Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

North East Lincolnshire Council's external auditor contractor, KPMG, has delivered its response to the request for a declaration of unlawful account and report in the public interest.

You have to bear in mind that as a private company and contractor to the council it had little choice in the matter if it wanted to carry on being the council's contractor.

From: outlawlgo
To: Auditor (KPMG)
Sent: December 27, 2015
Subject: Audit Commission Act 1998 - Council tax summons costs Accounts

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: Declaration of unlawful account and report in the public interest

In your capacity as external auditor to North East Lincolnshire Council (the 'Council') I am requesting KPMG apply to the court for a declaration that an item of account is contrary to law under section 17(1) of the Audit Commission Act 1998 with respect to Council Tax court summons costs.

It would also seem appropriate that serious consideration is given whether to produce a report in the public interest under section 8 of the Audit Commission Act 1998.

Charge briefly outlined

A £60 sum is applied as standard to the taxpayer's account in all cases where the Council makes complaint to the Magistrates' court for alleged non-payment of council tax. The charge is added on serving a summons, whether or not the person summonsed is proceeded against in the Magistrates' court, or whether the Council incurs any expenditure in respect of resources expended engaging with the person.

Note: It is this activity (staff contact) for which a significant element of the £60 costs is attributed, see Annex F, attached Grounds of Appeal ("GoA").

Point of law

The Statutory Instrument which provides for claiming these costs is the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992. The level (and application) of costs are restricted to instituting the complaint (summons) by regulation 34(5) and where the case proceeds to court and a liability order is obtained, regulation 34(7) allows costs to include the additional expenditure attributed to that process.

The costs must be referable to each of these stages therefore a lesser sum is incurred by the Council for instituting the complaint and must not include any of the expenditure attributed to obtaining the court order, or other expenditure, like for example enforcing the order after it has been granted by the court.

The Council's policy to apply costs / Judicial review

As stated, the Council recharges a standard sum in all cases and therefore not in accordance with the incremental two stage approach outlined in the Regulations. Also, by applying the same sum in all cases, the situation arises where a taxpayer who simply settles his debt on receiving a demand (summons) subsidises the costs of another taxpayer who engages with staff, for example to renegotiate payment plans, and the subsequent expenditure attributed to monitoring the arrangement.

However, in a recent High Court case; R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin), the judge gave guidance in a bid to clarify the grey area surrounding the Council electing; i) to charge a standard sum in all cases; and ii) not to apply a lesser sum for instituting the complaint than the costs for proceeding to court and obtaining the liability order.

Paragraph 46 of the judgment (attached), with regard to a standard sum, states, so far as is relevant as follows:

"46. In principle, therefore, provided that the right types of costs and expenses are taken into account, and provided that due consideration is given to the dangers of double-counting, or of artificial inflation of costs, it may be a legitimate approach for a local authority to calculate and aggregate the relevant costs it has incurred in the previous year, and divide that up by the previous (or anticipated) number of summonses over twelve months so as to provide an average figure which could be levied across the board in “standard” cases..."

Paragraph 50 of the judgment, with regard to not applying a lesser sum for instituting the complaint etc., states as follows:

"50. In principle there is no reason why a local authority should not decide to limit the costs it claims to the costs in connection with issuing the summons, although in practical terms that approach provides no incentive to the respondent to pay up after the summons is issued. What matters is that the costs that it does decide to claim are properly referable to the enforcement process."

Implications of R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates

The judge's opinion at para 46 is that it may be a legitimate approach to apply a standard sum in all cases. However, if wanting to take that approach (and do so lawfully) the standard sum would also have to be properly referable to the Regulations (regs 34 and 35). If there is any doubt as to what these regulations provide clarification has been provided in the Council Tax Practice Note 9: Recovery and Enforcement, produced by the Department of the Environment (1993) and more recently in the 2013 Government good practice guide, for the collection of Council Tax arrears, which both state that "the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case is no more than that reasonably incurred by the authority".

In that case, given that the amount claimed by way of costs in any individual case must be no more than that reasonably incurred by the billing authority, if the Council wanted to take advantage of streamlining the administration process by applying a standard sum in all cases, in order for it to be done lawfully, it would need to forfeit each element of expenditure it incurs that is not common to every application (the majority of costs which are accounted for in its breakdown).

In other words, a standard sum could not exceed that incurred by the authority in a case where the least expenditure is attributed, which would in practice relate to a taxpayer settling his outstanding debt on receipt of a summons without contacting the council on any issue. Deriving a figure therefore from the ‘Gross Recoverable costs’ (see Annex F, GoA) which is split between an estimated number of summons, can not be lawful; even less so if the number of summons is reduced to factor in an estimate for those withdrawn, waived and those in respect of unrecoverable costs.

The least cost case is the only basis on which to determine a standard sum if the aim is to eliminate the administrative burden of calculating the costs in each case, whilst at the same time complying with the regulations which require that the costs be no more than that incurred by the authority in any individual case.

The Council sets its standard costs at a level to ensure that no cost of recovery is borne by the taxpayer in priority to complying with the Regulations that restrict the amount that can be recharged in costs to the court application (Annex C of GoA, particularly paras 4-10). It is therefore contended that an element of the standard £60 costs can not be compliant with the Regulations, based as they are on the premise that any expenditure considered attributable to recovery and enforcement activity (however tenuously linked) is recoverable by recharging it to the defendants through costs claimed in an application for a Liability Order

The breakdown of costs which the Council has undertaken to keep under review provides evidence that in the circumstances relating a taxpayer simply settling their debt on receiving a summons, the vast majority of expenditure it claims is not incurred for the issue of a summons so is contended that the claimed costs represent a sum outside that which the law provides.

If the Regulations were applied lawfully, the consequences would be that the majority of ‘Council Tax’ (£191,730), ‘Debt Recovery’ (£327,480) and the ‘Control & Monitoring’ costs (£109,380) would not be permissible in respect of re-charging expenditure for instituting the complaint (see paras 73-115, GoA).

Yours sincerely

From: Prentice, John
To: [outlawlgo]
Cc: Wroot, Sharon
Sent: Monday, June 06, 2016
Subject: North East Lincolnshire Council - council tax summons costs

Dear Mr [outlawlgo],

Declaration of unlawful account and report in the public interest

We refer to your e-mail of 27 December 2015, in which you request KPMG to apply to the court for a declaration that an item of account is contrary to law under section 17(1) of the Audit Commission Act 1998 with respect to Council Tax court summons costs reclaimed by North East Lincolnshire Council. You also requested consideration of whether a report in the public interest should be produced under section 8 of the Audit Commission Act 1998.

The Council seeks a standard summons costs of £60 for all cases where the Council applies to the Magistrates Court for recovery of outstanding council tax. You contend that the manner in which this is applied is outside that which the law provides. You also contend that the costs included for recovery exceed those allowable, following guidance from the judge in the High Court Case R (Nicolson) v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] EWHC 1252 (Admin)

You have demonstrated your knowledge of the legal powers relating to council tax enforcement in your attachment relating to the Defendant’s Grounds of Appeal in your previous submission to the Magistrates Court. As Parliament has given power to the courts to determine whether to approve or accept the request for summons costs or costs reasonably incurred by the Council, we cannot circumvent the wishes of Parliament by substituting our judgement in these situations. You have previously put your case before the Magistrates Court and High Court so it would be inappropriate for us to determine that any summons costs awarded by the Magistrates Court could be unlawful. Any decision otherwise could only be taken by a higher Court and therefore must be deemed beyond our responsibilities. Similarly, whether or not the Council seeks to recover further costs for instituting an application for a liability order is a policy matter for the Council and it is not the role of the auditor to interfere in policy decisions made within the powers of the Council.

It was therefore not necessary for us to establish the legal powers that apply in this situation. We have therefore considered the following points in relation to the matters you raise:

1. What actions has the Council taken in relation to the recovery of council tax summons costs?

2. Has the Council acted reasonably in relation to the recovery of those costs?

3. Are there any matters where we might conclude that the Council has acted unlawfully?

4. Are there any matters which would justify a report in the public interest?

Council actions

The Council’s website contains an annual calculation of its summons costs for the forthcoming year. It sets out the costs included in its calculation, based on estimated costs for the year ahead, and divides these by the number of summons issued in the previous year (being its best estimate for the year ahead). Those costs include administration, recovery and enforcement but only estimated proportions to exclude costs estimated to relate to routine processing and collection of council tax on time. The figure derived is rounded to the nearest £10 and this figure is used when applying to the Magistrates Court for additional costs along with arrears of council tax. As the Regulations allow for costs of collection and recovery to be recovered where costs are sought, we would consider that the Council’s actions are not unreasonable in this situation.

The website states:

“This figure is determined based on comparisons with the fees charged by neighbouring councils and the national average. A check is made to ensure that the monies raised from applying costs are not greater than the actual cost of the service.”

As stated in the previous paragraph, the Council determines its summons cost by reference to its own estimated costs. It is therefore incorrect, as well as inappropriate, for it to then say this figure is determined on the basis of comparison with other authorities. Instead these are used to confirm that the Council’s own costs are not out of line with others before setting its charge. We have recommended to the Council that the latter statement should be amended on its website.

Has the Council acted reasonably?

The Council has acted in an open and transparent manner by publishing the details of its calculations of its council tax court summons costs for at least three years. It has altered the amount it has sought to recover for is costs, from £70 to £60, due to changes in volume and efficiency savings. Although entitled to seek further costs for liability orders, it has opted not to seek further costs which is a policy decision within the Council’s powers. It has considered charges made by other councils to confirm that its own costs are not excessive. Overall, we are able to conclude that the Council has acted reasonably.

Are their actions unlawful?

Following consideration of the above, and given that the website description is an administrative error only, we have concluded that there is no unlawful item of account. Consequently there is no need for any action under paragraph 28 of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014.

Is a report in the public interest required?

There are also no matters which would require reporting in the public interest under schedule 7 paragraph 1 of that Act. (This Act replaces the Audit Commission Act 1998 from 2015-16 onwards.)

We have recently sent you a booklet published by the National Audit Office which explains your rights. We have therefore not included this again but it is also applicable to the matter above.

We have copied this e-mail to the Council so that they are aware of the decisions reached.

Yours sincerely

J G Prentice
Director, for and on behalf of, KPMG LLP

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: [outlawlgo]
To: Rose, Nicholas (JACO)
Sent: Friday, May 27, 2016
Subject: Re: Emailing: [outlawlgo] final letter

Dear Mr Rose

My suspicions are now confirmed that the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman is an organisation put in place at the expense of the taxpayer to give the appearance that holders of judicial office are accountable. It takes little concluding that legislation governing investigatory powers has been enacted to enable its application to cases with such flexibility that the same complaint could either fall within the Ombudsman's remit and be accepted for investigation or be considered outside his remit and be rejected.

The statutory nature of the process serves as protection for judicial office-holders as invariably the Ombudsman will apply the law in a way that ensures the matter falls outside the Ombudsman's remit. Presumably, only when the MoJ wishes to be rid of someone will the governing legislation be applied as a means to that end.

The Ombudsman has decided the outcome purely on the basis that he believes the Advisory Committee's version of events when the overwhelming evidence is that the letters have been produced afterwards and in response to preliminary enquiries.

From the Ombudsman statement at paragraph 4 of his decision the matter is narrowed down to such triviality as to decide whether he considers the alleged letters containing a minor error in the post code constitutes maladministration, which of course it wouldn't but is not the issue.

The deliberate postcode error was an obvious and half-hearted attempt at a red herring, but did serve as something on which the Ombudsman could base his report. It should be noted that other correspondence sent by the Justices' Clerk, properly addressed, have been received both before and after the alleged letters were sent.

I doubt the Ombudsman disagreed with my assertion that the odds of four items of correspondence failing to be delivered are virtually zero. If he doesn't the matter effectively comes down to being my word against the relevant person at the Advisory Committee's. I have stated that none of the correspondence reached me and prepared to declare so in a signed statement of truth and suggest that the relevant person at the Advisory Committee does similar. However, this proposal has been ignored and believe it has been because discovering the truth might not fit in with the Ombudsman's agenda.


Further inaccuracies

It might seem trivial but there should be at least a minimum standard to which the Ombudsman should aim with regard accuracy of reports.

At paragraph 4 of the decision, the dismissal letter referred to was not the letter of 2 September 2015, that was the date of my letter of complaint to the Advisory Committee.

In your email (24 May) it is stated that the complaint file did not contain the letter of 16/09/14. My understanding is that this was in the complaint file as it was one of three letters sent to me as email attachments on 23/02/16. That email stated as follows:

"I am sorry for the delay in writing to you. It took a significant amount of time to obtain the complaint file from the Advisory Committee, which was received last week."

While checking my records today to confirm this I also looked into when the letters were created which were as follows:

Letter 16.9.14 – Created on 08/02/16 at 18:20:11

Letter 29.5.15 – Created on 08/02/16 at 18:20:29

Letter 6.7.15 – Created on 08/02/16 at 18:20:51

Whether or not the fact they were produced two weeks before you sent them to me has any significance I will let you decide.


Case stated document and MoJ correspondence

I assume you meant the case stated document when referring in your email (24 May) to the complaint file not containing the letter of 16/09/14.

The final 'case stated' referred to in the 16/09/14 letter is a key piece of evidence that should have been obtained. The Ombudsman should have insisted on its disclosure whether or not it was part of the complaint file. Where events are questioned the Ombudsman must be required to make a reasonable attempt to get at the truth. That could have been done simply by asking for the disputed document as it supposedly exists as stated in the recently obtained dismissal letter of 16/09/14:

"A certificate of refusal to state a case was not issued by the Justices because they did state a case for the consideration of the Administrative Court and the final case has been sent to you."

The complaint file clearly should have contained the final 'case stated', but it is immaterial that the Ombudsman disagrees. Discovering it did not exist, therefore not sent would provide a solution for why the three other letters had similarly not existed. Merely requiring proof that the case stated existed to further an investigation does not amount to considering issues surrounding the document.

For the same reasons stated for being unable to consider the MoJ correspondence, i.e., that it was not part of the complaint file and not dealt with by the Advisory Committee, it does not amount to considering issues around the 'case stated', only reinforces the assertion of maladministration by the failure to reply after undertaking to do so by a given date.

It is clear from the chronology (para 47) that a certificate of refusal to state a case was requested on 22/04/14 and if as is said in the dismissal letter of 16/09/14, the final case had been sent to me, then you would have expected this would have been advised.

It is my belief that the Ombudsman, knowing full well I have been caused gross injustice by these events, has unfairly applied the law in a way that ensures the matter falls outside his jurisdiction in a bid to protect the responsible person.

It would be reasonable, given these arguments, that this matter be reconsidered, however, I expect you will counter this by informing me that I have the option of challenging the decision by entering into another procedure that has been responsible for causing me the injustice in the first place.

Your sincerely

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: Rose, Nicholas (JACO)
To: [outlawlgo]
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2016
Subject: RE: Emailing: [outlawlgo] final letter

Mr [outlawlgo]

Thank you for your comments, I am happy to respond to the points you raise.

Para 2 of the Report - You confirm that the 'case stated' related to a separate claim and not the JR - thank you for clarifying this. This is not something that would affect the outcome of the decision as the Ombudsman confirmed in Para 2 that correspondence about the 'case stated' was not a matter that could be considered under the regulated disciplinary process. Your proceedings and correspondence with the court about these proceedings did not raise an issue which could be considered by the AC or the Ombudsman.

Your papers appeared to suggest that the JR did not proceed because the Council had declined to pursue the costs against you (see Para 32 and 38 of your chronology). You have now clarified that this was not the case - again this has no bearing on the Ombudsman's decision as he has already stated that correspondence about a 'case stated' was outside the scope of the regulated disciplinary procedures.

Delay by the AC in providing a copy of its complaint file - the AC stated that the delay in responding to a request for the complaint file was caused by an office move. There was a further delay when I asked the AC if it had proof of posting for the three letters. It finally confirmed that the letters would have been sent by standard delivery and that there was no record of posting for this type of mail. JACO provided regular updates to you during this period.

The complaint file did not contain the letter of 16/09/14 or correspondence with the MoJ because this was not a matter dealt with by the AC as it was outside the disciplinary process. Again the Ombudsman was clear that issues around the case stated were not matters he could consider, he cannot consider any issue arising in your correspondence with the court regarding your claim or your application for JR. He confirmed in his report that the AC properly dismissed your judicial conduct complaint in accordance with the legislation. Other matters you raised were outside the AC's investigative remit.

I trust that the 3 letters have now reached you. You will have to chase your contact in the MoJ about the 4th letter. The Ombudsman's preliminary investigation report is final and there will be no further 'final' reports; the complaint process has been completed and no further action will be taken by the Ombudsman as he has confirmed that the actions complained about could not lead to a finding of maladministration because the AC correctly dismissed your original complaint in accordance with the disciplinary legislation.

I trust this clarifies matters and concludes the complaint.

Nick Rose
Investigating Officer
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman
9th floor, The Tower, 102 Petty France, London SW1H 9AJ
0203 334 2912
nick.rose@jaco.gsi.gov.uk

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: [outlawlgo]
To: Rose, Nicholas (JACO)
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2016
Subject: Re: Emailing: [outlawlgo] final letter


Dear Mr Rose

Further to my 24 May 2016 email, I have noted that the events are inaccurate regarding the proceedings, for example there seems to have been confusion regarding the the two High Court applications. The first was an application for the justices to state a case for the opinion of the High Court and the second (Judicial Review claim) was for a mandatory order requiring the Justices to state a case for an appeal to the High Court as I was having no success dealing directly with the Magistrates court.

For the moment I will leave that to one side except to say that I'm concerned about how it has come about that you have been led to believe that there was some settlement with North East Lincolnshire Council, hence (para 2):

"He subsequently applied to Judicially Review this decision and the matter appears to have been settled with the Council at that point."

And (para 6)

"The papers show that the application was not proceeded with as the local authority responded with an offer acceptable to Mr Yyyyy."

I would like to know what information has been referred to in order to assert the above because there has never been any kind of settlement with North East Lincolnshire Council in the matter.

Letters produced in response to the investigation

There is no obvious reason why the three documents which were allegedly sent to me dated 16 September 2014, 29 May and 6 July 2015 could not have been made available for the Ombudsman within a few days, yet Mr Jones who was initially dealing with the matter stated the following in his 23 February 2016 correspondence:

"It took a significant amount of time to obtain the complaint file from the Advisory Committee, which was received last week."

I have checked my records and note that Mr Jones wrote to me on 3 December 2015 and from the contents of his email it was implied that it was on or around that date when these documents were asked for:

"I will now request your complaint file from the JCIO and you will be written to again when it has been received and considered."

To take over 12 weeks to disclose the documents does tend to suggest what I believe has happened which is they have been produced purposely for the Ombudsman's investigation. This would be supported by the fact that the final case stated, which is said in the 16 September 2014 letter by the Justices' Clerk who handled the complaint was sent to me has apparently never been seen by anyone. Presumably the Ombudsman has not at any time been furnished with the document and I definitely have not despite requesting or enquiring about it on the following occasions:

1. An email to the Justices' Clerk on 25 February 2016, (Mr Jones JACO copied in).

I was never sent a response.


2. A request to the Ministry of Justice on 13 March 2016 regarding the 25 February email.

I received the following

"I have spoken to Ms Watts and she apologises for the delay in response and for not arranging for you to be updated with the fact that she is dealing with your email. Ms Watts has confirmed that she will respond to your email of 25 February by no later than 15 April 2016. Ms Watts has been considering this matter and has had to review the file to give full consideration to the matter raised."

I was not sent a response by or on 15 April 2016 nor have I received one since.


3. Prompted the Ministry of Justice on 11 May 2016.

I was emailed on 12 May by the MoJ as follows: "I will contact Ms Watts again and ask her to respond."

Still no reply or even acknowledgement.


It is also material that the Court was contacted nine times in connection with obtaining the finalised case stated and replied only once, despite the Ombudsman stating that the mishandling of the application does not come under his remit. The fact that I was written to on that one occasion (6 March 2014) with an undertaking that by the following day, the position regarding the case would be set out and communicated in writing fits in with the pattern, as that too was never acted on.

A letter updating me on the progress of my complaint, sent 12 May 2016 provides further evidence of the difficulty there seems to be for the Advisory Committee to provide information. Delaying continues to be the recurring theme:

"I am writing to update you on the progress of your complaint. I have contacted the Advisory Committee to obtain further information and comment but have not received a response. Today I sent a chase-up letter. Once I have this information I will be able to complete my report and prepare the papers for the Ombudsman."

The odds are virtually nil that four items of correspondence – correctly addressed, all but a minor error – being sent that neither reached me nor were returned. I have stated that none of the correspondence reached me and am prepared to declare so in a signed statement of truth.

I would think the most sensible way forward – before a final report is produced – is for the relevant person at the Advisory Committee to make a written statement of truth that the documents said to have been sent to me on the respective dates were actually produced and sent around that time.


Yours sincerely

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: [outlawlgo]
To: Rose, Nicholas
Sent: Monday, May 23, 2016 5:05 PM
Subject: Re: Emailing: [outlawlgo] final letter


Dear Mr Rose

I have briefly looked at the attachments and from what I've seen the contents are so misrepresentative of the truth that they are hardly recognisable.

It is so obvious that the Ombudsman is being fed a pack of lies by the [redact] yet you are prepared to allow this injustice on the basis that she is being honest.

How has the Ministry of Justice managed to deteriorate to such a state that it is staffed [redact]?

I would like my criticism officially recording.


Your sincerely

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Investigating Officers Report (JACO)

Annex A

JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND CONDUCT OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE
COMPLAINT BY MR XXXX YYYYYY
INVESTIGATING OFFICER’S REPORT

INTRODUCTION

1. This report is prepared following a request by Mr Xxxx Yyyyyy, that the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman review the conduct of an investigation by the Humber Advisory Committee (HAC) of his complaint against Mr JA O’Nions JP and Mr T A Shepherdson JP. This report will form part of the evidence considered by the Ombudsman in assessing the complaint.

BACKGROUND

2. The papers I have seen indicate that Mr Yyyyyy faced a summons to appear at Grimsby Magistrates Court on 2 November 2012 for non-payment of Council Tax. He paid the outstanding tax plus part of the costs demanded in the summons prior to the hearing. He was concerned that on the date of the hearing the court made him liable for the outstanding costs. He subsequently applied to Judicially Review this decision and the matter appears to have been settled with the Council at that point. On 2 September 2014 Mr Yyyyyy complained to the HAC about the magistrates hearing his case. His complaint was dismissed on 16 September 2014 on the grounds that he was complaining about a judicial decision which did not raise a question of misconduct. Mr Yyyyy did not receive the letter and subsequently complained about this to Judicial Office, the JCIO and to you.

THE COMPLAINT

3. Mr Yyyyyy contacted the Ombudsman’s Office on 8 August 2015 and made final comments on 3 March 2016. The Ombudsman has agreed to investigate the concerns that: the HAC failed to properly respond to his complaint or his correspondence and dismissed the complaint erroneously.

4. Mr Yyyyyy asked the Ombudsman to investigate his concern that the court had not properly responded to his application for Judicial Review and had not provided a “case stated” document. The complaint about the Court’s handling of the Judicial Review application would be outside the Ombudsman’s remit as it does not concern a matter which could be considered under the disciplinary legislation as it does not concern the actions of a judicial office-holder. The Ombudsman cannot therefore consider it within the powers granted to him under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.

MY OBSERVATIONS

The complaint to the Advisory Committee

5. On 2 September 2014 Mr Yyyyyy complained to the Central Secretarial Office in Doncaster that

two Magistrates, Mr O’Nions and Mr Shepherdson had adjudicated on his case and allowed the local authority to enforce payment of an unpaid element of his court summons costs; and that

his application was subsequently submitted to the Magistrates’ Court to state a case in his appeal to the High Court, he believed the failure to respond to this request was a failing in the Magistrates’ behaviour which he described as “conduct [which] has been such to pervert the course of justice”.

6. Mr Yyyyyy attached an affidavit to his complaint which he had produced for his application for Judicial Review, this document set out a chronology of the events surrounding the hearing of his case; it also set out his attempts to obtain a response to his application from the court. The papers show that the application was not proceeded with as the local authority responded with an offer acceptable to Mr Yyyyyy.
The Advisory Committee’s handling of the complaint

7. On 16 September 2014 the HAC responded, stating that the Chairman had dismissed both aspects of his complaint because:

first, the complaint related to a judicial decision which did not raise a question of misconduct and

second, the complaint about correspondence in his legal proceedings concerned actions which were not done or caused to be done by the Magistrates.

8. I observe that the disciplinary rules state that:

The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee must dismiss a complaint, or part of a complaint, if it falls into any of the following categories: 32(b) it is about a judicial decision or judicial case management, and raises no question of misconduct; and 32(c) the action complained of was not done or caused to be done by a magistrate.

9. I also observe that first tier complaints bodies such as the HAC do not have the power to investigate complaints about criminal behaviour such as ‘perverting the course of justice’ this is a matter for police action if appropriate.

10. The response was sent to Mr Yyyyyy but did not reach him. I observe that the postal address was correctly stated on the letter but that the postcode was written as DN32 0Q3 rather than DN32 0QJ.

11. Having not received the response, Mr Yyyyyy emailed the Judicial Office HR Team at the Royal Courts of Justice on 14 May 2015 to complain. His complaint was forwarded to the HAC which sent another copy of the dismissal letter to him on 29 May 2015; unfortunately this letter did not reach him (it had the same error in the postcode but was otherwise correctly addressed). I observe that the HAC did not email a copy of the letter to Mr Yyyyyy.

12. On 25 June 2015 Mr Yyyyyy emailed the Judicial Complaints Investigations Office (JCIO) to complain that his complaint had been ignored by the Secretary of the HAC. The JCIO forwarded the email to the HAC on 29 June 2015.

13. On 16 July 2015 the HAC sent another copy of the dismissal letter to him, unfortunately this letter did not reach him (it had the same error in the postcode but was otherwise correctly addressed). I observe that the HAC did not email a copy of the letter to Mr Yyyyyy.

14. Mr Yyyyyy then complained to the Ombudsman.

15. I asked the HAC to ask if it had a record of postage of the letters; it responded:

“A log is not maintained of post that is sent out by the Advisory Committee. Correspondence that for any reason is despatched by recorded delivery will of course have proof of posting. Correspondence of the description sent to Mr Yyyyyy is issued by ordinary post and will be despatched on the date of the correspondence or exceptionally the next working day if for some reason the mail does not reach the collection by Royal Mail from the court office in time.”

16. The Ombudsman will consider whether there is any maladministration in the handling of Mr Yyyyyy’s complaint and his correspondence.

17. The Judicial Conduct (Magistrates) Rules 2014 state that:

..::::...:::::...:::::...

Nick Rose
Investigating Officer
2016

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Judicial Conduct Ombudsman’s Preliminary Investigation Report

Judicial Appointments & Conduct
Ombudsman

Our ref: 15-2489

Mr Xxxx Yyyyyy

yyyyyyyxxxx@mail.com

23 May 2016

Dear Mr Yyyyyy


Your complaint

Thank you for your correspondence with my officers setting out your concerns about your complaint.

I asked Mr Rose to consider this matter; as you are aware his letter indicated that I would conduct a full investigation, including referring my report to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. However I have since discussed the matter with him and concluded that your complaint does not raise issues which could enable me to make a finding of maladministration.

I am therefore afraid that I must refuse to accept your complaint for a full investigation. You will see from the accompanying reports that I was content that the Humber Advisory Committee properly considered and dismissed your complaint on 2 September 2014, in accordance with the relevant legislation and guidance.

The fact that three letters did not reach you is surprising as they were properly addressed except for a minor error in the postcode which should not have prevented delivery. I do not consider that a finding of maladministration is possible for this error.

Concerns that you raise about the Court's response to your application for Judicial Review do not fall within the scope of the disciplinary process and were properly dismissed by the Humber Advisory Committee in accordance with legislation and guidance. The Court's response to your application for Judicial Review is outside my remit and I cannot comment further on that issue.

I appreciate that you will be disappointed that I have not been able to accept your complaint for a full investigation, but I can assure you that I did consider the matter most carefully before reaching my decision.

Yours sincerely,


Mr Paul Kernaghan CBE

_______________________________________________

JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND CONDUCT OMBUDSMAN’S PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT

COMPLAINT BY MR XXXX YYYYYY

Introduction

1. Mr Xxxx Yyyyyy asked me to review the investigation by the Humber Advisory Committee (HAC) of his complaint against Mr J A O’Nions JP and Mr T A Shepherdson JP.
The complaint

2. Mr Yyyyyy complained to me on 8 August 2015. I have carried out a preliminary investigation into his concerns that the HAC did not respond to his complaint: I could not consider his complaint about the Court’s failure to provide a “case stated” response to his application for Judicial Review as this could not be dealt with under the regulated disciplinary procedures and is therefore outside my remit.

The background

3. Mr Yyyyyy faced a summons to appear at Grimsby Magistrates Court on 2 November 2012 for non-payment of Council Tax. He paid the outstanding tax plus part of the costs demanded in the summons prior to the hearing. He was concerned that on the date of the hearing the court made him liable for the outstanding costs. He subsequently applied to Judicially Review this decision and the matter appears to have been settled with the Council at that point. On 2 September 2014 Mr Yyyyyy complained to the HAC about the magistrates hearing his case. His complaint was dismissed on 16 September 2014 on the grounds that he was complaining about a judicial decision which did not raise a question of misconduct. Mr Yyyyyy did not receive the letter and subsequently complained about this to the Judicial Office and the JCIO.

My decision

4. I have not identified any issue arising in my preliminary investigation which could lead to a finding of maladministration. I consider that the error in the post code of the dismissal letter of 2 September 2015 should not have prevented it from being delivered, as the whole of the postal address was correctly set out, and if it was undelivered it should have been returned to the HAC for further action and re-issue. This minor error could not in itself amount to maladministration. I note that the HAC re-issued the dismissal letter on two further occasions but that there is no proof of postage as the letter was sent by standard post. It is unfortunate that the HAC did not email a copy to Mr Yyyyyy when it posted a copy of the letter, but again this omission could not amount to maladministration. I am content that Mr Yyyyyy’s complaint of 2 September 2014 was properly dismissed in accordance with disciplinary legislation and guidance. For these reasons I cannot accept this complaint for a full investigation

Paul Kernaghan CBE

23 May 2016

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: outlawlgo
To: Clerk to the Justices
Cc: JACO
Sent: February 25, 2016
Subject: Application to State a Case - Grimsby Magistrates' Court

Dear Mrs Watts

The Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman has made me aware of three letters it appears you sent me, dated 16 September 2014, 29 May and 6 July 2015.

Although I now have copies of all three letters, none of these reached me and I was not aware they had been sent, neither did I receive the final case stated which in your 16 September 2014 letter you say was sent to me. The Ombudsman, however, has not sent a copy of the case stated and so would like to have that in order to proceed with my application to the High Court.

If you agree to this would you please clearly state the original date and an effective date of service so I can ensure the relevant papers are served within the 10 day time limit under the procedure rules.

Yours sincerely

outlawlgo

The final case stated which the justices' clerk claims to have sent but was never received is the reason why the appeal can not progress (appeal papers are complete).

The email above asked for the case to be resent but it was never replied to. The Ministry of Justice was asked to intervene and it responded as follows:

"Re email of 25 February 2016 to Alison Watts - I would like the MoJ to disclose who or what department at Grimsby Magistrates Court dealt with the correspondence, and what the court’s policy is in regards picking and choosing which correspondence it replies to.

I can confirm that there is not a policy of “picking and choosing” correspondence to reply to within HMCTS. All courts endeavour to reply to correspondence usually within 5 working but usually no later than 10 working days.

I have spoken to Ms Watts and she apologises for the delay in response and for not arranging for you to be updated with the fact that she is dealing with your email. Ms Watts has confirmed that she will respond to your email of 25 February by no later than 15 April 2016. Ms Watts has been considering this matter and has had to review the file to give full consideration to the matter raised.

No correspondence has been received yet from the justices' clerk relating to this.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: outlawlgo
To: A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2016
Subject: Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673


Dear Mr Hobley


Any further action taken over this won't be via the casino justice system, it will be a report to the fraud squad for the £15 million annually the LGO thieves from the taxpayer.


Yours sincerely


outlawlgo

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk
To: outlawlgo
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2016
Subject: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673


13 April 2016


Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us)


Dear Mr outlawlgo,

I note your comments on my review of Mr Oxley's decision, but have nothing further to say. If you wish to challenge Mr Oxley's decision I suggest you seek legal advice before starting judicial review proceedings.


Yours sincerely


Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader
0330 403 4725
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Local Government Ombudsman
PO Box 4771
Coventry
CV4 0EH

12 April 2016


Ref: 15 016 673


Dear Mr Hobley

Representations on final decision review

1. The complaint to the LGO concerned first and foremost the council’s mishandling of the complaint, by which I mean the matters raised were not investigated properly. Irrelevancies were focused on which had the overall affect of leaving the salient points unaddressed.

2. Leaving that aside, there are several matters which can be separated from those relating to the commencement of court proceedings, notably the Council engineering default by misallocating payment to a previous year’s account which was clearly intended to reduce the current year’s liability. The delay and sometimes complete failure in responding to queries amounts to maladministration and has been a common theme highlighted throughout the complaint.


Is a part of the complaint separable from the matter which has been litigated?

3. LGO Guidance¹ suggests that an investigator with delegated authority to make decisions would be required to identify “aspects of complaint which are separable” from appeal matters, and those that can, be will be within jurisdiction even when a complainant has resorted to court proceedings.

4. I am aware from a report on an investigation into Newham Borough Council (ref 08 019 113) that the ombudsman retains ‘jurisdiction to investigate administrative actions prior to the issue of court proceedings’. That would tie in with the LGO Guidance where it deals with the commencement of proceedings under Schedule 5 of the Local Government Act 1974 (the ‘1974 Act’) and the claim made that the LGO has ‘found fault with councils obtaining Liability Orders from the courts for unpaid Council Tax where they should not have done’. Furthermore, listed among the matters that are IN jurisdiction under the same heading is ‘the process leading up to the council’s decision to commence proceedings’.

_________________

¹ Guidance on jurisdiction – June 2015


R v The Commissioner for Local Administration ex parte PH [1999] EWCA Civ 916

5. Specifically regarding the above case, the matter upon which Turner J based his judgment appears to have been on the grounds that the complainant had no entitlement to seek compensation via the Ombudsman because the applicant had resorted to a remedy in court and the matter settled by way of a consent order in the applicant’s favour. In my case, although a remedy has been exercised, none has been reached, nor has there been a ruling on the matter appealed, which if there had been, would if the proceedings were on the same point, put the complaint out of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

6. I understand in circumstances similar to my case the Ombudsman follows counsel opinion with regards exercising discretion. This means that the Ombudsman does not exercise her discretion once a complainant has made an application to the court ‘irrespective of what then happens’. Though this would apply ‘even if the application is rejected or withdrawn before the hearing’, I would question whether as a blanket approach, the courts would accept this argument. It is conceivable that in a case similar to mine where the application has neither been rejected nor withdrawn that a court would deem there a greater reason for discretion being used because the Magistrates’ court, by ensuring the remedy resorted to is impossible to reach, is causing additional injustice.

Note: The equivalent legislation² setting out the LGO’s powers (1974 Act) contains the same provision (s26(6)(c) / Schedule 5 para 1) with regards seeking a remedy through the courts. However, where the LGO interprets this as having no jurisdiction, merely on account of the complainant commencing proceedings, the Welsh Ombudsman (and it seems the PHSO) only considers this a jurisdiction barrier where a legal remedy has been sought and one obtained. It therefore goes that an applicant who has been unable to obtain a remedy may have recourse to the ombudsmen who may then be free to exercise discretion to investigate a complaint.

_________________

² The Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 “Section 9(1)(c) / Schedule 2 para 2”. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 “Section 5(2)(b) / Schedule 3 para 6”. The Health Service Commissioners Act 1993 “Section 4(1)(b)”.


Possibility of joint working with Parliamentary Ombudsman (PHSO)

7. The final review summarises my complaint as follows, despite extensive representations contesting this interpretation:

“Your complaint is, in summary, that the Council made a charge of £70 for the issue of a council tax summons. You disputed the level of the charge. You took legal action against the court in the High Court by way of case stated. You then issued judicial review proceedings, which you later withdrew. You suggested the question costs should be jointly investigated by the Local Government Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Ombudsman.”

8. There is little merit reiterating what has already been submitted in my representations but one material inaccuracy concerning the suggestion of a joint investigation with the PHSO needs highlighting. The summary above states that I suggested the costs should be jointly investigated, though the question of costs, in reference to the PHSO’s involvement was not the remedy I sought. Paragraph 2 in my complaint contained the following:

“It is therefore suggested that the main body of the complaint and the matter of the Magistrates’ court perverting the course of justice are jointly investigated in conjunction with the Parliamentary Ombudsman under powers granted by 2007 Regulatory Reform legislation.”

9. The reference to ‘perverting the course of justice’ was not a reference to costs but to the Magistrates’ Courts mismanagement of the application (case stated) that has resulted in the failure to reach an outcome (see Annex A). This is clarified a number of times in the representations on the Ombudsman’s draft decision. On every occasion (example below) the reference is clearly to the Magistrates Court’s maladministration:

“It is in this matter that the supporting documents, if they had been considered, would have highlighted the true extent of HMCTS’s maladministration that involved lying to prevent an outcome of the proceedings and why it was recommended to be jointly investigated with the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Despite this; though I’m pursuing the available remedy, and have never withdrawn my appeal, it is reasonable that the Ombudsman would consider the matter out of my control, and for practical purposes deem that resolve via the High Court is not a reasonable alternative to the Ombudsman’s involvement.”

10. The gross injustice caused by the combined maladministration of these two bodies could not in my mind be more suited to be jointly investigated by the LGO and PHSO.


Where the relevant legal proceedings have been instigated by the council

11. Schedule 5 of the 1974 Act is cited in the review to justify not investigating with regard to the council taking the matter to court, i.e., para 1 (Sch 5) says the Ombudsman may not investigate “the commencement or conduct of civil or criminal proceedings before any court of law.” The relevant paragraph (the review) is quoted below:

“The issue of the summons with the costs was ‘commencement’ of proceedings and so this is out of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction and she cannot look at the costs or what happened in court.”

12. The guidance however states that s26(6)(c) does not apply where the proceedings have been instigated by the council, though ‘if the matter has been considered by the court it may be appropriate not to investigate under s24A(6). In these circumstances the investigator must consider the court’s decision and presumably would need to take into account ‘aspects of complaint which are separable’ and ‘the process leading up to the council’s decision’ (see above paras 1-4).

13. The guidance then advises that ‘where in the course of such proceedings the complainant has made a counterclaim against the council in relation to the subject matter of his complaint, s/he may be treated as having exercised an alternative remedy under s26(6)(c)’. But to properly determining that the bar should apply would also require taking into account ‘aspects of complaint which are separable’ etc. etc., and the point (para 6 above) about people who are denied the possibility of redress i.e., where the application has neither been rejected nor withdrawn³.

_________________

³ The review cites R (Scholarstica Umo) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England [2003] EWHC 3202 (Admin) to endorse its decision of having no jurisdiction, merely on account of the complainant commencing proceedings. However, in that case the claimant was refused permission to apply for judicial review and so does not relate to a case where the application has neither been rejected nor withdrawn.


14. Regarding ‘a counterclaim against the council’, the remedy sought, although summons costs factored into representations, the questions of law on which the opinion of the High Court was sought, did not centre on the ‘level of the charge’ (See Annex B).

15. Finally, it is underestimating the extent of the injustice caused by the maladministration to say that it amounts to a mere £60 when clearly that is just the starting point and the knock-on affects are potentially far more serious. I have been pursuing these issues with the council over a protracted period and therefore it is necessary to examine events over the whole period, so as to appreciate the full extent of the maladministration and injustice.


Yours sincerely

Annex A

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

CHRONOLOGY.......

Annex B

(Content of Skeleton Argument relevant to these representations)

SUBMISSIONS


Questions for the High Court


19. The questions of law on which the opinion of the High Court is sought were presented to the Magistrates’ court on 22.11.12 in accordance with the relevant Criminal Procedure Rules, in the following terms:

“The questions focus on two principle points of law with regards regulation 34 of the Council Tax regulations (SI 1992/613).

Those points being, whether

i) costs being disputed as unreasonable should have been awarded by the court without evidence from the council to support them.

ii) costs specifically incurred by the council for obtaining the liability order should have been charged at the summons issuing stage.”

20. In Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates it was held unlawful for the court to award costs without having sufficient relevant information from the billing authority to support them. Consequently the first question of law in the present case appears to be resolved in the judgment at paragraph 61 which states as follows:

“This application for judicial review of the decision taken by the Magistrates must therefore succeed. I was told that since the hearing the order for costs against the Claimant has been withdrawn, but that does not render the proceedings academic; as I have said, it raises issues of wider public importance. Had the order not been withdrawn, I would have quashed it. Since it has been withdrawn, I will declare that the order was unlawful, because:

i) the Magistrates did not have sufficient relevant information before them to reach a proper judicial determination of whether the costs claimed represented costs reasonably incurred by the Council in obtaining the liability order;

ii) the Magistrates erred in law by failing to make further inquiries into how the £125 was computed and what elements it comprised; and

iii) the Claimant was denied a fair opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of the order before it was made, by reason of the failure to answer his requests for the provision of information as to how the sum of £125 was arrived at.”

21. Put in context of the present case it is evident that the Council merely informed the Magistrates' Court of the standard sum it had decided it would impose as costs and provided no evidence as to how they were arrived at, and what costs they represented (see below paras 45-46).

22. Though the court enquired into how the costs were justified at the hearing on 2.11.12, the Council simply offered that it was not required to justify costs to the court and had never submitted a breakdown. It was however stated generally that they covered Council Tax collection and recovery, IT systems, employment of staff and HMCTS for the use of their facilities.

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Local Govermnent
OMBUDSMAN

31 March 2016

Mr outlawlgo

Our ref: 15 016 673
(Please quote our reference when contacting us and, if using email, put the number in the email subject line)

If telephoning please contact: 0330 403 4725
email address: A.Hobley@coinweb.lgo.org.uk


Dear Mr outlawlgo

Complaint against North East Lincolnshire Council

The Ombudsman has asked me to review Mr Oxley’s decision on your complaint to make sure this was justified by the evidence.

Mr Oxley has the delegated authority of the Ombudsman to make decisions on her behalf. His decisions carry the same weight in law as decisions made by the Ombudsman herself and can only be challenged by judicial review. There is no right of appeal, but we offer one internal review to consider whether the decision has been made.

I have reviewed how Mr Oxley handled the case to make sure that his decision was justified by the evidence. After reviewing the file and looking carefully at what you have said, I appreciate you may be disappointed, but I support the decision to close your complaint.

Your complaint is, in summary, that the Council made a charge of £70 for the issue of a council tax summons. You disputed the level of the charge. You took legal action against the court in the High Court by way of case stated. You then issued judicial review proceedings, which you later withdrew. You suggested the question costs should be jointly investigated by the Local Government Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Ombudsman.

Schedule 5, paragraph 1 of the Local Government Act 1974 says the Local Government Ombudsman may not investigate “The commencement or conduct of civil or criminal proceedings before any court of law.”

The issue of the summons with the costs was ‘commencement’ of proceedings and so this is out of the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction and she cannot look at the costs or what happened in court.

You may dispute our understanding of our jurisdiction, but you have also taken legal action against the actions of the court. Although technically this action was not against the Council this would be a reason, were the summons costs in jurisdiction, (which they are not) for the Ombudsman to exercise her general discretion (under Section 24A(6) of the 1974 Act) not to investigate.

This would be by analogy with the legal restriction (in Section 26(6)(c) of the 1974 Act) which means she cannot investigate if someone has used a right to challenge a council’s decision in court. This principal was confirmed by the case of R v The Commissioner for Local Administration ex parte PH (sometimes ex parte H) 1998 (Ex parte PH) where the judge said –

"Finally, it is plain that the intention underlying the Act of 1974 was to provide redress for those people who were denied the possibility of resort to redress of any kind in respect of maladministration by a local authority in exercise of its administrative powers. It can hardly have been the intention of Parliament to have provided two remedies, one substantive by way of judicial review and one compensatory by way of the local commissioner."

"Where a party has ventilated a grievance by means of judicial review it was not contemplated that they should enjoy an alternative, let alone an additional right by way of complaint to a local government commissioner."

And also in R (Scholarstica Umo) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England [2003] EWHC 3202 (Admin) where the judge said “To commence proceedings by Judicial Review will, as a result of the statutory structure, deprive the Ombudsman of jurisdiction thereafter to investigate.”

Concerning the exercise of our discretion I would refer you to R (on the application of Doy) v Commission for Local Administration in England [2002] Env. L.R. 11 where the judge found that decisions of the Commissioners are subject to review, but the Commissioners are given a very wide discretion and the courts can only set aside their decisions if they are wrong in law, irrespective of the fact that any particular Judge would have come to a different decision.

So Mr Oxley was right to say this was not a matter we could investigate.

Because Mr Oxley properly considered your complaint, I will not overturn the decision which he made on behalf of the Ombudsman under her delegated authority. Therefore, although I recognise that this will disappoint you, the decision must stand.

I understand you may continue to disagree. Our process allows for one review of a decision, and this is that review. We have now finished considering your complaint and the decision is final.

Your remaining means of challenging our decision is through judicial review in the High Court. Please take some advice before considering taking such action as the Ombudsman will – as a publicly funded body – to seek to recover our reasonable costs in defending unsuccessful applications.

The case remains closed and we shall not write about or discuss it further because we cannot justify the cost of continuing to communicate with people whose cases we have closed. We shall note any further contact from you, but we will not acknowledge it or reply unless it clearly contains new information which we decide has a bearing on our decision.

Yours sincerely


Andrew Hobley
Assessment Team Leader

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

Some more words for deaf ears (LGO complaint)

From: outlawlgo
To: @ Coinweb.lgo.org.uk
Sent: March 28, 2016
Subject: Re: Confidential: Case ID - 15016673 (COMPLAINT)

Dear LGO

Complaint

I note from various items of correspondence that the Ombudsman is mindful of using public resources sparingly which suggests to me that the vast majority of complaints have to be filtered out. I guess this is enabled by the fact that the LGO, being a statutory complaints process, can apply the law so that one or a number of exemptions can be applied to justify rejecting a complaint based upon it being outside the organisation's jurisdiction. The statutory nature of the process serves as protection for the organisation from those already aggrieved by their council who are further let-down by the LGO as it is able to threaten them with the prospects of having to enter the casino justice system (judicial review) if they disagree with its decision.

The law has been enacted to enable its application with such flexibility that the same complaint could either fall within the LGO's remit and be accepted for investigation or be considered outside its remit and be rejected. The law can therefore be applied so that complaints which are valid and cause the aggrieved person undue amount of injustice, can if the organisation has no desire to address it, call up the law to back up its decision. Anyone taking the only action open to them which is the High Court would not, in my mind stand a chance of success because the law covers all angles in favour of the LGO. A system which I assume is in place to provide a safety net for the oppression of local authorities must be questioned in respect to why its function relies on having the ability to magnify the injustice infinitely by inviting litigation in the High Court.

The organisation appears not to provide any deterrent to local authorities from causing injustice to its residents, presumably because they know that the probability is low with regard to complaints made against them being investigated and upheld. A change in policy, which involves a tougher approach might not only improve the attitude of local government but have the affect of lessening the strain on resources as the number of complaints escalated to the organisation would likely plummet.

Regarding my complaint specifically, I can hardly add more to what I have already submitted in my representations. They have in my mind been completely ignored and can not possibly see how the LGO, if this is typical of all cases, can claim to be acting in the interest of taxpayers who are affected by oppressive councils. The existence of the Ombudsman in my case has clearly made the gross injustice suffered at the hands of the council at least ten times as bad.

Yours sincerely

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

From: outlawlgo
To: Jones, Adam (JACO)
Sent: March 03, 2016
Subject: Re: Your complaint to the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman

Dear Mr Jones

Thank you for your [3] March 2016 email.

The complaint does surround the Advisory Committee's handling of my judicial misconduct complaint.

I never received the letters which have been obtained from the Advisory Committee until you sent copies. Neither did I receive the final case stated, which in the 16 September 2014 letter Mrs Watts, the Justices' Clerk who handled the complaint (also Secretary to the Advisory Committee) stated was sent to me. Moreover, I have still not been sent a copy, nor do I know when that document was sent. This is all tied in with the Secretary to the Advisory Committee's handling of my judicial misconduct complaint.

As you will recall, the email I sent Mrs Watts on 25 February 2016, asked for the case stated to be re-sent and to be informed of the original date it was served. The Justices' Clerk has not responded to the email which raises the question, why, if the document exists and has been sent once would it be an issue to do so again. The answer, in all probability lies in the fact that the final case stated has never been sent nor produced which can also be said of the 16 September 2014, 29 May and 6 July 2015 letters. On the balance of probabilities, these letters will have been produced in response to the investigation, which by your own admission took a significant amount of time to obtain from the Advisory Committee.

I appreciate the Ombudsman will have as his highest priority for you to find a get out clause, but these are issues that have arisen since the complaint was submitted in September 2014 which fall under the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, and in any event, the issues preceding this were detailed in my complaint as concerns, but which were never addressed. All the concerns I have raised are in relation to the handling (or mishandling) of my complaint.

The Deputy Chairman of the Humber Advisory Committee, who is said to have dealt with the complaint, dismissed it erroneously for the reasons I have previously stated, and as such this also falls under the Ombudsman's remit.


Your sincerely

outlawlgo

[outlawlgo]

Re: Council Tax Liability Order Applications Court Costs – Test Case

It's worth a mention that the email I sent the Justices Clerk on 25 February 2016 asking for the case stated to be re-sent (post #271) has disappeared from my email management system. Another sent to HMCTS on another matter has also disappeared.

Of course, I'm not pointing my finger at any organisation for sabotage, attempting to destroy evidence or anything like that, but if something fishy were going on I obviously have all emails relating to these issues saved separately and the majority are posted online anyway.