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Mullen v Hackney - re strike outs and costs
HACKNEY LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL v MULLEN sub nom THE MAYOR AND BURGESSES OF THE LONDON BOROUGH OF HACKNEY v MAUREEN MULLEN (1996)
CA (Civ Div) (Waite LJ, Saville LJ, Otton LJ) 18/10/96
Whether the consideration of previous breaches of undertakings by the same defendant in earlier cases amounted to an improper or unreasonable reliance on local or special knowledge. The nature and scope of Judicial Notice.
Appeal by the defendant London Borough of Hackney (LBH) from a decision of County Court judge (HHJ Graham QC) ordering them, under the provisions of s.14(4A) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, to pay a £5000 fine. The respondent was a secure tenant who pursued a claim for compensation and for a mandatory order to carry out remedial work. A consent order was made by the Court containing an undertaking by LBH to carry out specified works of repairs within a given period. The fine was in respect of the breach of this undertaking. LBH contended the judge had erred in law in taking into consideration previous instances in different cases where LBH had failed to honour undertakings given to the Court, there being no evidence before the Court as to such previous breaches. HELD: (1) Courts may take judicial notice of matters which are so notorious or clearly established or susceptible of demonstration by reference to a readily obtainable and authoritative source, that evidence of their existence is unnecessary. Judges have a wide discretion and may notice much that they are not required to notice, such notice being in some cases conclusive and in others prima facie and rebuttable. (2) A judge can rely on his own local knowledge, as long as he does so properly and within reasonable limits, and as long as that knowledge is general in character and not liable to be varied by the specific characteristics of the particular case. Judges using such knowledge were to be regarded as fulfilling a constitutional function. (3) Applying these principles to the present case, the judge was entitled to take Judicial Notice of his special or local knowledge of how the appellant had conducted itself in relation to undertakings given in similar cases. (4) The facts noticeable were relevant in deciding the appropriate sanction. The judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion to take such matters into account, and it was for him to decide what weight to attach to the knowledge once he had decided to take notice. It being acknowledged by the appellants that the fine could not be regarded as manifestly excessive if it was permissible to take notice, the appeal was dismissed.
Mr Ranjit Bhose instructed by Christopher Hinde, Hackney for the respondents. The plaintiff did not appear and was not represented.
HACKNEY LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL v MULLEN sub nom THE MAYOR AND BURGESSES OF THE LONDON BOROUGH OF HACKNEY v MAUREEN MULLEN (1996)
CA (Civ Div) (Waite LJ, Saville LJ, Otton LJ) 18/10/96
Whether the consideration of previous breaches of undertakings by the same defendant in earlier cases amounted to an improper or unreasonable reliance on local or special knowledge. The nature and scope of Judicial Notice.
Appeal by the defendant London Borough of Hackney (LBH) from a decision of County Court judge (HHJ Graham QC) ordering them, under the provisions of s.14(4A) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, to pay a £5000 fine. The respondent was a secure tenant who pursued a claim for compensation and for a mandatory order to carry out remedial work. A consent order was made by the Court containing an undertaking by LBH to carry out specified works of repairs within a given period. The fine was in respect of the breach of this undertaking. LBH contended the judge had erred in law in taking into consideration previous instances in different cases where LBH had failed to honour undertakings given to the Court, there being no evidence before the Court as to such previous breaches. HELD: (1) Courts may take judicial notice of matters which are so notorious or clearly established or susceptible of demonstration by reference to a readily obtainable and authoritative source, that evidence of their existence is unnecessary. Judges have a wide discretion and may notice much that they are not required to notice, such notice being in some cases conclusive and in others prima facie and rebuttable. (2) A judge can rely on his own local knowledge, as long as he does so properly and within reasonable limits, and as long as that knowledge is general in character and not liable to be varied by the specific characteristics of the particular case. Judges using such knowledge were to be regarded as fulfilling a constitutional function. (3) Applying these principles to the present case, the judge was entitled to take Judicial Notice of his special or local knowledge of how the appellant had conducted itself in relation to undertakings given in similar cases. (4) The facts noticeable were relevant in deciding the appropriate sanction. The judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion to take such matters into account, and it was for him to decide what weight to attach to the knowledge once he had decided to take notice. It being acknowledged by the appellants that the fine could not be regarded as manifestly excessive if it was permissible to take notice, the appeal was dismissed.
Mr Ranjit Bhose instructed by Christopher Hinde, Hackney for the respondents. The plaintiff did not appear and was not represented.
