can you please help me how to defend

[helphelp786]

Hello, I managed to cancel the CCJ (County Court Judgment) with the assistance of the LegalBeagles team. This happened due to dishonest behavior by the solicitor of my commercial lease landlord. I've also submitted a defense. However, now the claimant has initiated a summary judjemnt or strike off judgement alternatively , and the hearing is scheduled for Monday. They've given me a bundle of documents and their summary of arguments.

Unfortunately, my situation has been made worse as my doctor prescribed new medication. The previous medication was not effective, and due to my PTSD, I was feeling very low and even had thoughts of suicide. I can share the prescription details with you, although I can't attach images but if you do show me how i can . Here's the text version of the prescription:

Medicines:

• Sertraline 50 mg tablet daily
• Risperidone 2 mg tablet at night

Instructions: The patient has a history of PTSD and has been experiencing mood-related symptoms, fearfulness, repeated distressing thoughts, low mood, irritability, feelings of worthlessness, hopelessness, and even suicidal thoughts while they were in the UK. The patient is currently isolating, withdrawing socially, lacking interest, and experiencing panic-like symptoms in the early morning. A follow-up is recommended in three weeks from today.

I've been gradually working on my defense against the counter defense when i feel a bit better . without chat gpt no way i could have managed to write all this . The hearing is on monday .
Legal team, could you assist by suggesting relevant case laws?

1. Regarding the claimant's skeleton arguments , I've prepared my own skeleton arguments but do I also need to create a witness statement?

I've copied and pasted the claimant solicitor's skeleton arguments and my own. However, it's quite long, and I'm worried it might be overwhelming to review by you, which is causing my anxiety to worsen.

If possible, please provide guidance on court cases that might support my position like laws etc and cprc etc i can mention for my case as claimaint solicotr has doenf roe themselves . My current savings are £168, and I might have more next month. If there are fees or charities I can contribute to, please let me know.
without your help legal beagles i will loose the case . please


(sorry capslock ) CLAIMMAINT SOLOICIOR HAS SUBMITTED BELOW SKELETON ARGUMENTS and at last is my skeelton arguments please help

Page references to the hearing bundle numbering are [X] unless otherwise specified. Suggested reading, if possible: the Claim Form [1]; the Defence [64]; the Claimant’s present application [78].

1. The Court is invited to grant the Claimant’s application for summary judgment as the Defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim. Alternatively, the Court is invited to strike out the Defendant’s defence.

1. The Claimant claims £30,000 pursuant to a personal guarantee given by the Defendant by deed on 6 October 2014 (“the Guarantee”) [50]. The Defendant has now filed a defence which disputes the validity of the Guarantee, in particular, he disputes he signed it. For the reasons below, the Defendant’s defence is unsustainable.

Background

1. The Defendant was a director of London Rug Company Limited (“LRC”). In 2014, LRC sought to lease commercial premises owned by the Claimant. The terms of the lease and Guarantee were subject to some negotiation through legal representatives [115]-[123].

1. On 6 October 2014, LRC and the Claimant entered into a lease (“the Lease”) and the Claimant and Defendant executed the Guarantee. The Guarantee guaranteed to the Claimant and LRC the rent due under the Lease.

1. LRC failed to pay the rent due under the Lease. Accordingly, the Claimant now claims the rent arrears from the Defendant pursuant to the Guarantee. Arrears were £38,000 on the date of the Claim Form (26 September 2022) [3].

The Provisions of the Guarantee

1. The Parties are the Claimant and the Defendant [52]. At that time, the Defendant was known as Habib Ullah. The Defendant subsequently changed his name via deed poll [7].

1. Under Background [52]:

“(A) This agreement is supplemental and collateral to the Lease.

(C) The Landlord granted the Lease at the request of the Guarantor”

1. Clause 3: Guarantee and Indemnity [54]:

“3.1 The Guarantor guarantees to the Landlord that the Tenant shall pay the rents reserved Lease and perform the tenant covenants of the Lease and that if the Tenant fails to pay any of those rents or to observe or perform any of those tenant covenants, the Guarantor shall pay or observe and perform them.


3.2 The Guarantor covenants the Landlord as principal obligor and as a separate and obligation and liability from its obligations and liabilities under clause
3.1 to indemnify and keep indemnified the Landlord against failure by Tenant

either…to pay any of the rents reserved by the Lease.


PROVIDED THAT FOR THE AVOIDANCE DOUBT the amount in recoverable in under this Guarantee Agreement shall not exceed thirty thousand pounds (£30,000) which sum includes all costs incurred by the Landlord pursuant the provisions of the Lease.”

1. Clause 4.2 [55]: “Any sum payable by under this agreement shall be paid without any set-off or counter-claim against the Landlord or the Tenant.”

1. The Guarantee is stated to be “Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH…” [60].

1. The Defendant signed the Guarantee and printed his name next to his signature [60]. The signature is attested and signed by a witness.

Issues

1. The Defendant disputes that he signed the Guarantee, further alleging his signature has been lifted from a £250 promissory note. The Claimant submits the Defendant did indeed sign the Guarantee and the Guarantee is indisputably valid.

1. The Claimant submits the question for the Court is whether the Defendant signed the Guarantee.

Submissions

The Law

1. The Court is invited to grant summary judgment against the Defendant under CPR 24.2:

“The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the

whole of a claim or on a particular issue if—

1. it considers that—

1. that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or
2. that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and
3. there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”

1. The Claimant must show they have a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of success which is one that is more than merely arguable and carries some degree of conviction (ED&F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [24]).

1. In King v Stiefel [2021] EWHC] 1045 (Comm), Cockerill J made clear “the Court is by no means barred from evaluating the evidence, and concluding that on the evidence there is no real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success”.

1. The Court is alternatively invited to strike out the defence under CPR 3.4(2), which states:

“The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court—

1. that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim…”

The Defence

1. The Defendant states he did not sign the Guarantee. This is not borne out by the

correspondence between the parties’ legal representatives in 2014:

1. On 21 August 21, an email from the Defendant to the Claimant’s solicitor which stated [116]: “first you didnt want personal guarantee than you needed we are ready to provide that…”

1. On 26 August 2014, an email from Jeffrey Freed (“JF”) (the Defendant’s solicitor) to Nicky Corner (“NC”) (the Claimant’s solicitor) with the Defendant copied in, which stated [117]: “My client has instructed me to confirm that he will agree to his liability under the Guarantee continuing on an assignment of the lease or the insolvency of the tenant subject to there being a cap on his personal liability”.

1. On 2 September 2014, an email from NC to JF stated [118]: “I am also returning the Guarantee… On the basis that the liability is limited to £30,000 I hope that we can get this agreed now”.

1. On 3 September 2014, an email from JF to NC (with the Defendant copied in) stated [119]: “My client has instructed me that he agrees the further amendments to the Guarantee Agreement and the Lease”.

1. On 16 September 2014, an email from JF to NC stated [120]: “The Guarantee Agreement is approved subject to a minor typo where it refers to “this Lease” rather than “the Lease” in the definition of Liability Period and await engrossment in readiness for execution by my client”.

1. On 19 September 2014, a letter from Freed and Co to BPE Solicitors LLP stated [121]: “Further to our telephone conversation, I confirm that I have sent the Lease and Guarantee Agreement to our client for signature”.

1. On 30 September 2014, a letter from Freed and Co to BPE Solicitors LLP stated [122]: “I confirm I have received from my client the signed Lease and Guarantee Agreement in readiness for completion on Monday 6^th October 2014”.

1. Importantly, the Defendant does not dispute the signature on the Guarantee is his own.

The Claimant submits the above correspondence demonstrates the Defendant did sign the Guarantee and was legally represented at the time.

1. The Defendant in his defence and pre-action correspondence makes serious allegations against the Claimant and their legal representatives. Allegations which are demonstratable false. The defence is no more than a last ditch attempt to escape liability for the rent arrears incurred by LRC after the Defendant’s threats failed; it is purely fanciful.

1. As such, the Claimant submits the Defendant has no prospect of successfully defending his claim and there is no other compelling reason for a trial. Alternatively, the defence discloses no reasonable grounds for defending the claim.

Conclusion

1. In light of the matters above, the Court is invited to:

1. Enter judgment for the Claimant, under CPR 24.2 and/or CPR 3.4(2).

1. Order the Defendant do pay the Claimant’s costs of the proceedings on the

indemnity basis and in line with the Statement of Costs.




and MY SKELETON ARGUMENT WITH HELP of chat GPT ..Please help


Page references pertaining to the hearing bundle numbering are designated as [X] unless explicitly stated otherwise. For recommended perusal, if feasible: the Claim Form [1]; the Defence [64]; the Claimant's current application [78].

1. The Court is requested to decline the Claimant's motion for summary judgment, given the Claimant's inability to substantiate the authenticity of the successful claim. Alternatively, the Court is invited not to strike out the Defendant’s defence but to order a full trial .
2. The claimant has not succeeded in demonstrating that the defendant has signed and provided the personal guarantee, due to the following reasons

1. The Defendant served as the sole director of Lrc and held the position of a joint director and minority shareholder at Ocl Ltd (which was dissolved in 2019, with proper notification provided to the landlord).
2. The lease presented by the claimant in their hearing bundle, dated 6 October 2014, distinctly outlines the involvement of all three parties in the lease and the guarantee arrangements. Notably, the guarantor is explicitly identified as Ocl Ltd, a company that was dissolved in 2019, with proper notification to the claimant. However, conspicuously absent is any reference to a fourth party, specifically naming the defendant in a personal capacity providing personal guarantee .

1. Prior to the defendant acquiring the lease from the claimant, there were exhaustive and protracted negotiations. However, it's important to note that every email subject during these negotiations explicitly states "subject to contract" (116). At various stages and multiple times, both parties altered their positions, with the subject of the contract indicated in the subject line. Notably, the defendant remarked, "First, you didn't want a personal guarantee, then you needed it, and we are ready to provide that..." This statement does not specify the amount, nor does it constitute a definitive agreement for a personal guarantee. It merely represents an offer to furnish a personal guarantee, explicitly mentioning the claimant's shift from initially rejecting the personal guarantee to now insisting upon it.

The defendant further emphasizes that the email displayed on page (116), dated 21 August 2014, predates the claimant's proposed completion date of the lease, set for 6 October 2014. This temporal gap underscores the considerable duration of negotiations and the fluctuating positions of both the claimant and the defendant. Ultimately, the outcome was the participation of a company named Ocl in providing a guarantee, while the defendant refrained from offering a personal guarantee due to the unacceptable terms.
At one juncture, the defendant even proposed the possibility of offering a personal guarantee, contingent on the removal of Ocl as a guarantor. However, this proposal included conditions such as capping the guarantee at £300,000 and reducing the rental deposit. It's important to stress that no agreement was reached, and all the offers made were consistently prefaced with the caveat "subject to contract."

1. If the claimant intends to base their argument on emails, particularly noting that none of these emails demonstrate the presence of an agreement reached without the "subject to contract" stipulation, then all email correspondences become pertinent. This encompasses every single email exchanged between 21 August 2014 (which is the earliest email presented to the court in the claimant's hearing bundle on page 116) and 6 October 2014 (the commencement or completion date of the lease).

1. In point number 18 (b) of the claimant's skeleton arguments, the claimant contends that "On 26 August 2014, an email from Jeffrey Freed (“JF”), the Defendant’s solicitor, to Nicky Corner (“NC”), the Claimant’s solicitor, copied to the Defendant, stated [117]: 'My client has instructed me to confirm that he will agree to his liability under the Guarantee continuing on an assignment of the lease or the insolvency of the tenant subject to there being a cap on his personal liability'."
   The defendant counters this by asserting that this communication is part of the ongoing negotiations and is subject to the "subject to contract" principle, ultimately not culminating in a finalized agreement .
2. In point number 18 (c) of the claimant's skeleton arguments, the claimant asserts that "On 2 September 2014, an email from NC to JF stated [118]: 'I am also returning the Guarantee... On the basis that the liability is limited to £30,000 I hope that we can get this agreed now.'"The defendant rebuts this assertion by highlighting that this communication is part of the ongoing negotiations. They emphasize that the claimant's solicitor employs the phrase "I hope that we can get this agreed now," indicating an aspiration for agreement but not confirming that both parties have indeed agreed.Furthermore, the defendant points out an omission in the claimant's representation of the email. Specifically, on 2 September 2014, the email from NC to JF also contained the following statement: "[118] I am also returning the Guarantee. Your amendments are so wide sweeping that it makes the Guarantee virtually meaningless." The defendant argues that this inclusion underlines their viewpoint that there were substantial disagreements on both sides. From their perspective, the claimant's reliance on this email lacks a solid foundation.
3. The defendant respectfully brings to the attention of the honorable court a crucial distinction between the terms "guarantee" and "personal guarantee," given their distinct meanings. The term "guarantee" encompasses a wide range of interpretations. To illustrate this point:Regarding point number 18 (d) of the claimant's skeleton arguments, it is asserted that "On 3 September 2014, an email from JF to NC (with the Defendant copied in) stated [119]: 'My client has instructed me that he agrees to the further amendments to the Guarantee Agreement and the Lease.'"The defendant argues that the term "guarantee agreement" can carry various implications. It remains unclear whether this pertains to a personal guarantee from the defendant or a guarantee provided by the company Ocl Ltd, as previously outlined in point number 4. This ambiguity in the language does not conclusively establish the defendant as a personal guarantor. The defendant suggests that this might potentially refer to the guarantor mentioned as a party in the original lease, as described in point number 4 above. Notably, OCL Ltd is explicitly identified as a guarantor in a commercial capacity within the original lease, as per point number 4 above, without any connotation of a personal guarantee.
4. Furthermore, concerning points 18 (e), (f), and (g) within the claimant's skeleton arguments, the term "guarantee" is consistently utilized, devoid of any specific mention of the terms "personal guarantee" or "director's guarantee." From the defendant's vantage point, this particular usage could potentially refer to the company OCL Ltd. As stipulated in point number 4 previously, OCL Ltd is explicitly acknowledged as a guarantor in the lease document. The defendant posits that OCL Ltd now functions as the guarantor, ensuring the rent in a commercial capacity, rather than on a personal basis. This interpretation is supported by OCL Ltd's inclusion as a party in the lease, unlike the defendant, who is not cited as a guarantor within the lease.The defendant's understanding is grounded in the belief that these references likely pertain to OCL Ltd, and any implied guarantee could be associated with the company's role as delineated in point 4. This perspective firmly asserts that the claimant's reliance on these references as indicators of a personal guarantee from the defendant lacks substantiated support.
5. Significantly, in point number 19 of the claimant's skeleton arguments, the claimant's solicitor contends that "the Defendant does not dispute the signature on the Guarantee is his own. The Claimant submits the above correspondence demonstrates the Defendant did sign the Guarantee and was legally represented at the time." Moreover, within point number 10 of the claimant's skeleton arguments, the claimant's solicitor asserts, "10. The Guarantee is stated to be 'Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH...' [60]."However, the defendant concurs that their signature appears on the last page of an alleged personal guarantee. Nonetheless, the defendant raises a formidable challenge on the grounds that the signature seems to be placed on a seemingly blank page, which merely contains the phrase "Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH..." [60]. This context possesses the potential to be utilized in various ways or within the context of any document. This contention arises because there is no heading on the paper indicating that this specific signature page is a component of a personal guarantee. Additionally, there are no explicit words related to a personal guarantee on or around the blank page where the defendant's signature is located.Upon careful examination, the defendant uncovered the phrase "guarantee agreement" in a small, inconspicuous font within the footer section. This discovery opens up numerous possibilities, including the scenario where a blank page with a signature could be fed into a printer to add content to the footer section. The absence of a clear heading or the word "guarantee" raises questions. In fact, the claimant's solicitor had to explicitly state in point number 10 of their skeleton arguments: "10. The Guarantee is stated to be 'Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH...' [60]." This was necessary to clarify the context, as the phrase "Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH" alone sounds incomplete.It is crucial to highlight this distinction. Nowhere does it explicitly state that "The Guarantee is stated to be 'Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH.'" Instead, it merely reads "Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH." This raises a pertinent question: why is the explicit statement "The Guarantee is stated to be 'Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH'" absent? Why is it phrased as "Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH"? Interestingly, in the absence of substantial wording like "personal guarantee" associated with the property or phrasing that clarifies execution in a personal capacity, one must consider the claimant solicitor's own words, "The Guarantee is stated to be 'Executed as a deed HABIB ULLAH.'" It's worth noting that even though the solicitor uses the term "guarantee," there is no corresponding mention of such terms on the signed page, which solely reads "Executed as a deed" without reference to a personal guarantee or any form of guarantee near the defendant's signature.This leads to the question: where is the term "personal guarantee" found? The answer is nowhere. Does the last page where the defendant's signature appears contain the word "guarantee"? After meticulous scrutiny, the defendant discovered in a small, hidden font within the footer section the words "guarantee agreement." However, this revelation fails to address the fundamental query: what type of guarantee does this pertain to? As elaborated upon in point 4 earlier, does it relate to OCL Ltd guaranteeing the rent or a personal guarantee? This intriguing question will be further explored in the forthcoming points.

12. In relation to the points discussed above, it becomes evident that none of the evidence presented by the claimant's solicitors within their outlined arguments can establish the existence of agreed upon by both parties the purported personal guarantee. Moreover, these evidences fall short in proving that the term "guarantee," which is frequently used, specifically refers to a personal guarantee rather than OCL Ltd providing the guarantee. This is despite the clear mention on the first page of the lease copy provided by the claimant in the hearing bundle, where it unmistakably identifies three parties: Crw Properties as the landlord, LRC as the tenant, and OCL as the guarantor. Notably, there is no mention of the defendant as a guarantor.

12b) Delving deeper into the examination of the document referred to as the "Guarantee Agreement," as it is introduced within the claimant's hearing bundle [52] and the defendant's hearing bundle [51], a comprehensive observation can be made. This document encompasses a total of 11 pages; however, a notable aspect is that only 9 of these pages are furnished with page numbers. Interestingly, the initial 2 pages are conspicuously unnumbered. Specifically, the first page [50] and the second page [51] bear no numerical marking. Consequently, it's significant to underscore that the third page [53], which holds the designation of "page 1," serves as the commencement point for the document. This numbering setup fails to include any indication of the overall count of pages, such as the format "1 of 9," which would clarify that there are a total of 9 pages and the given page is part of this sequence. This omission inadvertently opens the door for the potential addition or removal of pages without clear documentation or tracking.

12c)In the so-called personal guarantee agreement [56], under clause 6.3.2, a reference is made to the “guarantor's statutory declaration dated "---------" according to the requirements of section 38A(3)(b) of the LTA 1954. However, crucially, the actual dates are missing entirely. The defendant can only speculate that the reason behind the missing dates is the potential non-existence of statutory declarations. It's worth highlighting that no copy of statutory declarations has been presented to the court.


12d Adding to this, the final page of the alleged personal guarantee agreement [60] lacks clear wording or headings that would definitively indicate that the document pertains to a personal guarantee. It merely carries a small-font footer mentioning "Guarantee Agreement" and is numbered as page 9. Experts consulted by the defendant suggest that this footer section could easily be altered after obtaining signatures, simply by using the same paper and adding desired text to the footer section through a printer. Given the experience of the claimant's solicitors, it's surprising that they didn't recognize the importance of clear headings indicating the nature of the agreement being signed, whether as a personal guarantee or a deed executed for personal guarantee purposes. This raises concerns about the potential for tampering.
12e) In an attempt to seek clarification about the alleged personal guarantee, the defendant wrote multiple emails to the claimant's solicitor on April 3, 2023, April 7, 2023, April 13, 2022, and April 27, 2023, asking for information regarding the place and date of signing the purported personal guarantee agreement. The responses received were largely evasive, with the claimant's solicitor questioning the relevance of such information. It was only when the defendant sent a serious email on April 28, 2023 [233] that the claimant's solicitor finally responded, mentioning that they've asked their client, Mr. Crw, to confirm the signing details.
As of now, neither the defendant nor the defendant's solicitor has received a response. Additionally, it's noteworthy that the claimant's signature does not appear on any of the provided alleged personal guarantee documents [60]. The situation becomes even more intriguing, as discussed further in section 12f.

12f) Moreover, an email dispatched by the claimant's solicitor to the defendant on May 2, 2023, discloses an entirely distinct rendition of the personal guarantee [71]. Noteworthy is the fact that this version's last page, where signatures are expected, identifies both the claimant company known as Crw Properties Limited and the defendant’s company, Lrc, as entities anticipated to sign. Importantly, this version, shared by claimant solicitor Peter Knibbs [71], diverges notably from the alleged personal guarantee presented before the court [60]. This incongruity carries significant import and demands careful consideration.


12g) Expanding upon point 12f) as stated above, the claimant's solicitor asserts that modifications to the last page of the alleged personal guarantee were necessary due to the circumstances surrounding its signing. Specifically, they explain, "In paragraph 10 you refer to the draft personal guarantee agreement having both parties’ signature boxes on one page, but the signature page signed by you has only one party’s signature box. We are instructed that is because the guarantee was being signed by the parties separately (i.e. they were not physically in the same room when the Agreement was signed), and separate signature pages were sent to the parties for signature."
This explanation provided by the claimant's solicitor raises several pressing questions:
12fi) Is there any documented correspondence between the claimant and the defendant discussing the alteration of the last page? Given that this page carries the defendant's signature, it's crucial to ascertain whether both parties were informed and agreed to the changes made to the final page of the personal guarantee. As of now, there is no evidence to suggest that the parties were duly notified or that they consented to the modifications, as the claimant asserts these were necessary due to their non-physical presence during the signing process.
12fii) Additionally, it's worth noting that the claimant's permanent residence is in New Zealand. However, at the time of signing the lease, they were present in the UK, as indicated in their email (). The pertinent question arises: Shouldn't it have been anticipated from the outset that the guarantee agreement would be signed while the parties were not in the same room? Moreover, since the claimant was indeed in close proximity to the leased property at that time, what prompted the need for alterations to the personal guarantee's crucial page where signatures are affixed? The seeming absence of authorization, permission, or notification to the defendant regarding these alterations raises concerns about the transparency and legitimacy of the process.

13. The defendant earnestly seeks access to the original documents, specifically the alleged personal guarantee agreement that has been referenced. As the heart of the dispute, these documents are of paramount importance for the defendant to conduct thorough forensic assessments and, if required, make any pertinent adjustments to their defense strategy. Gaining access to the unaltered, original documents is crucial to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the legal proceedings.

Conclusion
14 In light of the provided information, it becomes apparent that the evidence presented by the claimant's solicitors in their skeleton arguments lacks the ability to conclusively establish the existence of an agreed-upon personal guarantee. The repeated use of the term "guarantee" falls short of proving whether it pertains to a personal guarantee by the defendant or if it refers to OCL Ltd providing the guarantee, as outlined in the initial lease document. The absence of the defendant's name as a guarantor in the lease copy further adds to the ambiguity.
Upon closer examination of the alleged "guarantee agreement," discrepancies emerge that raise valid concerns. The numbering scheme of the document's pages appears inconsistent and non-standard, potentially indicating the possibility of pages being added or removed. Additionally, within the alleged personal guarantee agreement, clause 6.3.2 references a statutory declaration, but crucially, the absence of specific dates renders this clause incomplete, casting doubt on its accuracy.
Moreover, the final page of the alleged personal guarantee agreement lacks clear wording or headings that definitively signify its nature as a signed personal guarantee. The inclusion of the term "guarantee agreement" in small font within the footer section raises the possibility of tampering, wherein content could be added after obtaining a signature through the printer.
The claimant's solicitor's explanation for altering the last page of the personal guarantee agreement due to the parties not being physically present in the same room during signing introduces new questions. Notably, there is no proof of correspondence or authorization regarding the alteration of this page. Additionally, given that the claimant was present in the UK at the time of signing, the need for alterations raises suspicions regarding the process's legitimacy.
In a further twist, an email from the claimant's solicitor introduced a markedly different version of the personal guarantee, identifying both the claimant company and the defendant's company as signatories. This version contrasts significantly with the alleged personal guarantee presented in court, highlighting inconsistencies that warrant careful consideration.
Taken together, the points underscore the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the alleged personal guarantee. The lack of concrete evidence, discrepancies in documents, and questions about the alteration process cast doubt on the authenticity and clarity of the personal guarantee's existence and terms.


15. Furthermore, in light of the circumstances and complexities surrounding this case, the defendant seeks a cost order in their favor. The need for a full trial, driven by the inconsistencies and uncertainties presented in the evidence, has imposed an additional burden on the defendant. A cost order would help mitigate the financial implications incurred during the legal proceedings and reflect a just outcome in accordance with the intricacies of the case.


16. The defendant highlights a crucial aspect based on the claimant solicitors' hearing bundle {34}. In the email exchanges dated August 20, 2014, and considering the lease commencement date of October 6, 2014, a notable time gap emerges, comprising a substantial number of days. This extended duration of negotiations, including a busy period like the Christmas shopping season, potentially impacted the pace and efficiency of reaching agreements.
Furthermore, the defendant recalls a specific instance when negotiations were hurried due to concerns about disrupting Christmas shopping activities. This urgency led to a meeting with the claimant's agent at the leased premises. During this interaction, there was a discussion about retaking photographs for a missing part of the photographic schedule. However, the claimant's agent insisted on an additional fee of £250 for this service.
Facing unpreparedness and financial constraints, an arrangement was reached to sign a multi-page document. This document, as per the defendant's recollection, was essentially a promise to pay the £250 fee once the lease was finalized and the photographs were incorporated into the lease agreement. This arrangement is corroborated by a subsequent email from the claimant's agent on October 14, reminding the defendant to settle the outstanding £250 balance, which was duly paid.
Considering these details, the defendant asserts the potential likelihood that signatures were obtained on a blank paper or without a corresponding footer note. The various possibilities, including the discrepancies in the claimant's version, underscore the need for the original alleged personal guarantee document to be presented. Such an original document would greatly aid the defendant in potentially amending their defense and shedding light on the intricacies of the situation.

[atticus]

What exactly do you want? I ask as you appear to have written a pretty comprehensive argument.

Reading this, it appears that your argument is that you did not sign a guarantee or that you question the authenticity of the document that has been produced purporting to be your guarantee.

[helphelp786]

What exactly do you want? I ask as you appear to have written a pretty comprehensive argument.

Reading this, it appears that your argument is that you did not sign a guarantee or that you question the authenticity of the document that has been produced purporting to be your guarantee.

dear Atticus many thanks , i just need to mention some laws or caes also some cpr . please help me in this i will be grateful . i just need some case reference or cpr pleaseeeeeeee



For your reference ciamiant has used following law and cpr The Law

1. The Court is invited to grant summary judgment against the Defendant under CPR 24.2:
   
   “The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if—
   
   (a) it considers that—
   (i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or
   (ii) that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and
   
   (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
2. The Claimant must show they have a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of success which is one that is more than merely arguable and carries some degree of conviction (ED&F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [24]).

Page 4 of 7

1. In King v Stiefel [2021] EWHC] 1045 (Comm), Cockerill J made clear “the Court is by no means barred from evaluating the evidence, and concluding that on the evidence there is no real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success”.

[atticus]

Never mind legal argument, cases, CPR etc; you need to concentrate on showing that what you are trying to prove has a realistic chance of being proved. If you cannot do that, no amount of case law etc will help you.

[helphelp786]

Never mind legal argument, cases, CPR etc; you need to concentrate on showing that what you are trying to prove has a realistic chance of being proved. If you cannot do that, no amount of case law etc will help you.

thank you very much Atticus , i have definately put aot of proofs and hopeful to win . your reply has definately helped me my anxiety . many thanks . however in the mean time if you did come up with a case to support my case it wuld be great , however as you mentioned now i wouldnt worry too much on cpr or adding cases reference unless you kindly proovide me one . many thanks again i feel relived as if i spoken to some one .best regards

[atticus]

If you have not already done so, you should download and study this guide: https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-an...-civil-221013/. In respect of summary judgement, read paragraphs 13.35 onwards.

Also read and understand CPR Part 24 and Practice Direction 24.

[helphelp786]

Hi Mr. Atticus,

I sent my skeleton arguments to the court and the other side's lawyer early this morning, around 4 am. My arguments countered theirs, and I had strong reasons and references to support my points. It took me a while because I'm dealing with mental health issues.

However, today at about 4:35 pm, the other side's lawyer sent a completely new set of skeleton arguments. They changed the numbering of their points, which makes it difficult for me to refer to their previous arguments. This situation is making my anxiety worse, and I'm finding it challenging to update my arguments to match theirs due to my anxiety and PTSD medication.

I have a few questions:

1. What would you suggest I do in this situation?
2. The hearing is scheduled for Monday at 2 pm. Is it acceptable for them to send new skeleton arguments this late? I thought they were required to send them at least three days before the hearing. Can I object to this timing?note i sent mine 4 am early morning they then updated their skeleton argument and sent 4.35 pm
3. Interestingly, they're not addressing the most important part where the other side admitted to changing the last page of the agreement. I provided evidence and two versions of the contract, but they're choosing not to respond to it.

I appreciate your guidance on this matter.