HI all -
I want to bring an issue to your attention and hopefully get some feedback from PSTM (people smarter than me). Below is the part of an argument I submitted in support of a request for summary judgment to set aside a default judgment under CPR s.24.2 and s.3.4(2)(c). There were many arguments and issues, but this one likely applies to a great number of people in similarly unfair circumstances, so I want to share.
In short, the claim was signed 'Restons Solicitors Limited' -- I don think this is legal. Here is the argument I put in my statement of case. Note references to 'E#' refer to evidence. Point 2.2 is besides the point, but Im leaving enough context here so you are able to see the flow of the arguments. As noted there were several further strong arguments forwarded. I am awaiting a response from the court on my n244 application and will let you know what the court says just as soon as I do.
2.1 The claimant failed to sign the Statement of Truth on the original claim [E1] as required and as argued in detail under D. Discussion: IV. The Statement of Truth... on p.24.
2.2 The claimant failed to provide the defendant's correct name as required by CPRPD 16 §2.6(a) or birth date as required by CPR §12.4(2) and CPRPD 12 §3.2, where such knowledge is and was readily available and demonstrably reasonable to expect, since this information was clearly noted on the contract provided by the claimant [E5.2] and credit report [E6, E6.1].
2.3 The defendant contends that these failures to comply with the basic rules and directions as noted above suffice under CPR §3.4(2)(c) for striking out the claimant’s claim in its entirety.
(below is the stuff on p.24 where the point is argued in detail
IV. The Statement of Truth and CPRPD 7E §10
1. Considerable emphasis is placed on the statement of truth as a seminal and foundational pillar for every case, claim, document, service, statement, amendment and piece of evidence. The references in the CPR abound so numerously to this requirement that no attempt will be made to cite them all; it should suffice to note that an entire chapter of the CPR with its own Practice Direction is dedicated to it: CPRD §22 and CPRPD 22. Moreover, the references to CPR §32.14 abound no less frequently in context, and so it does not seem unreasonable to emphasize this issue's significance, even at risk of overstating it.
2. In every instance but one, a statement of truth attached to a claim or statement of case must be signed by a specific individual, a 'person', under CPR §22.1(6)(a). This includes the further special situation where signing is undertaken by a 'legal representative' under CPR §22.1(6)(a)(ii), which is defined in CPR §2.3(1) as a range of individuals or persons with one noted exception: '(e) person who, for the purposes of the Legal Services Act 2007, is an authorised person...' This issue requires clarification before the contention can be made sharp.
3. LSA(2007) §18(1) distinguishing between: (a) a person granted special authority and (b) a licensable body with certain privileges. In both cases, the authority derives from an 'approved regulator', in the latter case by virtue of a license. The privileges bestowed are explicated in LSA(2007) §12(1), §12(2), Schedule 2 and, as regards this issue, (Sched. 2)(4)(1)(c), whereby signing authority is uncontentiously granted to a legal representative as a species of 'performance of any ancillary functions...'. Thus, the point is accepted (and so not argued) as follows: If a legal firm could sign a statement of truth, that legal firm would be in its licensed right to do so as an 'authorised person' under CPR §22.1(6).
4. However, nowhere in LSA(2007) or any other statute, act or law whatsoever is authority granted for one individual ('S') to sign as a different 'authorised person' ('F'); there may be precedent for a license to kill, but not a license to commit fraud. For example, a parent may sign for a child, a solicitor might sign for a client, a CEO might sign on behalf of a corporation and a magistrate might sign with the authority of the court, but in no case does one party sign as or with the name of another. The special privileges afforded by LSA(2007) for firms to represent clients as 'authorised persons' cannot endow them beyond their natural capacities nor should it provide for otherwise unlawful acts to be committed in compensation for their evident handicaps. So, when Ms. XXXX filed the application for a charging order [E4], she signed her name to the statement of truth, not 'Restons Solicitors Limited', and it is contended that to have done otherwise would have invalidated it. Yet, the signature on the original claim [E1] is, indeed, 'Restons Solicitors Limited'.
6. The only legal distinction between these two instances is the permitted use of electronic signatures and alternative media provided by CPRPD 7E §10 for claims issued through the Moneyclaim website. It simply states that if a personis authorised to sign with a quill, 'that person' may equivalently sign a Moneyclaim claim's statement of truth with an ipod. Whether even that should be permitted is contentious, but for the purposes here, it grants no further privileges beyond those provided in LSA(2007).
7. 'Restons Solicitors Limited' should only be regarded as a valid signature on a statement of truth when the firm itself grows wings with feathered quills and hands, or it becomes a sentient being able directly to manipulate the characters displayed on a computer screen under its own volition. Until then, such 'authorised persons' will in any case have to rely upon the actual activities of us lesser mortals to achieve its purposes. And we who are mortal must not claim to be anyone other than who we are, not least in a statement of truth.
5. Thus the defendant contends that signatures must unambiguously and clearly correspond to their signers without exception. Should the court find otherwise on this issue, the defendant respectfully requests that an objection be noted in the record; and if the court concurs or finds the arguments reasonable, the defendant also respectfully requests that such be clearly noted for the purposes of stare decisis. The defendant would only note that the issue's philosophical importance, ethical relevance and practical significance in the near future probably cannot be overstated, so it merits serious consideration.
On retrospect, I think I should have made explicit mention of the fraud act accordingly.
So, what do you think?
I want to bring an issue to your attention and hopefully get some feedback from PSTM (people smarter than me). Below is the part of an argument I submitted in support of a request for summary judgment to set aside a default judgment under CPR s.24.2 and s.3.4(2)(c). There were many arguments and issues, but this one likely applies to a great number of people in similarly unfair circumstances, so I want to share.
In short, the claim was signed 'Restons Solicitors Limited' -- I don think this is legal. Here is the argument I put in my statement of case. Note references to 'E#' refer to evidence. Point 2.2 is besides the point, but Im leaving enough context here so you are able to see the flow of the arguments. As noted there were several further strong arguments forwarded. I am awaiting a response from the court on my n244 application and will let you know what the court says just as soon as I do.
2.1 The claimant failed to sign the Statement of Truth on the original claim [E1] as required and as argued in detail under D. Discussion: IV. The Statement of Truth... on p.24.
2.2 The claimant failed to provide the defendant's correct name as required by CPRPD 16 §2.6(a) or birth date as required by CPR §12.4(2) and CPRPD 12 §3.2, where such knowledge is and was readily available and demonstrably reasonable to expect, since this information was clearly noted on the contract provided by the claimant [E5.2] and credit report [E6, E6.1].
2.3 The defendant contends that these failures to comply with the basic rules and directions as noted above suffice under CPR §3.4(2)(c) for striking out the claimant’s claim in its entirety.
(below is the stuff on p.24 where the point is argued in detail
IV. The Statement of Truth and CPRPD 7E §10
1. Considerable emphasis is placed on the statement of truth as a seminal and foundational pillar for every case, claim, document, service, statement, amendment and piece of evidence. The references in the CPR abound so numerously to this requirement that no attempt will be made to cite them all; it should suffice to note that an entire chapter of the CPR with its own Practice Direction is dedicated to it: CPRD §22 and CPRPD 22. Moreover, the references to CPR §32.14 abound no less frequently in context, and so it does not seem unreasonable to emphasize this issue's significance, even at risk of overstating it.
2. In every instance but one, a statement of truth attached to a claim or statement of case must be signed by a specific individual, a 'person', under CPR §22.1(6)(a). This includes the further special situation where signing is undertaken by a 'legal representative' under CPR §22.1(6)(a)(ii), which is defined in CPR §2.3(1) as a range of individuals or persons with one noted exception: '(e) person who, for the purposes of the Legal Services Act 2007, is an authorised person...' This issue requires clarification before the contention can be made sharp.
3. LSA(2007) §18(1) distinguishing between: (a) a person granted special authority and (b) a licensable body with certain privileges. In both cases, the authority derives from an 'approved regulator', in the latter case by virtue of a license. The privileges bestowed are explicated in LSA(2007) §12(1), §12(2), Schedule 2 and, as regards this issue, (Sched. 2)(4)(1)(c), whereby signing authority is uncontentiously granted to a legal representative as a species of 'performance of any ancillary functions...'. Thus, the point is accepted (and so not argued) as follows: If a legal firm could sign a statement of truth, that legal firm would be in its licensed right to do so as an 'authorised person' under CPR §22.1(6).
4. However, nowhere in LSA(2007) or any other statute, act or law whatsoever is authority granted for one individual ('S') to sign as a different 'authorised person' ('F'); there may be precedent for a license to kill, but not a license to commit fraud. For example, a parent may sign for a child, a solicitor might sign for a client, a CEO might sign on behalf of a corporation and a magistrate might sign with the authority of the court, but in no case does one party sign as or with the name of another. The special privileges afforded by LSA(2007) for firms to represent clients as 'authorised persons' cannot endow them beyond their natural capacities nor should it provide for otherwise unlawful acts to be committed in compensation for their evident handicaps. So, when Ms. XXXX filed the application for a charging order [E4], she signed her name to the statement of truth, not 'Restons Solicitors Limited', and it is contended that to have done otherwise would have invalidated it. Yet, the signature on the original claim [E1] is, indeed, 'Restons Solicitors Limited'.
6. The only legal distinction between these two instances is the permitted use of electronic signatures and alternative media provided by CPRPD 7E §10 for claims issued through the Moneyclaim website. It simply states that if a personis authorised to sign with a quill, 'that person' may equivalently sign a Moneyclaim claim's statement of truth with an ipod. Whether even that should be permitted is contentious, but for the purposes here, it grants no further privileges beyond those provided in LSA(2007).
7. 'Restons Solicitors Limited' should only be regarded as a valid signature on a statement of truth when the firm itself grows wings with feathered quills and hands, or it becomes a sentient being able directly to manipulate the characters displayed on a computer screen under its own volition. Until then, such 'authorised persons' will in any case have to rely upon the actual activities of us lesser mortals to achieve its purposes. And we who are mortal must not claim to be anyone other than who we are, not least in a statement of truth.
5. Thus the defendant contends that signatures must unambiguously and clearly correspond to their signers without exception. Should the court find otherwise on this issue, the defendant respectfully requests that an objection be noted in the record; and if the court concurs or finds the arguments reasonable, the defendant also respectfully requests that such be clearly noted for the purposes of stare decisis. The defendant would only note that the issue's philosophical importance, ethical relevance and practical significance in the near future probably cannot be overstated, so it merits serious consideration.
On retrospect, I think I should have made explicit mention of the fraud act accordingly.
So, what do you think?
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