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Wise refusing chargebacks and APP reimbursement after coordinated phising scam
Hi all,
Looking for advice on a dispute with Wise after being a victim of a coordinated vishing scam on 23 March 2026. Three individuals called my partner and me via WhatsApp, impersonating Wise's security team, using our real names, card details, and account information. They sent a fake verification email from what appeared to be support@wise.com. Over several hours, they carried out:
Fraudulent Wise-to-Wise transfers (EUR):
- From my account: 5,180.27 EUR to Abdul Hadi Jahan Khan at 18:08 CET
- From my account: 4,184.38 EUR to Arun William Jhita at 18:27 CET. This one was refunded by the scammers to build trust and get us to approve subsequent transactions
- From my partner's account: 5,180.27 EUR to Tremaine Joshua at 21:01 CET
All three were internal Wise-to-Wise transfers.
Fraudulent card transactions (GBP):
12 transactions totalling over 12,700 GBP at UK merchants I have never used, including Harrods (1,740 GBP), Hermes (1,620 GBP), BullionByPost (3,529 GBP), Emma Sleep (1,099 GBP), Booking.com (1,613 GBP), Grailed (630 USD), FARFETCH (582 GBP), PopArtFusion (1,249.99 GBP), Decathlon (99 GBP), Nando's (48.53 GBP), Zooplus (255.14 GBP), HomeLoft (247.86 GBP). There were also multiple failed attempts at Emma Sleep (x4), Harrods (x2), Decathlon (x2), and Global-E (x2), plus Amazon and Zara. None were flagged by Wise's fraud detection.
Things to note:
- Both my partner and I called Wise customer support DURING the active fraud to report it
- We were told to flag transactions in the app and wait up to 2 business days
- Our accounts were not frozen, we were not escalated to a fraud team, and further transactions went through after we called
- The transfers were internal Wise-to-Wise, and Wise could have frozen/reversed them
- The scammers refunded one transfer (4,184.38 EUR) to build trust, which is a known social engineering tactic. Wise should recognise this pattern
- After I reported the fraud, the scammer account sent 0.10 EUR back to my partner's account with a reference using the fake case number the scammers had given us. The fraudulent account was still active on Wise's platform even after my report.
- Wise has since blocked the card and removed it from my app while investigations are ongoing
- I was deceived into converting remaining balances in other currencies to EUR before the transfers, to maximise the amount available
Wise's responses so far:
1. For the Wise-to-Wise transfer: denied refund saying "funds already transferred to recipient." Closed the case via a no-reply email address so I couldn't even respond.
2. For the card transactions: first claimed APP doesn't cover card payments. When I asked for chargebacks, they then claimed that because the transactions were 3DS-approved (via push notification/TASK), they have no fraud chargeback rights under Visa's Zero Liability policy. Their position is that because I technically approved the 2FA prompts, the transactions count as authorized.
3. They claim they attempted recalls with the merchants but were unsuccessful and merchants did not respond. However, I have been contacting merchants directly and multiple have responded positively (Hermes has refunded, PopArtFusion cancelled and refunded, BullionByPost stopped the order).
4. Their transaction log shows repeated attempts at the same merchants (Emma Sleep x4, Harrods x2, Decathlon x2) and all were approved within hours. None flagged by fraud detection.
5. They quote their T&Cs about gross negligence and claim they "can't find Wise responsible for the loss."
6. Wise has its own card dispute process (https://wise.com/help/articles/29779...rd-transaction) but never offered it to me.
7. Sent me links to fraud awareness tips and T&C quotes.
My position:
- The Wise-to-Wise transfers are push payments, not card payments. The transfer was in EUR (not GBP), so Wise claims the UK APP scheme doesn't apply. However, PSD2 Articles 73-74 cover this regardless of currency (Wise operates under EU regulation through its Belgian entity, Wise Europe SA, authorised by the National Bank of Belgium).
- For the card transactions: I am entitled to chargebacks under Visa rules. Wise's claim that 3DS approval means they have "no fraud chargeback rights" is wrong — consent obtained through social engineering is not valid authorization. Under Regulation 76 of the PSR 2017, the burden is on Wise to demonstrate I authorized the transactions.
- Wise failed to act when I reported the fraud in real time, which directly caused the funds to settle.
- The crime took place in the UK: all card transactions were at UK merchants in GBP, the scammers used UK phone numbers (+44) and spoke with English accents, and the recipient Wise accounts were UK-based. The only reason the transfers were in EUR is that my funds were held in EUR in a multi-currency account. Wise's multi-currency feature effectively gives scammers a way to route around APP protections.
I have filed a police report (Mossos d'Esquadra, Spain) and a report with UK Report Fraud. I have requested a formal complaint from Wise.
My questions:
1. Has anyone successfully escalated a similar case against Wise to the Financial Ombudsman? I can see FOS has ruled against Wise in fraud cases before.
2. Wise is claiming that because the transactions were 3DS-approved (push notification), Visa Zero Liability doesn't apply and they have "no fraud chargeback rights." Is this correct? My understanding is that consent obtained through social engineering/deception is not valid authorization, even if 2FA was technically completed.
3. Does Wise's refusal to provide me with a chargeback mechanism, combined with blocking the card and removing it from my app, give me stronger grounds at FOS?
4. For the EUR transfers, is PSD2 my best route, or is there a stronger argument?
5. Wise closed the transfer case via a no-reply email. Does this count as a valid final response for FOS purposes?
6. Wise's multi-currency feature effectively gives scammers a way to route around APP protections by keeping transfers in a non-GBP currency. Does anyone have experience arguing that the APP scheme should still apply in this situation, or that Wise's own product design should not be a valid defence for denying reimbursement?
7. Any other advice on dealing with Wise specifically?
Please let me know if I should post on a specific channel rather than here.
Any help would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance.
Looking for advice on a dispute with Wise after being a victim of a coordinated vishing scam on 23 March 2026. Three individuals called my partner and me via WhatsApp, impersonating Wise's security team, using our real names, card details, and account information. They sent a fake verification email from what appeared to be support@wise.com. Over several hours, they carried out:
Fraudulent Wise-to-Wise transfers (EUR):
- From my account: 5,180.27 EUR to Abdul Hadi Jahan Khan at 18:08 CET
- From my account: 4,184.38 EUR to Arun William Jhita at 18:27 CET. This one was refunded by the scammers to build trust and get us to approve subsequent transactions
- From my partner's account: 5,180.27 EUR to Tremaine Joshua at 21:01 CET
All three were internal Wise-to-Wise transfers.
Fraudulent card transactions (GBP):
12 transactions totalling over 12,700 GBP at UK merchants I have never used, including Harrods (1,740 GBP), Hermes (1,620 GBP), BullionByPost (3,529 GBP), Emma Sleep (1,099 GBP), Booking.com (1,613 GBP), Grailed (630 USD), FARFETCH (582 GBP), PopArtFusion (1,249.99 GBP), Decathlon (99 GBP), Nando's (48.53 GBP), Zooplus (255.14 GBP), HomeLoft (247.86 GBP). There were also multiple failed attempts at Emma Sleep (x4), Harrods (x2), Decathlon (x2), and Global-E (x2), plus Amazon and Zara. None were flagged by Wise's fraud detection.
Things to note:
- Both my partner and I called Wise customer support DURING the active fraud to report it
- We were told to flag transactions in the app and wait up to 2 business days
- Our accounts were not frozen, we were not escalated to a fraud team, and further transactions went through after we called
- The transfers were internal Wise-to-Wise, and Wise could have frozen/reversed them
- The scammers refunded one transfer (4,184.38 EUR) to build trust, which is a known social engineering tactic. Wise should recognise this pattern
- After I reported the fraud, the scammer account sent 0.10 EUR back to my partner's account with a reference using the fake case number the scammers had given us. The fraudulent account was still active on Wise's platform even after my report.
- Wise has since blocked the card and removed it from my app while investigations are ongoing
- I was deceived into converting remaining balances in other currencies to EUR before the transfers, to maximise the amount available
Wise's responses so far:
1. For the Wise-to-Wise transfer: denied refund saying "funds already transferred to recipient." Closed the case via a no-reply email address so I couldn't even respond.
2. For the card transactions: first claimed APP doesn't cover card payments. When I asked for chargebacks, they then claimed that because the transactions were 3DS-approved (via push notification/TASK), they have no fraud chargeback rights under Visa's Zero Liability policy. Their position is that because I technically approved the 2FA prompts, the transactions count as authorized.
3. They claim they attempted recalls with the merchants but were unsuccessful and merchants did not respond. However, I have been contacting merchants directly and multiple have responded positively (Hermes has refunded, PopArtFusion cancelled and refunded, BullionByPost stopped the order).
4. Their transaction log shows repeated attempts at the same merchants (Emma Sleep x4, Harrods x2, Decathlon x2) and all were approved within hours. None flagged by fraud detection.
5. They quote their T&Cs about gross negligence and claim they "can't find Wise responsible for the loss."
6. Wise has its own card dispute process (https://wise.com/help/articles/29779...rd-transaction) but never offered it to me.
7. Sent me links to fraud awareness tips and T&C quotes.
My position:
- The Wise-to-Wise transfers are push payments, not card payments. The transfer was in EUR (not GBP), so Wise claims the UK APP scheme doesn't apply. However, PSD2 Articles 73-74 cover this regardless of currency (Wise operates under EU regulation through its Belgian entity, Wise Europe SA, authorised by the National Bank of Belgium).
- For the card transactions: I am entitled to chargebacks under Visa rules. Wise's claim that 3DS approval means they have "no fraud chargeback rights" is wrong — consent obtained through social engineering is not valid authorization. Under Regulation 76 of the PSR 2017, the burden is on Wise to demonstrate I authorized the transactions.
- Wise failed to act when I reported the fraud in real time, which directly caused the funds to settle.
- The crime took place in the UK: all card transactions were at UK merchants in GBP, the scammers used UK phone numbers (+44) and spoke with English accents, and the recipient Wise accounts were UK-based. The only reason the transfers were in EUR is that my funds were held in EUR in a multi-currency account. Wise's multi-currency feature effectively gives scammers a way to route around APP protections.
I have filed a police report (Mossos d'Esquadra, Spain) and a report with UK Report Fraud. I have requested a formal complaint from Wise.
My questions:
1. Has anyone successfully escalated a similar case against Wise to the Financial Ombudsman? I can see FOS has ruled against Wise in fraud cases before.
2. Wise is claiming that because the transactions were 3DS-approved (push notification), Visa Zero Liability doesn't apply and they have "no fraud chargeback rights." Is this correct? My understanding is that consent obtained through social engineering/deception is not valid authorization, even if 2FA was technically completed.
3. Does Wise's refusal to provide me with a chargeback mechanism, combined with blocking the card and removing it from my app, give me stronger grounds at FOS?
4. For the EUR transfers, is PSD2 my best route, or is there a stronger argument?
5. Wise closed the transfer case via a no-reply email. Does this count as a valid final response for FOS purposes?
6. Wise's multi-currency feature effectively gives scammers a way to route around APP protections by keeping transfers in a non-GBP currency. Does anyone have experience arguing that the APP scheme should still apply in this situation, or that Wise's own product design should not be a valid defence for denying reimbursement?
7. Any other advice on dealing with Wise specifically?
Please let me know if I should post on a specific channel rather than here.
Any help would be greatly appreciated. Thanks in advance.
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