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Hi All!
I have a draft defence and would be really grateful if anyone could have a look over it for me (I really don't know what I'm doing!)
My main defence is signage, in this particular case, the driver did not leave the car during the parking stay. There is no signage on the wall in front of the space occupied. The only signage the motorist passed is at the busy entrance so it's unreasonable that a contract was entered. The second major part is £100 stay for a 16 minute overstay, and an overall stay of 36 minutes in a Tesco express car park. I think you'll agree that this is grossly inflated.
Claim Number: xxxx
BETWEEN:
ParkingEye Ltd (Claimant)
vs
xxx (Defendant)
Hi All, I have my draft defence, I'd be really grateful for any feedback. (submission Monday).
My main defence is signage, in this particular case, the driver did not leave the car during the parking stay. There is no signage on the wall in front of the space occupied. The only signage the motorist passed is at the busy entrance so it's unreasonable that a contract was entered. The second major part is £100 stay for a 16 minute overstay, and an overall stay of 36 minutes in a Tesco express car park. I think you'll agree that this is grossly inflated.
Claim Number: F5FC7315
BETWEEN:
ParkingEye Ltd (Claimant)
vs
xxx (Defendant)
The claim is denied in its entirety.
1. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 applies
2. The signage does not offer a contract with the motorist
3. The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges)
Regulations 2013 applies
4. The charge is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is therefore an unenforceable
penalty
The Defendant is the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. The Claim relates to an
alleged debt in damages arising from a driver's alleged breach of contract, when parking at car
park on xx/xx/2018 from xx.xx.xx to xx.xx.xx.
The defence asserts that they are not liable to the Claimant for the sum claimed, or any amount
at all. Any breach is denied, and it is further denied that there was any agreement to pay the
Claimant's £100.00 'Parking Charge Notice (‘PCN’)’, for the following reasons, any one of which
is fatal to the Claimant's case.
The claimant has not provided enough details in the particulars of claim to file a full defence. In
particular, the full details of the contract which it is alleged was broken have never been
provided. As the claimant has not provided this information, signage details have been inferred
from stock photographs and the details may not be correct. Minor variants in text may occur. All
references to signage therefore, are subject to change once the full particulars of claim have
been provided.
1. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 applies
1.1. It is asserted that the Claimant’s charges are unlawful, as they are in breach of
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, specifically regulation
8(1) of the Regulations and article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive (in providing
that an unfair term is not to be binding on the consumer), which is to redress the
imbalance between the contracting parties’ bargaining power, and to re-establish
equality between them, so that the contract terms which bind the parties are such
as the parties would have agreed if they had negotiated the contract on equal
terms.
1.2. The European Court of Justice case of Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya,
Tarragona I Manresa [2013] 3 CMLR 5 provides authority for this, and it is
submitted that European Court of Justice decisions must be taken judicial notice
of by lower courts in England and Wales. The test for unfairness and imbalance
in that case is as follows (para 77);
Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that:
– the concept of ‘significant imbalance’ to the detriment of the consumer must be
assessed in the light of an analysis of the rules of national law applicable in the
absence of any agreement between the parties, in order to determine whether,
and if so to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a less favourable
legal situation than that provided for by the national law in force. To that end, an
assessment of the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the means at
his disposal, under national law, to prevent continued use of unfair terms, should
also be carried out;
– in order to assess whether the imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of
good faith’, it must be determined whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and
equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would
have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract negotiations.
1.3. It is asserted that no reasonable person, of whatever means, would willingly
agree to pay a charge of £100 as a consequence of staying over free time, if they
had the opportunity to negotiate the contract on equal terms with the other
contracting party.
1.4. It is asserted that any competent solicitor would have negotiated the charge to be
equal to a genuine pre-estimate of loss, being the normal legal situation provided
for by the national law in force. ParkingEye’s charges in the original hearing were
asserted to be an average of around £18 per ticket issued.
1.5. The Claimant relies on the Court of Appeal judgment in the case of ParkingEye v
Beavis. However, in that case the court applied the wrong test for imbalance
(para 34 and also para 37, 38)
The judge […] held that the term did not cause a significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations because the charge was no greater than that which
a motorist could expect to pay for overstaying in a municipal car park.
1.6. It is submitted that the European Court of Justice definition of imbalance must
take precedence.
1.7. However, in any case the instant case is not saved from being unfair by Beavis.
In this particular location council charges for overstay are £50 discounted to £25,
not £100 discounted to £60. As the charge is 100% greater than that which a
motorist could expect to pay for overstaying in a municipal car park there is a
clear imbalance.
2. The signage does not offer a contract with the motorist
2.1. The claim is for breach of contract. However, it is denied any
contract existed.
2.2. The Claimant states, in their Particulars of Claim, that the signage is ‘clearly
displayed’ but this is not agreed. Thus, the necessary elements of offer and
acceptance to form a contract were not present.
The signs are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces contrary to
the Consumer Rights Act 2015:
68 Requirement for transparency
(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a
consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is
expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.
The terms on the Claimant's signage are displayed in a font which is too small
and too high to be read from a passing vehicle, and is in such a position that
anyone attempting to read the tiny font would be unable to do so easily
particularly at night in a badly lit area (as applicable for this case.
2.3. Although the Claimant has not provided a signage map in many of their car parks
signs are positioned in such a way as to create ‘entrapment zones’ where
signage is not clearly visible. The Claimant is put strictly to proof that this is not
the case on this site.
2.4. It is submitted that the driver therefore, had no access to clear signage, or fair
opportunity to review terms as the only signage passed, was that at the narrow
entrance to a small and busy carpark that required driver focus on traffic, not
signage set out high above eye level and in small font. There are no signs on the
wall in front of the space occupied by the driver so there was no possibility of any
contract being entered between the claimant and defendant. It is, therefore,
denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding
contract. The elements of offer, acceptance and consideration both ways have
therefore not been satisfied and so no contract can exist.
3. The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges)
Regulations 2013 applies
3.1. The regulations define three types of contracts; distance contracts, on premises
contract and off-premises contracts.
3.2. The definitions concern themselves with how a contract is concluded (and in
particular if face to face contact occurs during this process) and not where the
contract is eventually performed. Thus, if a consumer books a hair styling
appointment over the web, that is a distance contract even though they go to the
salon for the actual styling. If they re-book at the salon, that will be an
on-premises contract. If they meet their stylist in Tesco, arrange for an
appointment and immediately phone the salon to confirm, that will be an
off-premises contract. All these contracts are performed on-premises, but
concluded in different ways.
3.3. The regulations define an on-premises contract as:
“on-premises contract” means a contract between a trader and a consumer
which is neither a distance contract nor an off-premises contract;
3.4. Thus a contract cannot be on-premises if it is a distance contract. The regulations
define a distance contract as:
“distance contract” means a contract concluded between a trader and a
consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme
without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with
the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and
including the time at which the contract is concluded;
3.5. This is clearly an organised service-provision scheme (for parking). The contract
is clearly concluded without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and
the consumer.There is clearly the exclusive use of one means of distance
communication (signage) up to and including the time at which the contract is
concluded.
3.6. This is therefore a distance contract.
3.7. None of the exemptions in regulation (6) apply. No vending machine or
automated premises was used to conclude the contract. Any contract would be
concluded by parking and walking away.
3.8. Regulation 13 lists information to be provided before making a distance contract.
The contract fails to provide the required information listed in Schedule 2 or a
means to have a copy of the contract on a durable medium. Accordingly, 13.1
states the contract is not binding on the consumer.
4. The charge is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is therefore an unenforceable
penalty
4.1. The claim is for breach of contract. In such cases, it is trite law that any charge is
intended to put the recipient back in the position they were had the breach not
occurred. If the charge is larger, as in this case, then it is a penalty and the whole
charge is unenforceable.
4.2. In this case equivalent council fines are £25 rising to £50 after 14 days. In
comparison to this the sum demanded is clearly far more than that needed to
deter, far more than genuine losses, and is therefore disproportionate, especially
so in this case, where a £100 charge equates to a 16 minute overstay, on a
non-chargeable period of 20 minutes. A total parking time of 36 minutes does not
equate to a charge of £100.
4.3. As previously explained, the parking charge amount is due to the landowner, not
the claimant. The Claimant collects it on the landowner’s behalf. The Claimant
has suffered no actual, or genuine pre-estimate of, loss as a result of any alleged
overstay. There is no initial loss to the Claimant, and they have no standing to
bring any case.
4.4. In any case, all costs are due to the cost of enforcement, which was established
in ParkingEye v Beavis to be an average of around £18 per ticket issued. These
can therefore be mitigated by taking no action. The charge of £100 is primarily
intended as a deterrent. It is, therefore, an unenforceable penalty.
4.5. The charge for breach of contract is collected on behalf of the landowner,
according to clause 3.11 of the landowner contract. However, all costs for issuing
tickets are borne by ParkingEye. The landowner therefore suffers no loss at all.
This bizarre business arrangement means that there is no cause of action.
4.6. The Claimant may rely on the ruling of ParkingEye v Beavis, held in the court of
appeal in February 2015. This case has since been heard in the Supreme Court.
Consideration should therefore be given to staying this case until the judgment is
handed down.
4.7. Each case must turn on its own fact and the facts of that case are different to
this.
4.8. The Court of Appeal ruled that is a charge was not a genuine pre-estimate of loss
it could nevertheless be saved as a penalty if (i) there was social justification, and
(ii) the charge was no more than needed to deter, which was established by
comparison with council charges at that site.
4.9. The social justification was because the car park was in a town centre and so
might be abused by commuters who stayed all day. Additionally it was alleged
that retailers would suffer if motorists stayed longer than allowed, and other
motorists would not be able to find a space when they wanted to shop.
ParkingEye have not established any social justification in this particular case.
4.10. Additionally the sum is roughly equivalent to a week’s state pension or a day and
a half take home pay at average earnings. It is therefore a huge sum, completely
disproportionate to the costs involved in any overstay.
4.11. Solicitor Costs
The claim includes a sum of £50, described as ‘Solicitor’s costs’. The Claimant is
known to be a serial litigant, issuing up to 1,000 similar claims on a weekly basis,
using the bulk processing service, generating up to £50,000 income. Given a
standard working week, the claimant’s solicitor can spend no more than a few
minutes per claim, hardly justifying the £50. Since these are fully automated, no
intervention is required by a solicitor, and the Claimant is put to strict proof to
show how this cost has been incurred. The Claimant maintains case notes for
each person who has accessed the case, and it is suggested this would be
sufficient. The Claimant cannot rely on Nossen’s Letter Patent (1969) to justify
the charge, as this is part of their everyday routine, and no ‘expert services’ are
involved. The £50 is not valid because it is not incurred by the claimant,
generating over £1.5 million a year in profit.
4.12. Additionally, as this is already included as part of the costs of the claimant,
factored into the £100 parking charge, this is essentially double charging.
4.13. To put this into context, if the work was done by an outside solicitor who charged
ParkingEye £10 (which is believed to be the going rate for this type of work) then
ParkingEye would only be able to claim £10, and not £50.
4.14. The defendant therefore puts the claimant strictly to proof, by way of timesheets
or otherwise, that work was done by the litigant’s expert staff to the value of £50.
4.15. The £50 solicitor cost was disputed in the test case of ParkingEye v Beavis and
Wardley. HHJ Moloney refused to award the £50. His award was; “JUDGMENT
FOR CLAIMANT FOR £85 PLUS ISSUE COSTS”. These were presumably the
£25 filing fee and £25 hearing fee.
4.16. The £50 was also struck out by DJ Sparrow on 19 August 2015 in ParkingEye v
Mrs S, claim number B9FC508F.
The Court is invited to dismiss the Claim, and to allow such Defendant’s costs as are
permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14.
Statement of Truth: I confirm that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Signed: THE DEFENDANT
I have a draft defence and would be really grateful if anyone could have a look over it for me (I really don't know what I'm doing!)
My main defence is signage, in this particular case, the driver did not leave the car during the parking stay. There is no signage on the wall in front of the space occupied. The only signage the motorist passed is at the busy entrance so it's unreasonable that a contract was entered. The second major part is £100 stay for a 16 minute overstay, and an overall stay of 36 minutes in a Tesco express car park. I think you'll agree that this is grossly inflated.
Claim Number: xxxx
BETWEEN:
ParkingEye Ltd (Claimant)
vs
xxx (Defendant)
Hi All, I have my draft defence, I'd be really grateful for any feedback. (submission Monday).
My main defence is signage, in this particular case, the driver did not leave the car during the parking stay. There is no signage on the wall in front of the space occupied. The only signage the motorist passed is at the busy entrance so it's unreasonable that a contract was entered. The second major part is £100 stay for a 16 minute overstay, and an overall stay of 36 minutes in a Tesco express car park. I think you'll agree that this is grossly inflated.
Claim Number: F5FC7315
BETWEEN:
ParkingEye Ltd (Claimant)
vs
xxx (Defendant)
The claim is denied in its entirety.
1. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 applies
2. The signage does not offer a contract with the motorist
3. The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges)
Regulations 2013 applies
4. The charge is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is therefore an unenforceable
penalty
The Defendant is the registered keeper of the vehicle in question. The Claim relates to an
alleged debt in damages arising from a driver's alleged breach of contract, when parking at car
park on xx/xx/2018 from xx.xx.xx to xx.xx.xx.
The defence asserts that they are not liable to the Claimant for the sum claimed, or any amount
at all. Any breach is denied, and it is further denied that there was any agreement to pay the
Claimant's £100.00 'Parking Charge Notice (‘PCN’)’, for the following reasons, any one of which
is fatal to the Claimant's case.
The claimant has not provided enough details in the particulars of claim to file a full defence. In
particular, the full details of the contract which it is alleged was broken have never been
provided. As the claimant has not provided this information, signage details have been inferred
from stock photographs and the details may not be correct. Minor variants in text may occur. All
references to signage therefore, are subject to change once the full particulars of claim have
been provided.
1. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 applies
1.1. It is asserted that the Claimant’s charges are unlawful, as they are in breach of
the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999, specifically regulation
8(1) of the Regulations and article 6(1) of the Unfair Terms Directive (in providing
that an unfair term is not to be binding on the consumer), which is to redress the
imbalance between the contracting parties’ bargaining power, and to re-establish
equality between them, so that the contract terms which bind the parties are such
as the parties would have agreed if they had negotiated the contract on equal
terms.
1.2. The European Court of Justice case of Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya,
Tarragona I Manresa [2013] 3 CMLR 5 provides authority for this, and it is
submitted that European Court of Justice decisions must be taken judicial notice
of by lower courts in England and Wales. The test for unfairness and imbalance
in that case is as follows (para 77);
Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that:
– the concept of ‘significant imbalance’ to the detriment of the consumer must be
assessed in the light of an analysis of the rules of national law applicable in the
absence of any agreement between the parties, in order to determine whether,
and if so to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a less favourable
legal situation than that provided for by the national law in force. To that end, an
assessment of the legal situation of that consumer having regard to the means at
his disposal, under national law, to prevent continued use of unfair terms, should
also be carried out;
– in order to assess whether the imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of
good faith’, it must be determined whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and
equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would
have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract negotiations.
1.3. It is asserted that no reasonable person, of whatever means, would willingly
agree to pay a charge of £100 as a consequence of staying over free time, if they
had the opportunity to negotiate the contract on equal terms with the other
contracting party.
1.4. It is asserted that any competent solicitor would have negotiated the charge to be
equal to a genuine pre-estimate of loss, being the normal legal situation provided
for by the national law in force. ParkingEye’s charges in the original hearing were
asserted to be an average of around £18 per ticket issued.
1.5. The Claimant relies on the Court of Appeal judgment in the case of ParkingEye v
Beavis. However, in that case the court applied the wrong test for imbalance
(para 34 and also para 37, 38)
The judge […] held that the term did not cause a significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations because the charge was no greater than that which
a motorist could expect to pay for overstaying in a municipal car park.
1.6. It is submitted that the European Court of Justice definition of imbalance must
take precedence.
1.7. However, in any case the instant case is not saved from being unfair by Beavis.
In this particular location council charges for overstay are £50 discounted to £25,
not £100 discounted to £60. As the charge is 100% greater than that which a
motorist could expect to pay for overstaying in a municipal car park there is a
clear imbalance.
2. The signage does not offer a contract with the motorist
2.1. The claim is for breach of contract. However, it is denied any
contract existed.
2.2. The Claimant states, in their Particulars of Claim, that the signage is ‘clearly
displayed’ but this is not agreed. Thus, the necessary elements of offer and
acceptance to form a contract were not present.
The signs are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces contrary to
the Consumer Rights Act 2015:
68 Requirement for transparency
(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a
consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is
expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.
The terms on the Claimant's signage are displayed in a font which is too small
and too high to be read from a passing vehicle, and is in such a position that
anyone attempting to read the tiny font would be unable to do so easily
particularly at night in a badly lit area (as applicable for this case.
2.3. Although the Claimant has not provided a signage map in many of their car parks
signs are positioned in such a way as to create ‘entrapment zones’ where
signage is not clearly visible. The Claimant is put strictly to proof that this is not
the case on this site.
2.4. It is submitted that the driver therefore, had no access to clear signage, or fair
opportunity to review terms as the only signage passed, was that at the narrow
entrance to a small and busy carpark that required driver focus on traffic, not
signage set out high above eye level and in small font. There are no signs on the
wall in front of the space occupied by the driver so there was no possibility of any
contract being entered between the claimant and defendant. It is, therefore,
denied that the Claimant's signage is capable of creating a legally binding
contract. The elements of offer, acceptance and consideration both ways have
therefore not been satisfied and so no contract can exist.
3. The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges)
Regulations 2013 applies
3.1. The regulations define three types of contracts; distance contracts, on premises
contract and off-premises contracts.
3.2. The definitions concern themselves with how a contract is concluded (and in
particular if face to face contact occurs during this process) and not where the
contract is eventually performed. Thus, if a consumer books a hair styling
appointment over the web, that is a distance contract even though they go to the
salon for the actual styling. If they re-book at the salon, that will be an
on-premises contract. If they meet their stylist in Tesco, arrange for an
appointment and immediately phone the salon to confirm, that will be an
off-premises contract. All these contracts are performed on-premises, but
concluded in different ways.
3.3. The regulations define an on-premises contract as:
“on-premises contract” means a contract between a trader and a consumer
which is neither a distance contract nor an off-premises contract;
3.4. Thus a contract cannot be on-premises if it is a distance contract. The regulations
define a distance contract as:
“distance contract” means a contract concluded between a trader and a
consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme
without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with
the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and
including the time at which the contract is concluded;
3.5. This is clearly an organised service-provision scheme (for parking). The contract
is clearly concluded without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and
the consumer.There is clearly the exclusive use of one means of distance
communication (signage) up to and including the time at which the contract is
concluded.
3.6. This is therefore a distance contract.
3.7. None of the exemptions in regulation (6) apply. No vending machine or
automated premises was used to conclude the contract. Any contract would be
concluded by parking and walking away.
3.8. Regulation 13 lists information to be provided before making a distance contract.
The contract fails to provide the required information listed in Schedule 2 or a
means to have a copy of the contract on a durable medium. Accordingly, 13.1
states the contract is not binding on the consumer.
4. The charge is not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is therefore an unenforceable
penalty
4.1. The claim is for breach of contract. In such cases, it is trite law that any charge is
intended to put the recipient back in the position they were had the breach not
occurred. If the charge is larger, as in this case, then it is a penalty and the whole
charge is unenforceable.
4.2. In this case equivalent council fines are £25 rising to £50 after 14 days. In
comparison to this the sum demanded is clearly far more than that needed to
deter, far more than genuine losses, and is therefore disproportionate, especially
so in this case, where a £100 charge equates to a 16 minute overstay, on a
non-chargeable period of 20 minutes. A total parking time of 36 minutes does not
equate to a charge of £100.
4.3. As previously explained, the parking charge amount is due to the landowner, not
the claimant. The Claimant collects it on the landowner’s behalf. The Claimant
has suffered no actual, or genuine pre-estimate of, loss as a result of any alleged
overstay. There is no initial loss to the Claimant, and they have no standing to
bring any case.
4.4. In any case, all costs are due to the cost of enforcement, which was established
in ParkingEye v Beavis to be an average of around £18 per ticket issued. These
can therefore be mitigated by taking no action. The charge of £100 is primarily
intended as a deterrent. It is, therefore, an unenforceable penalty.
4.5. The charge for breach of contract is collected on behalf of the landowner,
according to clause 3.11 of the landowner contract. However, all costs for issuing
tickets are borne by ParkingEye. The landowner therefore suffers no loss at all.
This bizarre business arrangement means that there is no cause of action.
4.6. The Claimant may rely on the ruling of ParkingEye v Beavis, held in the court of
appeal in February 2015. This case has since been heard in the Supreme Court.
Consideration should therefore be given to staying this case until the judgment is
handed down.
4.7. Each case must turn on its own fact and the facts of that case are different to
this.
4.8. The Court of Appeal ruled that is a charge was not a genuine pre-estimate of loss
it could nevertheless be saved as a penalty if (i) there was social justification, and
(ii) the charge was no more than needed to deter, which was established by
comparison with council charges at that site.
4.9. The social justification was because the car park was in a town centre and so
might be abused by commuters who stayed all day. Additionally it was alleged
that retailers would suffer if motorists stayed longer than allowed, and other
motorists would not be able to find a space when they wanted to shop.
ParkingEye have not established any social justification in this particular case.
4.10. Additionally the sum is roughly equivalent to a week’s state pension or a day and
a half take home pay at average earnings. It is therefore a huge sum, completely
disproportionate to the costs involved in any overstay.
4.11. Solicitor Costs
The claim includes a sum of £50, described as ‘Solicitor’s costs’. The Claimant is
known to be a serial litigant, issuing up to 1,000 similar claims on a weekly basis,
using the bulk processing service, generating up to £50,000 income. Given a
standard working week, the claimant’s solicitor can spend no more than a few
minutes per claim, hardly justifying the £50. Since these are fully automated, no
intervention is required by a solicitor, and the Claimant is put to strict proof to
show how this cost has been incurred. The Claimant maintains case notes for
each person who has accessed the case, and it is suggested this would be
sufficient. The Claimant cannot rely on Nossen’s Letter Patent (1969) to justify
the charge, as this is part of their everyday routine, and no ‘expert services’ are
involved. The £50 is not valid because it is not incurred by the claimant,
generating over £1.5 million a year in profit.
4.12. Additionally, as this is already included as part of the costs of the claimant,
factored into the £100 parking charge, this is essentially double charging.
4.13. To put this into context, if the work was done by an outside solicitor who charged
ParkingEye £10 (which is believed to be the going rate for this type of work) then
ParkingEye would only be able to claim £10, and not £50.
4.14. The defendant therefore puts the claimant strictly to proof, by way of timesheets
or otherwise, that work was done by the litigant’s expert staff to the value of £50.
4.15. The £50 solicitor cost was disputed in the test case of ParkingEye v Beavis and
Wardley. HHJ Moloney refused to award the £50. His award was; “JUDGMENT
FOR CLAIMANT FOR £85 PLUS ISSUE COSTS”. These were presumably the
£25 filing fee and £25 hearing fee.
4.16. The £50 was also struck out by DJ Sparrow on 19 August 2015 in ParkingEye v
Mrs S, claim number B9FC508F.
The Court is invited to dismiss the Claim, and to allow such Defendant’s costs as are
permissible under Civil Procedure Rule 27.14.
Statement of Truth: I confirm that the contents of this statement are true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Signed: THE DEFENDANT
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