The following is a brief summary of the principal findings and conclusions set out above:

  1. (1) A creditor can satisfy its duty under s78 by providing a reconstituted version of the executed agreement which may be from sources other than the actual signed agreement itself;
    (2) The s78 copy must contain the name and address of the debtor as it was at the time of the execution of the agreement. But the creditor can provide the name and address from whatever source it has of those details. It does not have to take them from the executed agreement itself;
    (3) The creditor need not, in complying with s78, provide a document which would comply (if signed) with the requirements of the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 as to form, as at the date the agreement was made;
    (4) If an agreement has been varied by the creditor under a unilateral power of variation, the creditor must still provide a copy of the original agreement, as well as the varied terms;
    (5) If a creditor is in breach of section 78 this does not of itself give rise to an unfair relationship within the meaning of section 140A;
    (6) The Court has jurisdiction to declare whether in a particular case, there has been a breach of s78. Whether it will be appropriate to grant such a declaration depends on the circumstances of that case;
    (7) In assessing whether Prescribed Terms are “contained” in an executed agreement the principles set out at paragraph 173 above are relevant. On the assumed facts set out at paragraph 177 the Prescribed Terms were so contained;
    (8) The claims that there was an unfair relationship and an IEA in Adris should be struck out or dismissed. The claim that there was an IEA in Yunis should be struck out or dismissed. The absence of any positive pleaded case or evidence as to the circumstances of the making of the agreement by the debtor concerned was fatal to the IEA claims. The absence of any positive plea or evidence as to particular facts relied upon in support of the unfair relationship claim other than failure to provide a s78 copy, was fatal to that claim.

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173 ~~~~ The parties in Carey have helpfully agreed the following principles. The fourth one was added by Mr Uff, with their agreement. No other party takes issue with them. The OFT has formulated the matter in a slightly different way but accepts these principles are close to its position.

  1. (1) It is not sufficient for the piece of paper signed by the debtor merely to cross-refer to the Prescribed Terms without a copy of those terms being supplied to the debtor at the point of signature;
    (2) A document need not be a single piece of paper;
    (3) Whether several pieces of paper constitute one document is a question of substance not form. In particular a physical connection between several pieces of paper is not necessary in order for them to constitute one document;
    (4) Additionally, a physical connection (or one or more physical connections) between several pieces of paper does not necessarily constitute them as one document;
    (5) Accordingly, where the debtor’s signature and the Prescribed Terms appear on separate pieces of paper, the questions of whether those pieces of paper together constitute one document is a question of substance and not form.174 ~~As a matter of law, those principles appear to me to be correct, in the context of s61.


  1. According to HSBC, p197 is a reconstituted application form. I referred to it above in the context of Issues 1 and 2. The assumed facts here are as follows:
    (1) Ms Carey signed a form which contained, among other things, the entries at p197 including the specific reference to being bound by “the terms and conditions attached”; that form did not itself have the Prescribed Terms stated on the front or the reverse;
    (2) The form (referred to as “a signature page” in the WS from Alan Burden dated 3 December 2009) would have been produced with Ms Carey’s details already on, for her to sign once her application, already made, had been approved;
    (3) At the same time as the form was produced electronically, the relevant terms and conditions (including the Prescribed Terms and information) would have been printed off and physically attached to the form by a staple;
    (4) Ms Carey would then have been invited to read the agreement, consisting of the signature page and attached terms and would then have signed and dated the signature page. It would then have been countersigned by the bank;
    (5) The relevant terms and conditions would not have been precisely in the form of pages 198-201 simply because that is a s63 copy with the different cancellation clause. But they would have been the full terms with the Prescribed Terms included either in landscape form (as shown at ppl98-201) or portrait form.

178~~~Ms Tolaney contends that on those assumed facts, the document signed by the debtor did indeed “contain” the Prescribed Terms. I agree for the following reasons:

  1. (1) As described, it is hard to see the form and attached terms as anything other than one document. It is not suggested that there were separate page numbers on the terms attached but if there were, on these assumed facts, it would make no difference;
    (2) The signature page itself makes clear that it is incomplete as a document and needs something else because it has no terms on it at all and makes specific reference to the terms “attached”; it only makes sense if something else goes with it; equally pp 198-201 need something to go with them, not least a place for the applicant’s details and signature;
    (3) The signature page refers to a credit agreement regulated by the Act and so makes clear that it is the first page of an agreement for which there must be other pages;
    (4) The signature page and terms are presented to the debtor as a package;
    (5) This would satisfy the notion that the Prescribed Terms can be identified within the “four corners of the agreement” – see Hurstanger v Wilson [2007] 1 WLR 2351 per Tuckey LJ at para. 11