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Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015 UKSC 47 (8 July 2015)
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-33442942
A family has won its legal bid to challenge limits on welfare payments to severely disabled children in hospital.
Benefits for Cameron Mathieson, five, stopped after he spent more than 12 weeks in Alder Hey Hospital, Liverpool.
Supreme Court judges agreed the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) had been "grossly unfair" when it stopped his payments after 84 days.
His family said they had continued the fight over Disability Living Allowance (DLA) "on behalf of other families".
Cameron, from Warrington, Cheshire, died in 2012 after suffering from cystic fibrosis and Duchenne muscular dystrophy, among other conditions.
From the Judgment...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-33442942
A family has won its legal bid to challenge limits on welfare payments to severely disabled children in hospital.
Benefits for Cameron Mathieson, five, stopped after he spent more than 12 weeks in Alder Hey Hospital, Liverpool.
Supreme Court judges agreed the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) had been "grossly unfair" when it stopped his payments after 84 days.
His family said they had continued the fight over Disability Living Allowance (DLA) "on behalf of other families".
Cameron, from Warrington, Cheshire, died in 2012 after suffering from cystic fibrosis and Duchenne muscular dystrophy, among other conditions.
From the Judgment...
By notice dated 3 November 2010 the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, in accordance with regulations, suspended payment to Cameron Mathieson, then a boy aged three, of Disability Living Allowance ("DLA") on the ground that he had by then been an in-patient in an NHS hospital for more than 84 days (12 weeks). Did the Secretary of State thereby violate Cameron's human rights?
Proceedings
On 10 January 2012 the First-tier Tribunal (Social Security and Child Support) dismissed Cameron's appeal against the Secretary of State's decision to suspend payment of the DLA. On 15 January 2013 the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) determined a further appeal which Cameron had brought and with which, following his sad death on 12 October 2012, his father, Mr Craig Mathieson, had proceeded pursuant to an appointment under regulation 30(1) of the Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/1968). The Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on the ground of an error of law but, in the event, it likewise dismissed the appeal. On 5 February 2014, by a judgment delivered by Laws LJ with which Ryder and Underhill LJJ agreed, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Mathieson's further appeal: [2014] EWCA Civ 286. Mr Mathieson now appeals to the Supreme Court.
Proceedings
On 10 January 2012 the First-tier Tribunal (Social Security and Child Support) dismissed Cameron's appeal against the Secretary of State's decision to suspend payment of the DLA. On 15 January 2013 the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) determined a further appeal which Cameron had brought and with which, following his sad death on 12 October 2012, his father, Mr Craig Mathieson, had proceeded pursuant to an appointment under regulation 30(1) of the Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987/1968). The Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal on the ground of an error of law but, in the event, it likewise dismissed the appeal. On 5 February 2014, by a judgment delivered by Laws LJ with which Ryder and Underhill LJJ agreed, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Mathieson's further appeal: [2014] EWCA Civ 286. Mr Mathieson now appeals to the Supreme Court.
With regard to the appropriate remedy to give effect to these conclusions, I agree that this should be tailor-made and limited to Cameron's particular position, by simply deciding that the decision in his case cannot stand and that he was entitled to continued payment of DLA after 84 days. The Secretary of State may be able to refine the criteria for the receipt or cessation of DLA in other cases in a manner which avoids the inequity involved in its withdrawal in respect of those in Cameron's position. We cannot address in general declaratory terms the position of children receiving DLA and hospitalised for longer than 84 days, as Mr Mathieson invites us to do.
