an important part of developing our services to the community. Should you feel that your complaint has not been satisfactorily resolved, you can escalate to stage 2 of our complaints process where it will be reviewed by a senior officer.


Your sincerely


Neil Smith
North East Lincolnshire Council